Summary

1. The constitutional complaint filed with the Constitutional Court by the so-called members of parliament representing “Georgian Dream” and its affiliated factions—seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality and the prohibition of the activities of three pro-European political parties, including Unity – National Movement,” “Coalition for Change,” and “Strong Georgia – Lelo” (and potentially others)^[1]—constitutes an effort by Ivanishvili and the “Georgian Dream” regime to eliminate key political competitors. By doing so, it undermines the meaningfulness of any future elections and, ultimately, threatens to dismantle representative democracy in Georgia.
2. The constitutional complaint is incompatible with the views of the Constitutional Court of Georgia on the role of political parties in ensuring a pluralistic political environment, as well as with the well-established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the fundamental principles of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission concerning the freedom of political parties in a democratic society.
3. Under these principles, the prohibition of a political party is permissible only as a measure of last resort and may be applied solely in circumstances where the continued activities of the party pose an immediate and real threat to democracy, and where that threat cannot be averted by the application of other, less radical measures.
   In this respect, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that “a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the legal and constitutional structures of the State on two conditions: firstly, the means used to that end must in every respect be legal and democratic; secondly, the change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles” (Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98 et al., § 98).
4. Precisely because of this strict approach, historically the European Court of Human Rights has found the prohibition of a political party to be justified in only three cases as such: one concerning the Communist Party of Germany, one concerning a party advocating a radical Islamist agenda in Turkey, and one concerning a party that justified the methods of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA. In all other cases, the prohibition of political parties or refusal of their registration has been found not to be “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
5. The constitutional complaint lacks an evidentiary basis. The only material attached to it is the conclusion of a so-called Temporary Investigative Commission of the so-called parliament—a commission that was established in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of Parliament, and whose mandate goes far beyond the framework set out in the Rules of Procedure. As a result, the conclusions of this commission have no legal force.
6. The assessments made by the applicants in the constitutional complaint do not correspond to the purpose or the constituent elements of the norm provided for in Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution concerning the prohibition of political parties. In particular, the applicants’ assertion that the activities of the respondent parties allegedly served the pursuit of unconstitutional aims envisaged by that provision—namely, the overthrow or violent alteration of Georgia’s constitutional order, the undermining of the country’s independence, or the violation of its territorial integrity—is extremely unconvincing and unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the complaint is devoid of any legal basis.

7. Unlawful acts committed by individual officials during the period when the authorities in power between 2004 and 2012 were in office cannot be attributed either to the “United National Movement” or, all the more so, to the other two respondent political parties.
8. When addressing the Russian aggression of 2008 and the events related thereto, the document draws conclusions and makes assessments that pose a threat to the country’s territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. The reasoning developed therein constitutes, at the very least, a gesture of deference towards the Russian Federation. Moreover, it constitutes an act directed against the interests of the State.
9. We consider that the Constitutional Court should refuse to admit this constitutional complaint for examination or, if it nevertheless admits it for consideration, should dismiss the complaint as unfounded.

A. Theoretical Part

1. Constitutional provision

10. Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution of Georgia, which is relied upon for the purpose of prohibiting the three political parties, provides as follows:

“The establishment and activities of a political party shall be inadmissible if its aim is to overthrow or violently change the constitutional order of Georgia, to undermine the country’s independence, to violate its territorial integrity, or if it engages in the propaganda of war or violence, or incites national, ethnic, regional, religious or social hatred. The establishment of a political party on a territorial basis shall be inadmissible.”

11. Article 23 § 4 of the same Constitution further states:

“The prohibition of a political party may be ordered only by a decision of the Constitutional Court, in the cases determined by organic law and in accordance with the procedure established by law.”

12. The following section analyses the constituent elements and features of Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution, the existence of which the submitted constitutional complaint seeks to establish.

2. Constituent elements of the provision

13. The constituent elements of the norm provided for in Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution are as follows:

(a) First alternative model of the first sentence:

1. Prohibited conduct: the establishment and activities of a political party
2. the aim of which is:
   
   • to overthrow or violently change the constitutional order of Georgia;
   • to undermine the country’s independence;
   • to violate the country’s territorial integrity;

(b) Second alternative model of the first sentence:

1. Prohibited conduct: the establishment and activities of a political party
2. which:
   
   • engages in the propaganda of war or violence;
   • incites national, ethnic, regional, religious or social hatred;

(c) Second sentence:

1. Prohibited conduct: the establishment of a political party
2. on a territorial basis.

14. The complaint relies exclusively on the first alternative model of the first sentence of Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution. Neither the second alternative model of the first sentence nor the conduct envisaged by the second sentence of that provision is invoked as a ground for the complaint. Accordingly, the analysis below addresses only the first alternative model of the first sentence.
15. The first alternative model of the first sentence of Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution provides that the establishment and activities of a political party are prohibited where the party pursues the aim of:

(a) overthrowing or violently changing the constitutional order of Georgia;
(b) undermining the country’s independence;
(c) violating its territorial integrity.

