In the so-called “group violence” cases related to the civil protests of November–December 2024, the Ivanishvili-controlled prosecutor’s office was unable to prove the artificially fabricated charges of group violence against Zviad Tsetskhladze, Vasil Kadzelashvili, Vepkhia Kasradze, Irakli Miminoshvili, Giorgi Gorgadze, Nikoloz Javakhishvili, Tornike Goshadze and Insaf Aliev, as well as Jano Archaia, Ruslan Sivakov, Luka Jabua, Andro Chichinadze, Guram Mirtskhulava, Onise Tskhadadze, Valeri Tetrashvili, Giorgi Terishvili, Irakli Kerashvili, Revaz Kiknadze and Sergei Kukharchuk — not even before Ivanishvili’s own obedient courts. However hard the prosecutors tried to blame the peaceful pro-European protestors for causing harm to dozens of police officers and for approximately GEL 2 million in damage to state property, even the clan-controlled Murusidze–Chinchaladze judiciary—sanctioned by the U.S. and the U.K. for involvement in significant corruption—could not establish even the slightest causal link between the alleged acts of the demonstrators and the damages claimed by the police officers and other prosecution witnesses who testified in court.

Although the courts refused to classify the actions baselessly attributed to the demonstrators as group violence, they still found the defendants guilty — but this time for organizing or actively participating in such “group actions” that “grossly violate public order or involve clear disobedience to the lawful demands of a public official.” Accordingly, while the predominantly young participants of the civil protest — which was directed against the regime’s sabotage of Georgia’s European future — avoided the 6–9 year or 4–6 year prison sentences associated with group violence, the revised classification still resulted in prison terms: three of them were sentenced to 2.5 years, and the rest to 2 years of imprisonment.

We had previously published analytical articles on these cases (see publications of 24 December 2024, 11 March 2025, and 4 April 2025). The conclusions expressed in those earlier articles remain valid even after the delivery of these latest judgements. It was stated then, and it can be stated with certainty now, that — as in the cases of other civil protest participants — justice was not served here either. What was carried out was merely the political order of the regime, whose goal was to punish protest participants with imprisonment on any invented grounds, which was carried out by the obedient court. Judges Mchedlishvili and Galustashvili, who issued guilty judgments against the protest participants, presented themselves not as independent and impartial judges, who should obey only the Constitution and the law, but as party-political judges who fulfilled the political order of Ivanishvili and ‘Georgian Dream,’ thereby undermining the principle of the rule of law.

1. Judgements

By the judgement of 2 September 2025, Judge Tamar Mchedlishvili of Tbilisi City Court found Zviad Tsetskhladze, Vasil Kadzelashvili, and Vepkhia Kasradze guilty of organizing group actions that grossly violate public order and involve clear disobedience to the lawful demands of a public official under Article 226 of the Criminal Code (CC) and sentenced each of them to 2 years and 6 months of imprisonment. In the same judgement, Judge Tamar Mchedlishvili found Irakli Miminoshvili, Giorgi Gorgadze, Nikoloz Javakhishvili, Tornike Goshadze, and Insaf Aliev guilty of active participation in the same group actions under Article 226 of the CC — actions that grossly violate public order and involve clear disobedience to the lawful demands of a public official — and sentenced each of them to 2 years of imprisonment.

By the judgement of 3 September 2025, Judge Nino Galustashvili of Tbilisi City Court found 11 more participants of the protest guilty under Article 226 of the Criminal Code. These included Jano Archaia, Ruslan Sivakov, Luka Jabuya, Andro Chichinadze, Guram Mirtskhulava, Onise Tchadadze, Valeri Tetrashvili, Giorgi Terishvili, Irakli Kherashvili, Revaz Kiknadze, and Sergei Kukharchuk. Each of them was convicted of active participation in group actions that grossly violate public order, and each was sentenced to 2 years of imprisonment.

2. Change in the Initial Classification of the Crime

Initially, the prosecution charged all 19 participants of the protest under Article 225 of the Criminal Code — “organization, leadership, or participation in group violence.” Zviad Tsetskhladze, Vasil Kadzelashvili, and Vepkhia Kasradze were charged under the first paragraph of this article — “organization of group violence” — while the remaining 16 participants were charged under the second paragraph — “participation in group violence.”

In both judgements, the classification of the crime was changed because the courts concluded that the evidence did not prove the presence of “group violence” in the actions of the defendants.

