Imagine the following picture: the state announces a road-rehabilitation 29-million-GEL tender; you cannot take part in the tender if, within 30 kilometers of the site, you do not own an asphalt plant or do not have a supply agreement with such a plant; as a result — in the tender a single company participates and wins; the owner of this company is a sitting member of parliament; in the days before the contract was signed, persons connected to the company donate to “Georgian Dream” a total of GEL 120,000.

This is not a scenario we made up. It is a description of one of the major tenders conducted this March by the Batumi City Hall N(N)LE “City Infrastructure and Improvement Department,” in which Gza LLC — whose 100% shareholder is  “Georgian Dream” MP Giorgi Chkonia, GEL 29.2 million — received a road-works contract. In total, this company has won tenders worth  more than GEL 1.3 billion in value (with an unrealistically high tender-win rate of 93%). Meanwhile, persons connected to the company have donated to the ruling party more than GEL 1 million.

The story does not end here. It turned out that in 2024–2026, competition was also restricted by the “30 km radius rule” in other Batumi road-rehabilitation tenders. In total we found 5 such tenders, whose combined value exceeds GEL 70 million. In these tenders, a total of 3 companies participated and won in rotation. Two of the three companies are major donors to “Georgian Dream”; together they donated more than GEL 1.6 million to “Georgian Dream”.

These facts are classic examples of an artificial oligopoly. The system is arranged so that multi-million road tenders are divided among a closed club made up of just three companies. Through artificial barriers, competition no longer exists, while the club members remit substantial donations to the ruling party.

A Systemic Filter: How the “30 km Radius Rule” Creates an Oligopoly

In January 2026, the Batumi City Hall N(N)LE “City Infrastructure and Improvement Department” announced a tender to rehabilitate three streets in Batumi. Gza LLC was the only bidder.

Why did other experienced road-building companies not take part? The reason is an unusual requirement in the tender documentation: the bidder must own a plant located within a 30-kilometer radius of the site, or must have a contract for the supply of asphalt concrete with such a plant. This condition sidelines any large company that does not have a plant near Batumi, or does not have a contract with such a plant, regardless of whether it could supply asphalt by other means.

Our research showed that imposing such a geographic restriction is not standard practice — it is a filter created to artificially limit competition. Out of 117 major construction tenders announced in 2024–2026 (each worth more than GEL 1 million), only the Batumi City Hall N(N)LE “City Infrastructure and Improvement Department” set geographic proximity as a precondition in 5 tenders. The combined value of these tenders exceeds GEL 70 million.^[1]

What did such deliberate restriction of competition produce? Analysis of the data shows that only 3 companies took part in these tenders and divided up the budget millions by rotation (see table). Two of the three companies — Gza LLC and Bondi-2009 — are major donors to “Georgian Dream”.

As the table shows, the list of participants is identical in all five tenders. No outside competition whatsoever. When the market is closed off this artificially, state procurement loses its meaning and turns into a pre-agreed redistribution.

Bondi-2009 — Another Beneficiary of the Closed Tender Club

As noted, one of the main players in the oligopoly created by the “30 km radius rule,” besides Gza LLC, is Bondi-2009 LLC, which won 2 of the 5 tenders. This company is yet another major financier of the ruling party. Three of its four co-owners (Nukri Dolidze, Otar Putkaradze, and Davit Devadze) have donated to “Georgian Dream” a total of GEL 605,000. On the other hand, in total the company has won tenders worth GEL 292 million.

This fully reveals how the system works: the 30-kilometer geographic barrier filters the market in advance. As a result, competition is imitated, and only three selected players remain in the fight for the millions — two of which (Gza and Bondi-2009) are directly linked to the ruling power.

The Climax: GEL 29 Million and Donations Timed to Perfection

The most vivid and alarming example of how this closed corrupt ecosystem operates is precisely that 29-million-GEL tender (Gza LLC) with which we began our story. What makes it special is not only its value, but the chronology of events.

MP Giorgi Chkonia normally donated money to the party once a year, mainly in the second half of the year. In 2026, however, his GEL 60,000 donation was recorded in March — exactly one day before the multi-million-GEL tender contract was signed.

In general, the activity of persons connected to Gza LLC during the 7 days before the contract was signed looks like this:

• March 6: Malkhaz Dumbadze (chairman of Gza LLC’s supervisory board) donates GEL 30,000 to the party.
• March 10: Jimsher Zoidze (manager of Giorgi Chkonia’s share in Gza LLC) donates GEL 15,000.
• March 11: Jemal Chkonia (Giorgi Chkonia’s business partner) donates GEL 15,000.
• March 12: Giorgi Chkonia (company owner, MP) donates GEL 60,000.
• March 13: Gza LLC signs a GEL 29,163,899 contract.

These facts on their own are not direct proof of a crime; however, the coincidence in timing, the artificially limited competition, and the existence of a single tender participant contain clear signs of a conflict of interest and a probable corrupt arrangement.

Conclusion

Taken in isolation, a single case — a non-competitive tender, an asphalt-plant requirement, or even a donation — could be explained by chance. But when we see won tenders worth GEL 1.3 billion, artificial barriers added to tender participation that selectively create an oligopoly for the ruling party’s major donors, and tens of thousands of GEL transferred to the party’s account one day before a multi-million-GEL contract, this already bears the marks of well-organized, systemic corruption — corruption that kills competition and uses the state budget for narrow party and private interests, with society paying the final price.

It is precisely cases bearing such signs of systemic corruption that the State Security Service and the Prosecutor’s Office should address through effective and impartial investigation, so that the declared fight against corruption becomes a reality rather than a façade whose purpose is to cover up selective justice and behind-the-scenes confrontations.