16. The first sentence of Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution states that the establishment and activities of a party having any of the prohibited aims are inadmissible. The conjunction “and” appears to suggest that, if a party was established with a prohibited aim but does not in fact pursue that aim in its activities, such a party would not be subject to prohibition; or, conversely, if a party engages in activities pursuing a prohibited aim but was not established with that aim, the prohibition of such a party would likewise not be possible.
17. Accordingly, as a matter of first importance, the Constitutional Court must interpret whether, in the present context, the conjunction “and” requires the cumulative existence of two separate elements—“establishment” and “activities”—or whether proof of either one of them is sufficient.
18. Nowhere in the complaint is there even an indication that any of the three parties whose prohibition is sought by the applicants was established with any of the prohibited aims. No facts or arguments are presented in the complaint to substantiate the existence of such a circumstance.
19. As regards the alleged pursuit by the respondent parties of prohibited aims through their activities, see subsection F of this analysis concerning the ineffectual attempts to prove such conduct.

3. Legal nature of the provision

(a) Preventive character of the provision

20. Unlike criminal-law provisions, Article 23 § 3 of the Constitution of Georgia is not punitive in nature but preventive. Its purpose is to protect democracy and the constitutional order from a real and imminent threat, rather than to impose accountability for acts committed in the past.

(b) Reality of the threat

21. As established by the international standards referred to and described below in subsection C, the prohibition of a political party must constitute a measure of last resort, to be applied only in exceptional circumstances where the protection of democracy cannot be ensured by other means. It follows that the threat to democracy against which this constitutional provision is designed to provide protection must be real. An illusory or speculative threat, lacking in reality, cannot serve as a basis for the application of such an extreme measure as the prohibition of a political party.

(c) Imminence of the threat

22. The threat must be not only real but also imminent—present and immediate—rather than one that might materialise years later. The requirement of imminence also encompasses the continuity of the threat. A threat may have existed in the past; however, the mere existence of facts dating back 10–15 years cannot, in itself, constitute a sufficient basis for the prohibition of a party, unless it is demonstrated that the party continues today—through its statutes, ideology, or the repeated statements of its leaders—to advocate violence as a political method.

(d) Unconstitutional aim

23. Disregard for the principles of democracy and the rule of law, abuse of power, violations of human rights, and the squandering or misappropriation of budgetary funds constitute classic criminal offences for which mechanisms of individual criminal responsibility exist. For such acts to give rise to grounds for the prohibition of a political party, the applicant must demonstrate not only the fact that crimes were committed by representatives of the party, but also that, through the commission of those crimes, the perpetrators were pursuing the aims of overthrowing or violently changing the constitutional order, undermining the country’s independence, or violating its territorial integrity.

(e) Attribution

24. Acts directed towards the pursuit of the above-mentioned unconstitutional aims must be attributable to the party as a whole; they must be imputable to the party. Failing this, responsibility for such crimes remains within the sphere of criminal law and cannot constitute a constitutional basis for the prohibition of a political party.

B. Previous decisions of the Constitutional Court of Georgia

25. To date, the Constitutional Court of Georgia has never examined a complaint seeking the prohibition of a political party. Accordingly, it has no established case-law on the adjudication of such cases.
26. However, for the interpretation of the normative content of Article 23 of the Constitution, the decision in Giorgi Labadze v. Parliament of Georgia^[2] is of fundamental importance. Although that dispute concerned the formal aspect of party registration (the mandatory number of members), the general constitutional standard established by the Court is relevant for the analysis of the present complaint. In particular, the Court applied a strict scrutiny test and clearly held that:

“...Article 23 of the Constitution of Georgia excludes the possibility of any other form of State interference in the substantive regulation of the activities of political parties. Otherwise, the very emphasis placed by the Constitution on the special role of political parties in the exercise of democratic governance and in ensuring a pluralistic political environment would lose its meaning.”^[3]

27. In addition, for the practical application of the strict test provided for in Article 23 of the Constitution, the fundamental principles established by the Constitutional Court in another case are also of decisive importance, as they preclude the transformation of the party-prohibition process into an instrument of political retribution.
28. In Nodar Mumlauri v. Parliament of Georgia,^[4] the Court examined the constitutional limits of the extension of responsibility and held that it is impermissible to treat individuals not as subjects of law but as objects—as means for achieving political aims. The Court declared unconstitutional blanket prohibitions based on a person’s past status or affiliation, grounded in the principle of collective responsibility and imposed without establishing individual guilt, as such prohibitions violate human dignity (Article 17) and instrumentalise the individual for political purposes.^[5]
29. Accordingly, a combined analysis of the Labadze and Mumlauri cases establishes a constitutional framework within which the prohibition of a political party is possible only if:

(a) the exhaustive grounds set out in Article 23 exist; and
(b) responsibility is individual rather than collective.