In this regard, Judge Mchedlishvili noted in the judgement:

“The court notes that, in this case, the evidence examined during the substantive consideration of the case did not irrefutably establish the presence of the subjective and objective elements of the crime envisaged by the first paragraph of Article 225 of the Criminal Code of Georgia in the actions of Zviad Tsetskhladze, Vasil Kadzelashvili, and Vepkhia Kasradze, nor in the actions of Nikoloz Javakhishvili, Giorgi Gorgadze, Irakli Miminoshvili, Insaf Aliev, and Tornike Goshadze under the second paragraph of the same article.” (Judgement of 2 September 2025, para. 4.49)

“In classifying group violence, the chain of actions by the defendants, the perception of the victims, and the outcome are important. In this case, all victims questioned during the trial confirmed that some participants in the protest verbally insulted them, and that they were injured as a result of various objects (stones, glass bottles, bottles filled with stones, pyrotechnics, and other items) thrown by some participants. Infrastructure of the Parliament and municipal and private property were also damaged. However, all victims clearly indicated and confirmed that they could not verify whether the individuals charged in this criminal case directly committed the acts that caused injury to the police or damage to property. The court pays attention to this part of the victims’ testimony and notes that their testimony does not irrefutably establish that the damage (to persons or property) was caused, on the one hand, by the organization of group actions by Zviad Tsetskhladze, Vepkhia Kasradze, and Vasil Kadzelashvili, or, on the other hand, by participation in group actions by Nikoloz Javakhishvili, Insaf Aliev, Tornike Goshadze, Giorgi Gorgadze, and Irakli Miminoshvili. The evidence examined does not confirm that such actions were committed by the defendants.” (Ibid., para. 4.50)

Judge Galustashvili did not engage in such extensive reasoning, but she also noted that the victims were unaware of who had caused their injuries, and that they had not seen the actions carried out by the accused individuals (Judgement of 3 September 2025, para. 4.14), which ultimately became the basis for the requalification of the crime.

In our previous publications on these cases, we pointed out already at the early stages of the investigations that, in both cases, the harm suffered by any police officer could not be attributed to any of the defendants in either case, because there was no evidence establishing a causal link between the acts imputed to the defendants and the resulting harm. The same applied to damage caused to state and municipal property — there was no indication whatsoever that this damage was caused by the actions of any of the 19 defendants.

Accordingly, the courts confirmed what had been evident from the very beginning of the criminal proceedings. In this situation, the fact that the prosecution persistently upheld the charges under the first and second paragraphs of Article 225 not only during the investigation but throughout the entire court proceedings only demonstrates the prosecution’s bad faith and its unquestioning willingness to implement the regime’s political orders.

3. The Issue of Reclassification at the Stage of the Judgement

When the classification of a crime is changed at a time and in circumstances where the defense has not had the opportunity to present its facts and arguments against the now-altered charge, such a situation may conflict with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“Right to a fair trial”), specifically paragraph 1 and subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3, according to which the accused has the right “to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him” and “to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.”

Judge Mchedlishvili was fully aware of this circumstance. In her judgement, she discussed this legal issue at considerable length (see Judgement of 2 September 2025, paras. 4.60–4.65) and referred to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. Specifically, the judgement stated:

“The European Court of Human Rights, in the case Glonti and Others v. Georgia (N13708/18, decision of 11 February 2025), found that Article 6, paragraph 1, and subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 3 of the Convention were violated due to reclassification of the crime, explaining the following: the Court notes that the indictment, setting out the factual and legal basis of the charges against the defendant, plays a central role in criminal proceedings (see Kamasinski v. Austria, 19 December 1989, § 79, Series A no. 168, and Varela Geis v. Spain, no. 61005/09, § 51, 5 March 2013). In the present case, the applicants were charged with aggravated embezzlement only (see paragraph 2 above). Embezzlement and abuse of office are different offences under Georgian criminal law and the elements which have to be proven to secure a conviction differ… Thus, in case of abuse of office one of the constituent elements of the offence is the intent “to gain any personal benefit or privilege, or any benefit or privilege for another person”, whereas such an element is not inherently part of the offence of embezzlement (see, mutatis mutandis, Adrian Constantin v. Romania, no. 21175/03, § 23, 12 April 2011, and Gelenidze v. Georgia, no. 72916/10, § 33, 7 November 2019). In this connection, the Court does not accept the Government’s contention, relied on by the national courts… that the legal characterisation of the offence was of little importance as long as the amended conviction was based on the same facts. It reiterates that the Convention requires that the accused be informed in detail not only of the acts he or she is alleged to have committed, that is, of the facts underlying the charges, but also of the legal characterisation given to them (see Penev, cited above, § 42, and D.M.T. and D.K.I. v. Bulgaria, no. 29476/06, § 80, 24 July 2012). Throughout their trial, the applicants defended themselves against the charge of embezzlement only. Ultimately, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal found that charge unproved, since one of the constituent elements of the crime – control over the assets to be embezzled – was missing (see paragraph 4 above). Prior to rendering a new judgment, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal did not warn the applicants that their offence could be requalified... The hearing was not adjourned for further argument and the elements of the new offence were not debated in court (see Gelenidze, cited above, § 35; see also Penev, cited above, § 43). The applicants only learned of the new legal characterisation of the facts in the appellate court’s judgment.  Accordingly, the Tbilisi Court of Appeals did not give the applicants the opportunity to adapt their defense to the new charge.” (Ibid., para. 4.64)