C. The unsuccessful attempt to justify the constitutional complaint by reference to international standards

1. References to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights

30. The applicants seek to justify their unsubstantiated request for the prohibition of three political parties by relying on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. To that end, they extract quotations from several judgments of the European Court out of context.^[6]
31. For example, with regard to the concept of a so-called “militant democracy”, the applicants state:

“According to the case-law established by the European Court of Human Rights, although political parties play an essential role in ensuring pluralism and the proper functioning of democracy, and although restrictive measures taken against them affect the freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights and democracy in the State as a whole, the State also has an obligation to take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of democracy itself. According to the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘democracy must be able to defend itself’. Relying precisely on the concept of militant democracy, the European Court of Human Rights has stated in its judgments that the State is not required to wait until a political party takes concrete steps to implement a policy incompatible with the Convention and with democracy; in particular, if the competent State authorities have sufficiently established the risk that a political party is pursuing a policy that poses a threat to democracy, the State is entitled to prevent the implementation of such a policy. The obligation to take such measures also derives from Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, under which the State has a positive obligation to secure the rights and freedoms of persons within its jurisdiction.”^[7]

32. The quoted passage refers to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Ždanoka v. Latvia,^[8] Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain,^[9] and Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey.^[10]
33. To a reader unfamiliar with the Strasbourg Court’s case-law, the above-quoted passage may create the false impression that the European Court of Human Rights has established an absolute rule according to which “democracy” is in all circumstances entitled to “defend itself”, for example by banning opposition political parties, and that it may do so without waiting for such parties to take any concrete steps.
34. The falsity lies not in the claim that the European Court has never made such statements, but rather in the fact that the applicants say nothing about the specific factual circumstances of the cited cases, the political and legal context existing in the respective countries, the legal bases for the prohibitions imposed by those States, and—most importantly—whether the overall situation in Georgia and the aims and activities of the three opposition parties targeted by the present constitutional complaint bear any resemblance to the aims and activities of the parties involved in the cases relied upon by the European Court.
35. These issues will be addressed in detail in the following section. At this stage, it suffices to note in general terms that the cited cases concerned, respectively, a Latvian party organisation regarded as the successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; a party supporting the Basque terrorist organisation ETA; and a Turkish party advocating jihadist ideology.

2. Case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the prohibition of political parties

(a) General principles

36. Under Article 11 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”), everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of their interests. According to § 2 of the same Article, the exercise of this right may be restricted only if all of the following three conditions are cumulatively met:

(a) the restriction is prescribed by law;
(b) the restriction pursues a legitimate aim, such as national security or public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others;
(c) the restriction is necessary in a democratic society, which requires that there exists a “pressing social need”, that the restrictive measures are “proportionate to the legitimate aim”, and that the arguments invoked in favour of the restriction are “relevant and sufficient”.

37. According to the European Court, democracy is a fundamental feature of the European public order. The preamble of the Convention establishes a clear connection between the Convention and democracy.^[11] For democracy to function properly, the existence of political parties is essential.^[12] Accordingly, when it comes to the prohibition of parties, such measures affect not only the freedom of association but also democracy itself.^[13]
38. On this basis, the European Court considers that, when political parties are concerned, the exceptions listed in Article 11 of the Convention must be strictly construed, and only convincing and compelling reasons may justify restrictions imposed on parties. States parties enjoy only a limited margin of appreciation in this regard.^[14] Consequently, drastic measures, such as the dissolution of an entire political party and the temporary prohibition of similar activities by its leaders, may be imposed only in the most serious cases.^[15] Except where the association can reasonably be regarded as a breeding ground for violence or as incarnating a negation of democratic principles, radical measures restricting such fundamental rights as that of freedom of association are difficult to reconcile with the spirit of the Convention, which is aimed at guaranteeing the articulation of political views.^[16]
39. A political party whose leaders incite to violence or put forward a policy which fails to respect democracy or which is aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy, cannot claim protection against sanctions that may be imposed for these reasons.^[17]
40. The European Court has developed certain criteria to be taken into account when determining whether the prohibition of a political party corresponds to a “pressing social need”:
    
    1. whether there was plausible evidence that the risk to democracy, supposing it had been proved to exist, was sufficiently imminent;
    2. whether the acts and speeches of the leaders and members of the political party concerned were imputable to the party as a whole; and
    3. whether the acts and speeches imputable to the political party formed a whole which gave a clear picture of a model of society conceived and advocated by the party which was incompatible with the concept of a “democratic society”.^[18]