Despite the European Court of Human Rights’ widely cited precedent against Georgia, Judge Mchedlishvili committed the same violation that the European Court clearly described in the “Glonti and Others” case, because she reclassified the crime in such a way that the defendants were not given the opportunity to defend themselves against the new charge. She explained her action by stating that in the case of Zviad Tsetskhladze and others, supposedly, there was no “substantially different crime or a crime that is essentially different from the original charge and could not have been foreseeable for the defense” (Ibid., para. 4.65). In any case, the judge attempted to safeguard herself by noting that “the parties have the right to appeal the judgement to a higher instance and to challenge the qualification of the acts, where they will be given reasonable time and opportunity to justify their position” (Ibid., para. 4.65).

The court’s position cannot withstand criticism. First, this is precisely the type of situation that the European Court described in the “Glonti and Others” case. Article 226 of the Criminal Code, under which the court requalified the actions of the protest participants, contains an element that Article 225 does not. Specifically, Article 226 criminalizes organizing or actively participating in group actions “that grossly violate public order, are connected to clear disobedience to the lawful demands of a public official, or cause disruption of transportation, a factory, institution, or organization.” Such an element does not exist in Article 225, which concerns violence and its specific forms.

Consequently, the defendants, who defended themselves throughout the trial against the charge that they organized or participated in group violence, clearly could not have anticipated the need to defend themselves against the elements of Article 226 cited above — namely that their “group action” allegedly “grossly violated public order” or was “connected to clear disobedience to the lawful demands of a public official.”

Contrary to the court’s claims, the reclassification of the charges was not foreseeable to the defendants and could not have been, because neither the prosecution nor the court had ever indicated this to them during the entire proceedings. As a result, they did not present any facts or arguments regarding the crime under Article 226 of the Criminal Code.

Had the defendants known that the judge intended to reclassify their actions, they would have tried to explain to the court that their conduct did not constitute any “group action” that “grossly violates public order,” since freedom of assembly is a fundamental human right, and its exercise, so long as it does not violate established rules, cannot be understood as a “gross violation of public order.” They would also have sought to explain that a person is not obliged to comply with unlawful police demands but only with “lawful demands.” The case contains no evidence proving that the defendants themselves, on their own initiative, exceeded the limits of their freedom of assembly, or that the police order to disperse the assembly was lawful (more on this below, in Section 6).

Based on the above, Judge Mchedlishvili clearly violated the European Convention and the same standards established by the European Court, which she herself cited in the judgement.

The court’s statement that the defendants could raise this issue at the appellate level also creates confusion. The possibility of appealing to a higher instance does not relieve the court of its duty to apply the law, including the international human rights obligations undertaken by Georgia, clearly, consistently, and in good faith. In such situations, the court was obliged to follow the precedent of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly since it was established in a case in which Georgia was a party.

Judge Galustashvili included virtually the same reasoning word-for-word in her judgement as well (see Judgement of 3 September 2025, paras. 4.35–4.38). Therefore, the criticisms we outlined above apply to her as well.

4. Lack of a Coherent, Clear, and Convincing Body of Evidence

According to the Criminal Procedure Code of Georgia (CPC), a conviction must be based solely on a coherent, clear, and convincing body of evidence that, from the perspective of an objective person, establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (CPC, Articles 3(13), 13(2), 82(3), 259(3)).