(b) European Court of Human Rights decisions on the compatibility of political-party bans or refusals to register with Article 11 of the Convention

i. Communist parties in various countries

41. The first case in which the European Court of Human Rights addressed the compatibility of a domestic court’s decision to dissolve a political party with the Convention was Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands v. Federal Republic of Germany (“German Communist Party case”).^[19] In that case, the Court declined to apply Articles 11, 9, and 10 of the Convention, and the specific circumstances of the case are discussed below in subsection 3. Here, it is noted only that the application was declared inadmissible on the basis of Article 17 of the Convention.
42. Unlike the complaint brought by the German Communist Party, the Court has taken different approaches in several other cases concerning communist parties in other States.
43. For example, in United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, the European Court found no provision in the statutes or other documents of the banned party that could justify such a measure under Article 11 § 2 of the Convention, particularly as the party was banned before it had even begun its activities.^[20] For instance, the argument that the United Communist Party of Turkey supposedly advocated the supremacy of the proletariat over other classes was rejected by the Constitutional Court of Turkey itself.^[21]
44. Regarding the Turkish authorities’ argument that the party deserved to be banned simply because its name included the word “Communist”, the Court responded that, absent other relevant and sufficient grounds, banning a party solely on the basis of its name was unjustified.^[22] Concerning the State’s second argument—that the party allegedly served Kurdish separatist aspirations and aimed to partition Turkey—the Court observed that the party’s statutes explicitly provided that it would strive for a peaceful, democratic and fair solution of the Kurdish problem, so that the Kurdish and Turkish peoples could live together of their free will within the borders of the Turkish Republic, on the basis of equal rights and with a view to democratic restructuring founded on their common interests. Such objectives could not be considered as fomenting separatism.^[23]
45. In Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania, the European Court of Human Rights found that the Bucharest Court of Appeal’s refusal to register the non-member Romanian Communist Party (PCN) was incompatible with Article 11 of the Convention.^[24]
46. The Court did not accept the State’s argument that the “Communist Party” aimed to build a “humane” state based on communist doctrine, which supposedly implied that the constitutional and legal order established in Romania after the overthrow of the Ceausescu regime in 1989 was “inhumane” and not based on true democracy. Even statements by the party leader, made after the refusal to register and therefore not formally before the Court, although critical and sometimes hostile towards the authorities, contained nothing that could be regarded as a call for violence or the overthrow of democracy for political ends. On the contrary, the party leader’s statements clearly indicated support for a political system tolerant of free and multi-party elections and of the political views of others.
47. The Court also disagreed with the Romanian government’s claim that the “Communist Party” did not support the country’s sovereignty. Based on the analysis of the party’s founding documents and programme, the Strasbourg Court found that these documents emphasized the party’s support for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rule of law and constitutional order, democracy, political pluralism, universal elections, and the freedom of political activity, and contained no calls for violence, rebellion, denial of democratic principles, or the establishment of a “dictatorship of the proletariat”.^[25]
48. Moreover, these founding and programme documents contained critical statements regarding the crimes committed by the former Communist Party prior to 1989 and its subsequent policies.^[26] Considering these and other circumstances, the Court concluded that the refusal to register the “Communist Party” did not constitute a “pressing social need”,^[27] was not proportionate to the declared legitimate aim, and therefore was not necessary in a democratic society.^[28]
49. By contrast, in another Romanian case involving the complainants being the Romanian Communist Party and its leadership, the Court reached a different conclusion, finding that the refusal to register that particular party did not constitute a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.^[29]

50. The difference in the latter Romanian case was that the complainants did not merely seek to establish a party based on Marxist ideology, but rather claimed succession to the Communist Party that had existed under the totalitarian regime prior to 1989. Furthermore, the party’s statutes explicitly provided that its aim was to create a socialist society primarily based on the principle of socialist ownership of the means of production.^[30] Accordingly, the Court concluded that the reasons presented by the State for refusing registration were “relevant and sufficient,” and that the measures applied were “proportionate to the legitimate aim.”^[31]
51. The question of banning communist parties operating in the territories of the Baltic States was not directly addressed by the Strasbourg Court. However, in a case concerning the disenfranchisement of a member of the Latvian Communist Party, the Court, taking into account the historical context—the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the occupation of the Baltic States by Soviet forces, and the extremely negative role of the Communist Party not only with respect to these events but also following the restoration of Latvia’s independence, when the party actively participated in attempted coups in January and August 1991—concluded that such a measure was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.^[32]