In these cases, no such body of evidence exists. The defense presented numerous facts and arguments before the courts that would convince an objective observer that, at the very least, there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendants had committed even the crime under Article 226 of the Criminal Code.

(a) CPC Requirements Regarding Evidence

According to Article 72 of the CPC:

1. Evidence obtained in violation of substantial legal procedures, and other evidence derived lawfully from such evidence if it worsens the legal position of the accused, is inadmissible and has no legal effect.
2. Evidence is also inadmissible if obtained in accordance with the procedures set by this Code, but there remains a reasonable doubt regarding its potential replacement, substantial alteration of its identifying features, or the substantial loss of traces on it.
3. The burden of proving the admissibility of the prosecution’s evidence and the inadmissibility of the defense’s evidence rests with the prosecution.
4. The party must provide the court with information about the origin of its evidence.
5. The court decides the question of inadmissibility of evidence. The court’s decision must be reasoned.
6. Inadmissible evidence cannot serve as the basis for the court’s decision.

According to the first sentence of the first part of Article 78 of the same Code, “At the request of a party, a document has evidentiary force if its origin is known and it is authentic.” According to the third sentence of the same part, “A document or physical evidence is admissible if the party can summon as a witness the person who obtained/created it and/or the person with whom it was stored before submission to the court.”

According to the first and second parts of Article 82 of the same Code:

1. Evidence must be evaluated in terms of its relevance to the criminal case, admissibility, and reliability.
2. No evidence has any predetermined strength.

(b) In the present case, the requirements of the law regarding evidence were not observed

In both cases, the court decisions are unfounded because the convictions of the defendants were based on illegally obtained or suspicious and non-authentic video recordings.

• Regarding Zviad Tsetskhladze, the prosecution relied on a video recording downloaded by the investigator from the Facebook page of Zviad Tsetskhladze’s organization “Dapioni,” which allegedly showed that Zviad Tsetskhladze “addressed participants of the protest, organized group actions, and instructed them on how and by what means to resist lawful requests of government officials.” The problem is that the video presented in court contained no audio at all, and the court “learned” the content of Zviad Tsetskhladze’s speech solely from the investigator’s testimony, who appeared in court as a witness. According to this investigator, when he downloaded and viewed the video from the social network, Zviad Tsetskhladze’s voice could be heard. He stated that after viewing the video, he transferred it to a laser disc, sealed the disc, and sent it for habitoscopic examination. Now, however, he claims it is “unknown” to him why the video submitted to the court and examined during the hearing had no sound.

The court noted that it could not base a conviction solely on this video, yet it considered the content of Zviad Tsetskhladze’s speech as proven based on the investigator’s viewing report of the video, whose authenticity and reliability the court did not question, because, according to the court, “no substantial violation of the law was identified during the viewing” (Judgment of September 2, 2025, para. 4.32).

This reasoning by the court is clearly arbitrary and biased in favor of the prosecution and to the detriment of the defendant. Since the court could not hear the audio content of the video, it could not verify how accurately the investigator described this content in the viewing report. The report may have been formally correct (for example, it had a date, signature, etc.), but the formal correctness alone does not guarantee the reliability of the evidence. This evidence could only be considered reliable if the court had the ability to verify the accuracy of its content. In the absence of such an opportunity, the court should not have accepted this evidence as a basis for a conviction, because reasonable doubt could not be excluded regarding whether the investigator may have incorrectly described the content of Zviad Tsetskhladze’s speech in the viewing report.

• Regarding Vasil Kadzelashvili and Vepkhia Kasradze, the problem with the “incriminating” evidence against these two defendants was even more serious, as previously analyzed in connection with this case. The issue concerned an alleged private conversation between Vepkhia Kasradze and Vasil Kadzelashvili, captured on audio-video and published on the Facebook page of the government’s propagandist TV channel “Imedi,” which supposedly “proved” that these individuals were planning violent actions during protests. According to this recording, Kasradze and Kadzelashvili allegedly discussed that “these [‘Georgian Dream’] will not leave on their own,” that it was necessary “to pour gasoline with a 5-gram syringe in Kaladze’s wife’s shops in Vake and drop a cigarette butt,” that they needed to find out “which restaurants they go to, which cafes, and who they meet with,” and that “we must arrange sabotage against them,” among other things.