ii. Parties related to the rights of Turkey’s ethnic Kurds

52. As noted above, in the United Communist Party of Turkey case, in addition to addressing the legality of a communist party as such, the Court also examined the Kurdish issue and the compatibility of the party’s ban with Article 11 of the Convention.^[33]
53. A similar issue arose in Yazar and Others v. Turkey, where the European Court considered the Constitutional Court of Turkey’s dissolution of the People’s Labour Party.^[34] The Constitutional Court concluded that the party’s representatives aimed at “dividing the State of Turkey,” separating ethnic Turks and Kurds into distinct states, and thereby “destroying Turkey’s national and territorial integrity.” According to the Constitutional Court, the People’s Labour Party treated acts of terrorism committed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party as “acts of international warfare,”^[35] which led to the decision to dissolve the party.^[36]
54. The European Court held that the Turkish Constitutional Court did not examine whether the founding and programme documents of the banned party complied with the Constitution and domestic law, but based its decision solely on statements made by the party’s representatives.^[37] The Court found nothing in these statements that could reasonably be interpreted as incitement to violence or tolerance of terrorist acts for political purposes.^[38]
55. Regarding the accusation of separatism, the Court found that the statements of the party’s representatives related only to the self-determination of the Kurdish people, their right to speak their language, and similar matters, which did not pose a threat to the State’s territorial integrity or democracy.^[39] According to the Court, even overly critical statements about counter-terrorism operations carried out by the Turkish armed forces could not be equated with the activities of armed Kurdish groups.^[40] Therefore, in the European Court’s view, in this case, such a “drastic” measure as banning the party was not justified by a “pressing social need” and was therefore not necessary in a democratic society.^[41]
56. Similar decisions were taken in several other Turkish cases, both before and after this case.^[42]

iii. Non-communist political parties in former communist countries

57. In a case against Bulgaria, the European Court examined whether the ban on a party representing the interests of the Macedonian minority was compatible with Article 11 of the Convention.^[43] The Bulgarian Constitutional Court had concluded that the party was engaged in spreading separatist ideas and therefore posed a threat to the country’s territorial integrity. However, the European Court found no evidence in the statements of the party’s leaders or members that could be qualified as incitement to violence or denial of democratic principles.^[44] The Constitutional Court had relied on party-organized meetings, speeches by its leaders, press conferences, letters, maps, and other materials indicating that a Macedonian minority existed in Bulgaria, that the relevant region was not part of Bulgaria, and that certain peaceful demands were being made in this regard.^[45]

58. The European Court stated that even if it were proven that a banned political party sought the autonomy of the Prina region or even separation from Bulgaria, this did not automatically mean that the party acted contrary to the principles of democracy. The Court repeated a phrase used in a similar earlier case:

“…the fact that a group of persons calls for autonomy or even requests secession of part of the country’s territory – thus demanding fundamental constitutional and territorial changes – cannot automatically justify a prohibition of its assemblies.”^[46]

The Court further emphasized that the dissemination of separatist ideas alone cannot constitute a sufficient basis for banning a political party. In its words:

"The mere fact that a political party calls for autonomy or even requests secession of part of the country’s territory is not a sufficient basis to justify its dissolution on national security grounds. In a democratic society based on the rule of law, political ideas which challenge the existing order without putting into question the tenets of democracy, and whose realisation is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression through, inter alia, participation in the political process. However shocking and unacceptable the statements of the applicant party’s leaders and members may appear to the authorities or the majority of the population and however illegitimate their demands may be, they do not appear to warrant the impugned interference. The fact that the applicant party’s political programme was considered incompatible with the current principles and structures of the Bulgarian State does not make it incompatible with the rules and principles of democracy. It is of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that call into question the way a State is currently organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself."^[47]

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the ban was not necessary in a democratic society and violated Article 11 of the Convention.^[48]

59. In Linkov v. Czech Republic, the Czech authorities refused to register the Liberal Party on the grounds that the party’s statutes aimed to “abolish the legal legacy of the totalitarian regime,” specifically the policy of impunity for certain acts committed by representatives during the communist regime, and that such a goal contradicted the Czech Constitution.^[49]
60. The Court found that nothing in the party’s statutory aim indicated that the party intended to achieve this goal by any means other than lawful and democratic ones.^[50] Moreover, the Court reiterated its principle that refusal of registration is an extreme measure to be used only in the most serious cases. Therefore, the refusal of registration was found to be a “disproportionate measure to the legitimate aim.”^[51]
61. The European Court also found that the Moldovan authorities’ temporary one-month ban on the country’s Christian-Democratic People’s Party was incompatible with Article 11 of the Convention. The temporary ban arose from demonstrations organized by the party, which the authorities considered unlawful, protesting a government decision to make Russian language instruction mandatory in schools.^[52] The Ministry of Justice and subsequent courts relied on three grounds for the temporary ban:

(a) the party held the demonstration without permission, “in violation of the established procedure”;
(b) children participated in the demonstration;
(c) calls to violence were made during the gathering.^[53]

62. Regarding the first ground, the European Court held that a mere breach of assembly rules, even if proven, could not be considered a relevant and sufficient basis for temporarily banning an opposition party.^[54] Concerning the second ground, the Court noted that the presence of children at the gathering was a matter of parental choice and could not justify banning the party.^[55] Finally, even a light song performed during the demonstration could not reasonably be considered incitement to violence or a relevant and sufficient basis for a temporary ban.^[56] Overall, the Court emphasized that such measures have a “chilling effect,” are not imposed on the basis of a “pressing social need,” and are not proportionate to the declared legitimate aim. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the temporary ban imposed by the Moldovan authorities violated Article 11 of the Convention.^[57]

iv. Cases in which the banning of a political party was not considered a violation of Article 11 of the Convention

63. The banning of a political party was not deemed incompatible with Article 11 of the Convention in the case of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey.^[58] This case concerned the Turkish Constitutional Court’s dissolution of a political party that, according to the Court, posed a threat to the secular state guaranteed by the Turkish Constitution, as its programmatic aim was to transform the Turkish state according to Sharia law. Thus, the party had become a centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism.^[59] The Constitutional Court primarily relied on statements made by the chairman of the Welfare Party and other party representatives.^[60]
64. The applicants argued that, regardless of any statements made by party representatives years before the ban, the State had not proven that, at the time of the ban, the party posed a real threat to Turkish secularism and democracy.^[61] They also questioned whether statements made by party representatives could be attributed to the party itself, since, according to them, those individuals had been expelled from the party precisely because of their statements.^[62]
65. Regarding the first argument, the Grand Chamber of the European Court stated that, at the time of the decision, the Welfare Party had the real potential to seize political power.^[63] Therefore, the Grand Chamber considered that the authorities’ actions did not exceed the limits of the margin of appreciation.^[64]
66. Concerning the question of attributing the chairman’s statements to the party, the Court held that this was possible because the statements came not from a simple member, but from the party chairman, who had also been elected as Prime Minister. The Court noted that Mr. Erbakan, the party chairman, never stated that his remarks reflected his personal views rather than the party’s.^[65] The same applied to the party deputy chairman and other high-ranking officials.^[66] Accordingly, the statements of these officials were attributed to the entire party.^[67]
67. Regarding the party’s programmatic objectives, the Grand Chamber stated that Sharia law is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy.^[68]
68. The Grand Chamber also considered statements by Mr. Erbakan and others concerning jihad, arming Muslims after coming to power, inciting hatred, issuing open threats to supporters of the Western model, and bloodshed,^[69] and agreed with the Chamber’s conclusion that, although party leaders had not included calls for the use of force or violence in official government documents, they did not take swift and practical steps to distance themselves from party members who publicly expressed support for the use of force against political opponents.^[70]
69. Based on the above, the Court concluded that the party’s ban constituted a “pressing social need” and was therefore necessary in a democratic society, meaning that there was no violation of Article 11 of the Convention.^[71]
70. The banning of a political party was also not considered incompatible with Article 11 of the Convention in Heri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain, which concerned the Spanish courts’ dissolution of two political parties because they were deemed political organizations supporting the Basque terrorist organization ETA.^[72] Specifically, according to the Supreme Court of Spain, these parties not only failed to condemn ETA’s terrorist acts but also served as “instruments of ETA’s terrorist strategy.”^[73]
71. The European Court held that these organizations provided assistance and political support to terrorist organizations in matters aimed at overthrowing the constitutional order or seriously disturbing the public peace.^[74] The Court agreed with the Spanish Constitutional Court that the parties’ failure to condemn violence amid decades-long terrorism in Spain, which had been condemned by all other parties, amounted to “tacit support for terrorism.”^[75]
72. Consequently, the European Court found that the parties’ plans were inconsistent with the idea of a democratic society and posed a substantial threat to Spanish democracy. Therefore, their banning was based on a “pressing social need,” was “proportionate to the legitimate aim,” and thus necessary in a democratic society. As a result, there was no violation of Article 11 of the Convention.^[76]

C. Justification for the banning of a party or other association under Article 17 of the Convention

73. In rare cases, the European Court examines the compatibility of state decisions to dissolve parties or other associations with the Convention not under Article 11, but under Article 17 of the Convention.
74. Article 17 of the Convention provides:

"Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention."