This so-called “evidence” is nothing other than data likely obtained through covert video/audio recording by the State Security Service or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The case contains no court ruling or prosecutor’s order legitimizing the lawful acquisition of this material. The fact that this material was uploaded to the public internet or social networks does not constitute a legal basis to consider inherently illegally obtained evidence admissible.

According to Article 143³(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, covert investigative measures must be conducted based on a court order upon the motivated request of the prosecutor. Article 143³(6) allows that, in cases of “urgent necessity,” a covert investigative measure may be conducted or initiated without a court order but under a motivated order of the prosecutor, provided that within 24 hours from the start of the measure, the prosecutor must submit a request to the district (city) court to legitimize the measure conducted under urgent necessity.

The absence of a court order or even a prosecutor’s decision that would have legalized this covert investigative measure indicates that this video recording was evidence obtained in violation of the law, pursuant to Article 72(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The judge did not consider this matter at all, i.e., the origin and legality of the document.

But this is only one aspect of the problem. The second issue concerns the authenticity, genuineness, and reliability of the video recording.

At trial, the defense pointed out that no phonoscopy (voice) examination had been conducted on this video recording. Accordingly, the defense disputed the attribution of the voices recorded on the video to Vasil Kadzelashvili and Vepkhia Kasradze. In response, the court stated that:

"When a particular person’s voice is clearly audible in a video recording, and the recognition of that voice and the visual depiction of the persons do not raise any doubt for the court or the parties, an expert examination remains a supplementary instrument, not a mandatory element. In the video examined at the hearing, the visuals of Vepkhia Kasradze and Vasil Kadzelashvili are clearly visible, and their voices and conversation are clearly audible. Moreover, the conclusions of the habitoscopic expert examination conclusively establish that the interlocutors in the video are Vepkhia Kasradze and Vasil Kadzhelashvili, which leaves no doubt for an objective observer regarding the identity of the persons depicted in the video or the fact that they are indeed speaking. Furthermore, procedural law does not require that an audio or video recording be admitted as evidence solely on the basis of a phonoscopy expert report. As noted, expert examination is a supplementary instrument, not a mandatory requirement. In this case, the voice of each person in the recording is identifiable, and their speech is characterized by intonation, manner of speaking, and context directly related to their personality." (Judgment of September 2, 2025, para. 4.35)

According to Article 144(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), “If it is impossible to determine factual circumstances relevant to the case without the participation of experts in a relevant field of science, technology, art, or certain craft… an expert examination shall be conducted.”

The court, which lacks specialized scientific or technical knowledge to determine whether a voice belongs to a particular person and cannot identify a person by voice, and similarly lacks expertise in the fields of “intonation” and “manner of speaking,” could not have objectively concluded that a phonoscopy expert report was unnecessary to determine that the dialogue recorded on the video was indeed between Vasil Kadzelashvili and Vepkhia Kasradze. In this case, discussion of the “visual” aspect was irrelevant. The case does contain habitoscopic expert reports confirming that the video visually depicts these two individuals. However, the reliability of the visual evidence does not automatically guarantee the reliability of the audio communication. Given modern technology, it is entirely possible to pair authentic visuals with falsified audio. A phonoscopy expert report was precisely what the court needed to eliminate this possibility.

Instead, the court assumed the role of an expert in voice identification, relieving the prosecution of the burden of proof in this area, and substituted its subjective judgment for the prosecution’s clear deficiency in establishing the identity of the defendants by voice on the video. Moreover, contrary to Article 144(1) of the CPC, the court ruled that an expert report was not a mandatory condition for identifying a person.

In doing so, the court not only demonstrated bias in favor of the prosecution and to the detriment of the defendants, but it also grossly violated the principle of presumption of innocence (Article 31(6) of the Constitution of Georgia; Article 5(2) of the CPC), as well as the principles of equality of parties and adversarial trial (Articles 9 and 25 of the CPC).

• Regarding all other defendants, Judges Mchedlishvili and Galustashvili relied on video recordings obtained from the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ Strategic Communications Department (see Judgment of September 2, 2025, para. 4.37; Judgment of September 3, 2025, para. 4.19).

As we noted in our previous analysis, the tasks of the Strategic Communications Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs include developing and planning the Ministry’s strategic communication policies, planning and executing communication campaigns regarding reforms implemented by the Ministry, informing the public about ongoing processes in the Ministry, conducting public opinion research, interacting with the media and non-governmental organizations, and other matters related to any organization’s “public relations” sphere. This, of course, has no connection to the objectives of detecting, preventing, or investigating crimes. Accordingly, there was no legal basis for operators from the Strategic Communications Department to be sent to protests for the purpose of filming.

Furthermore, according to Article 143¹(1)(e) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), “covert video and/or audio recording, or photography” constitutes a form of covert investigative action.

According to Article 143³(1) of the same Code, covert investigative actions are conducted by court order, based on a motivated request from the prosecutor. Article 143³(6) provides that in cases of “urgent necessity,” a covert investigative action may be conducted or initiated without a court order, on the basis of a motivated decision by the prosecutor, provided that no later than 24 hours after the start of the action, the prosecutor must submit a request to the district (city) court to legitimize the covert investigative action conducted under urgent necessity.

In this case, neither a court order nor a prosecutor’s motivated decision existed in the case materials that would have authorized operators from the Strategic Communications Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to covertly video-record or photograph protest participants.

Accordingly, the video recording and photography of protest participants, if conducted covertly, constituted an illegal act. Moreover, it could potentially constitute a criminal offense under Article 157 of the Criminal Code: “illegal acquisition, storage, use, dissemination, or otherwise enabling access to information relating to private life or personal data, which causes significant harm.”

Even if such recording or photography was not covert, it would still constitute an illegal act by the Strategic Communications Department operators. In that case, this activity would fall under the scope of the Law on Personal Data Protection.

According to Article 4(1)(a) of the Law on Personal Data Protection, personal data must be processed legally, fairly, and transparently for the data subject, unless otherwise provided by law.

The law distinguishes between “personal data” and “special categories of data” (Article 3(a) and (b)). The latter includes data related, among other things, to a natural person’s political opinions, religious, philosophical, or other beliefs, as well as biometric data. Biometric data is defined as data processed using technical means that relate to the physical, physiological, or behavioral characteristics of the data subject (for example, facial images, voice characteristics, or fingerprints) and allow for unique identification or verification of identity (Article 3(d)).

It follows that the video recordings and photographs of the defendants in this case constitute “special categories of data” and “biometric data.”

According to Article 6(1)(f) of the Law on Personal Data Protection, processing of special categories of data is only permitted if the responsible party ensures that the rights and interests of the data subject are protected in accordance with the guarantees established by law, and that processing of such data is necessary for the purposes of crime prevention (including appropriate analytical research), crime investigation, criminal prosecution, and administration of justice, and such processing is provided for by law or by law and a subordinate normative act issued on its basis.

According to paragraph 3 of the same article, the responsibility to substantiate the legal basis for processing special categories of data lies with the person responsible for the processing.

According to paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the same law, the processing of biometric data is permitted only if, among other things, it is necessary for the purposes of crime prevention, crime investigation, criminal prosecution, or administration of justice. However, under paragraph 2 of the same article, the person responsible for the processing is obligated, before processing the data, to specify in writing: the purpose and scope of the biometric data processing, the retention period of the data, the procedures and conditions for storing and destroying the data, and the mechanisms for protecting the rights of the data subject.

In this case, even if we assume that the video recording and photography of the defendants did not constitute covert investigative actions and were conducted openly and transparently to the defendants—which is not a fact established by the case materials—because these recordings constitute the defendants’ special categories of data and, moreover, their biometric data, the case materials should have included the following documentary evidence to substantiate the legality of such video recording and photography:

1. A reference to a law and/or subordinate normative act authorizing operators of the Strategic Communications Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to conduct video recording and/or photography of protest participants;
2. An act issued by a responsible official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, specifying in writing the purpose and scope of the defendants’ video recording and/or photography (i.e., the processing of their biometric data), the retention period of the data, the procedures and conditions for storing and destroying the data, and the mechanisms for protecting the rights of the data subjects.

No such evidence exists in the case materials. It is highly likely that operators from the Strategic Communications Department were sent to the protest based on verbal instructions from their superiors, which contradicts the requirements of the Law on Personal Data Protection cited above.

Based on the above, the video recordings obtained through unlawful filming were inadmissible evidence and could not serve as the basis for a conviction.

5. Absence of “Group Action”

Article 226 of the Criminal Code, like Article 225 of the same Code, criminalizes “group action.”