75. Article 17 was included in the Convention so that, as the European Court has noted, “[i]t cannot be ruled out that a person or a group of persons will rely on the rights enshrined in the Convention or its Protocols in order to attempt to derive therefrom the right to conduct what amounts in practice to activities intended to destroy the rights or freedoms set forth in the Convention; any such destruction would put an end to democracy.”^[77]  “In view of the very clear link between the Convention and democracy… no one must be authorised to rely on the Convention’s provisions in order to weaken or destroy the ideals and values of a democratic society.”^[78] In other words, the general purpose of Article 17 is “to prevent individuals or groups with totalitarian aims from exploiting in their own interests the principles enunciated in the Convention.”^[79] Article 17 is closely related to the idea of “democracy capable of defending itself”.^[80]
76. Article 17 has a dual effect. First, it prevents States from using any provision of the Convention to destroy the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Second, it prevents States from relying on any provision of the Convention to restrict those rights and freedoms more than the Convention allows.^[81]
77. Historically, the first and so far the only case in which the compatibility of domestic court decisions on the dissolution of a political party with the Convention was examined under Article 17 was Communist Party of Germany v. Federal Republic of Germany.^[82]
78. In this case, the applicant—the Communist Party of Germany—argued that the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on 17 August 1956 to dissolve and ban the Communist Party violated Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the Convention.
79. The European Commission of Human Rights stated that the matter of the Communist Party of Germany’s ban should not be considered in terms of compliance with Articles 9, 10, and 11, but rather under Article 17 of the Convention.
80. The Commission established that: 1) the Communist Party aimed to establish a socialist-communist system through a proletarian revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat; 2) the Communist Party of Germany continued to adhere to these principles.
81. According to the Commission, even if it were proven that the party’s current activities sought to come to power solely through constitutional means provided for in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, this did not imply that the party had abandoned its traditional objectives. On the contrary, statements presented in the case confirmed the Communist Party of Germany’s consistent commitment to these goals.
82. The Commission held that the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat was incompatible with the Convention, as such a regime implied the suppression of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, meaning that the Communist Party’s activities fell under the type of activity addressed in Article 17 of the Convention. Accordingly, the complaint was declared inadmissible.
83. As mentioned, the justification of a political party ban under Article 17 of the Convention has only been applied in the Communist Party of Germany case. However, similar precedents exist concerning other types of associations, not political parties.

84. For example, in the case Hizb ut-Tahrir and Others v. Germany, the first applicant was an organization whose name meant “Party of Freedom” and which described itself as a “global Islamic political party and/or religious society,” founded in Jerusalem in 1953. Through its printed materials and public statements of its representatives, the organization widely called on inhabitants of Muslim countries to overthrow their governments and replace them with an Islamic state structured as a caliphate.^[83] The organization repeatedly asserted that the State of Israel had no right to exist and should be destroyed, and that Jews should be killed.^[84]
85. The European Court held that the first applicant attempted to invoke Article 11 of the Convention not for its true purpose, but for objectives clearly contrary to the values of the Convention, such as “the committment to the peaceful settlement of international conflicts and to the sanctity of human life”. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the first applicant could not benefit from the protection of Article 11 of the Convention.^[85]
86. The Court applied the same approach in the case of Kasimakhunov and Saibatalov, who were members of the same organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir.^[86]
87. In another case, the European Court stated that neither the organization nor its representative could benefit from the protections of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention because they were engaged in propagating aggressive antisemitism and spreading statements inciting hatred and discrimination against Muslim immigrants and homosexuals.^[87]

D. Conclusions from the European Court’s case law on the banning of parties

88. A detailed analysis of the European Court of Human Rights’ case law allows the following conclusions:

• Importance of political pluralism: The Court’s practice emphasizes the significance of political pluralism; in a democratic society, expression of diverse political ideas is essential. Bans must be applied with particular caution to avoid becoming instruments of political repression.
• “Necessity” test: In cases concerning party bans or refusal of registration, the Court stresses the need to demonstrate that the ban or refusal is “necessary in a democratic society.” It must be proven that the measure was justified by a “pressing social need,” proportionate to a declared legitimate aim, and that the restriction met the requirements of being “relevant and sufficient” in relation to the legitimate aim.
• Extreme measure: Banning a party or refusing its registration is justified only in the most extreme cases, specifically when:

(a) There is sufficient evidence that the stability of a democratic society faces an immediate and inevitable threat;
(b) The acts and statements of the party’s leaders and members can be attributed to the party as a whole;
(c) These acts and statements form a coherent social pattern that contradicts the principles of a “democratic society.”

• Examples of justified bans: Party program goals or leaders’ explicit calls for establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat, implementing Sharia law and jihad, supporting terrorist organizations, or inciting national, racial, religious, or other hatred.
• Prohibition on abuse of rights: In rare cases, a party ban can be justified under Article 17 of the Convention, which applies only in exceptional circumstances to prevent States, groups, or individuals from abusing the Convention.