Article 27 of the Criminal Code distinguishes three types of group crimes:

(a) Crime committed by a group – when two or more perpetrators jointly participate in the commission of a crime without prior agreement (Article 27, first paragraph);

(b) Crime committed by a group with prior agreement – when the participants are prearranged to jointly commit the crime (Article 27, second paragraph);

(c) Crime committed by an organized group – when the crime is committed by a structured, coordinated group that existed for a defined period, whose members agreed in advance to commit one or more crimes, or whose purpose is the unlawful acquisition of financial or other material gain, directly or indirectly (Article 27, third paragraph).

The disposition of Article 226, like that of Article 225, which provides liability for both organizers and participants, unequivocally indicates that this crime cannot be committed by two or more perpetrators without prior agreement. At a minimum, there must be an organizer who preplanned the group action, and the participants must have been aware of this plan. In other words, the elements of Articles 226 and 225 require that the crime be committed either by a prearranged group or by an organized group.

This is confirmed by the practice of the Supreme Court of Georgia. In our previous analysis, we referenced Supreme Court decisions establishing that an essential element of Article 225 is a preorganized group action. Spontaneously executed joint actions are insufficient.

In one case, the Supreme Court stated:

“…Based on the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, it is not established that G. T., G. M., and G. S. were prearranged to organize, lead, or participate in a group crime, or that they acted in coordination with a specific person carrying out someone else’s instructions, which constitutes an essential element of the crime under Article 225 of the Criminal Code of Georgia. Without establishing this, the elements of the crime under Article 225, paragraph 2, are not met.” (Decision of July 18, 2023, Case №478აპ-23, para. 9)

In another decision, the Supreme Court added:

“…Participation in organizing group violence requires that the defendants were aware of the objectives of the organized group of offenders and knew of the common criminal activity or the intent to commit the crimes specified by this group. One of the main characteristics of an organized group is prior coordination. In the present case, the materials presented by the prosecution, under the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, do not confirm that the defendants participated in an organized manner within a group, nor do the examined pieces of evidence indicate that the defendants were previously coordinated with each other or aware of each other’s intent in advance. Based on the evidence examined in this case, it is conclusively established that the defendants—T. G., M. D., B. M., V. B., N. G., and I. T.—acted with others not in a prearranged, group-organized manner, but rather collectively, spontaneously, at a specific time and depending on a particular situation…” (Case №397აპ-23, September 25, 2023, para. 12).

Accordingly, according to established practice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, for defendants to be found guilty of a crime under Article 225 of the Criminal Code, the prosecution must present a sufficient body of evidence that satisfies an objective observer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the participants in the group violent act:

• Were pre-coordinated to organize, lead, or participate in a group crime;
• Acted in agreement with specific individuals, carrying out someone’s tasks or instructions, or themselves issuing orders or instructions;
• Acted prearranged, collectively, and in an organized manner, not spontaneously, depending on a specific time and situation;
• Were aware of the organized group’s objectives and knew of the collective criminal activity or the intent to commit the crimes within the group.

Judge Mchedlishvili was aware of this Supreme Court practice, as she cited relevant Supreme Court decisions in her judgment and correctly noted that the elements characteristic of Article 225 were not conclusively established by the evidence examined at the trial (Judgment of September 2, 2025, para. 4.51).

However, elsewhere in the same judgment, Judge Mchedlishvili adopts a completely contradictory reasoning regarding group crime, which is inconsistent not only with Supreme Court practice but also with the normative definition of group crime and its types under Article 27 of the Criminal Code. He writes:

“The court considers that the commission of a group crime by the defendants is evident and notes that a crime is committed by a group if two or more perpetrators fully or partially carry out the objective elements of the crime and are co-perpetrators… In the case of organized group crime, prior coordination is not necessary, but two or more perpetrators may participate jointly without prior agreement. That is, the legislator specifies who the participants in the commission of the crime are, namely the perpetrators. The court considers that, for an action to be qualified as committed collectively, at least two perpetrators must carry out part of the objective elements, although prior agreement between them is not mandatory.” (Emphasis added) (Judgment of September 2, 2025, para. 4.47).

As noted above, Article 27 of the Criminal Code distinguishes between three different types of group crime: by a group, by a group with prior agreement, and by an organized group. The quoted words clearly show that the judge confuses these three types and applies the elements specific to an ordinary group acting without a prior agreement to an organized group, suggesting either a misunderstanding of the norm or a deliberate misinterpretation.

Any fair, independent, and impartial court, when reviewing these cases, could not have found the defendants guilty under Article 226, nor under Article 225, because with regard to “group action,” both articles are identical. Under both articles, the crime can be committed only by a prearranged group or an organized group, since both imply the existence of an organizer as an essential element. If there is an organizer, and not merely two or more perpetrators acting spontaneously, the case inevitably involves a prearranged or organized group. This constitutes a substantive error or a deliberate misinterpretation of the law by Judge Mchedlishvili.

Judge Galustashvili did not address these issues at all. Apparently, she considered it irrelevant whether a “group action” actually occurred.

Beyond theoretical impossibility, the case materials do not substantiate the existence of the elements of Article 226 in the acts attributed to the defendants. In both cases, there is no evidence—no witness testimony, no audio-video recordings, no written documents—showing that the 19 individuals convicted under Article 226 acted in a prearranged, collective, or organized manner, that they had an organizer issuing orders and instructions, or that they were aware of the objectives of the organized group and the common criminal intent. Moreover, with the exception of the Kasradze–Kadzelashvili case, the defendants did not know each other and had no prior interaction before being held criminally liable. Even if they actually threw any objects, and as pointed out above there is no legally obtained and admissible evidence in the files proving it, they acted spontaneously, chaotically, depending on the situation, not in a prearranged or organized manner.

In such circumstances, the element of group action under Article 226 simply did not exist.

6. On Freedom of Assembly

In her judgment, Judge Mchedlishvili devoted extensive discussion to the issue of freedom of assembly, citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, other regional human rights instruments, the Constitution of Georgia, and jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (Judgment of September 2, 2025, paras. 4.53–4.55). She correctly noted that freedom of assembly protects only peaceful gatherings (para. 4.56) and added that, when an assembly is peaceful, its dispersal is impermissible (para. 4.57).

Turning to the specific circumstances of the case, Judge Mchedlishvili concluded:

“In the present case, based on the evidence examined during the trial, including witness testimony, video recordings, and written evidence, it was conclusively established that, during the period from November 28 to December 3, 2024, in Tbilisi, on Rustaveli Avenue and surrounding areas, the ongoing protest acquired a non-peaceful character, and part of the protesters’ actions became unlawful, which escalated into group actions.” (para. 4.59).

The judge made no attempt to examine the dynamics of the protest over the full five days: whether the police provoked peaceful protesters, whether dispersal operations were conducted arbitrarily, whether there were lawful grounds for dispersal, whether the dispersal was carried out lawfully, or whether police engaged in illegal arrests, beatings, torture, or other misconduct.

A court administering fair justice would have examined these and similar questions, taking into account the broader context, including widely reported media coverage and explanations from the defendants. Such examination was necessary to determine the unlawfulness of each defendant’s actions and to establish or exclude criminal liability.

As noted, Judge Mchedlishvili made no such attempt, and Judge Galustashvili did not address freedom of assembly at all.

Conclusion

1. In the two cases concerning the November–December 2024 civil protests, Zviad Tsetskhladze, Andro Chichinadze, and others were prosecuted for “group violence”; however, the prosecution failed to present evidence to substantiate the charges in court. The courts could not establish a causal link between the actions of protesters and any harm to police officers or state property.
2. The courts reclassified the initial charges against the defendants and convicted them under Article 226 of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes participation in “group action” that grossly violates public order or involves obvious disobedience to lawful demands of a government official. Changing the charges at the sentencing stage violated the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as the defendants were not given an opportunity to defend themselves against the revised charges.
3. The court judgments were unsubstantiated, based on suspicious, unlawfully obtained evidence. The court relied on video recordings taken by the Ministry of Internal Affairs employees themselves in circumvention of the law—evidence that any independent and impartial court would have considered inadmissible.

4. Article 226 of the Criminal Code criminalizes “group action.” According to Supreme Court practice, establishing group action requires evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt prearrangement or organized group activity. Such evidence was absent in these cases, meaning the essential elements of the crime were not met.
5. In this case, all state bodies—the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the court—acted in coordination, following a pre-written script in order to fulfill the government’s political order to set an example by punishing participants of the peaceful, pro-European protest. Pro-government propagandistic media supported them in this as well.

Overall, the court judgments were unlawful, unsubstantiated, unfair, and politically motivated. As in other cases involving civil protest participants, justice was not administered. Instead, the judgements reflect a political directive aimed at punishing protesters with imprisonment on any invented grounds