89. Below, there is a detailed analysis of the extent to which the applicants satisfied the “necessity” test as defined by the European Convention on Human Rights and interpreted in the Strasbourg Court’s case law.

3. Venice Commission’s Guidelines

90. The Venice Commission has formulated principles similar to those of the Strasbourg Court in its document Guidelines on Dissolution and Prohibition of Political Parties and Analogous Measures,^[88] which states:
    1. States should recognise that everyone has the right to associate freely in political parties. This right shall include freedom to hold political opinions and to receive and impart information without interference by a public authority and regardless of frontiers. The requirement to register political parties will not in itself be considered to be in violation of this right.
    2. Any limitations to the exercise of the above-mentioned fundamental human rights through the activity of political parties shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and other international treaties, in normal times as well as in cases of public emergencies.
    3. Prohibition or enforced dissolution of political parties may only be justified in the case of parties which advocate the use of violence or use violence as a political means to overthrow the democratic constitutional order, thereby undermining the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. The fact alone that a party advocates a peaceful change of the Constitution should not be sufficient for its prohibition or dissolution.
    4. A political party as a whole can not be held responsible for the individual behaviour of its members not authorised by the party within the framework of political/public and party activities.
    5. The prohibition or dissolution of political parties as a particularly far-reaching measure should be used with utmost restraint. Before asking the competent judicial body to prohibit or dissolve a party, governments or other state organs should assess, having regard to the situation of the country concerned, whether the party really represents a danger to the free and democratic political order or to the rights of individuals and whether other, less radical measures could prevent the said danger.
    6. Legal measures directed to the prohibition or legally enforced dissolution of political parties shall be a consequence of a judicial finding of unconstitutionality and shall be deemed as of an exceptional nature and governed by the principle of proportionality. Any such measure must be based on sufficient evidence that the party itself and not only individual members pursue political objectives using or preparing to use unconstitutional means.
    7. The prohibition or dissolution of a political party should be decided by the Constitutional court or other appropriate judicial body in a procedure offering all guarantees of due process, openness and a fair trial.

4. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution 1308 (2002)

91. Resolution 1308 (2002) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, entitled Restrictions on political parties in the Council of Europe member states, sets out the following principles for each member state:

• political pluralism is one of the fundamental principles of every democratic regime;
• restrictions on or dissolution of political parties should be regarded as exceptional measures to be applied only in cases where the party concerned uses violence or threatens civil peace and the democratic constitutional order of the country;
• as far as possible, less radical measures than dissolution should be used;
• a party cannot be held responsible for the action taken by its members if such action is contrary to its statute or activities;
• a political party should be banned or dissolved only as a last resort, in conformity with the constitutional order of the country, and in accordance with the procedures which provide all the necessary guarantees to a fair trial;
• the legal system in each member state should include specific provisions to ensure that measures restricting parties cannot be used in an arbitrary manner by the political authorities. References to these crucial documents of the Venice Commission or the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe are completely absent in constitutional complaints.^[89]

92. The constitutional complaint makes no reference whatsoever to these important documents of the Venice Commission or the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

D. Adoption of Unconstitutional Legislative Amendments

93. Before directly evaluating the complaint, it is worth noting the unconstitutional amendments introduced by the “Georgian Dream” Parliament into legislation, which prepared the ground for faster and simpler decisions in the future to ban other parties based on similar complaints. Our organization has issued a separate assessment regarding the unconstitutionality of these amendments.^[90]

E. Groundlessness of the Constitutional Complaint

1. Criteria for Selecting the Respondents: Pro-European Orientation and Influence on Political Processes

94. The plaintiffs seek the banning of three political parties:

• Citizens’ Political Association “Unity – National Movement”;
• Citizens’ Political Association “Coalition for Change – Gvaramia, Melia, Girchi – Droua”;
• Citizens’ Political Association “Strong Georgia – Lelo, for the People, for Freedom!”

95. According to the plaintiffs, the unity of the unconstitutional objectives of the above parties is allegedly confirmed by the following circumstances:

• These political parties have, for years, in elected bodies through general elections, in Georgia’s ongoing political processes, and in the unconstitutional actions presented in this constitutional complaint (including alleged sabotage against the state of Georgia), demonstrated qualitatively similar positions, forming a coalition with a unified purpose and operating as a single organization, and continue to act in this manner today;
• Former or current leaders of these political parties were elected to the Parliament of Georgia under the banner of the “United National Movement” or election blocs created with its participation, held various party positions within the “United National Movement”, and during the “United National Movement’s” governance (2004–2012) held important positions (including political and state-political offices) and/or participated, with the support of the “United National Movement”, in violations of human rights.^[91]

96. The inconsistency of these statements with reality is explained in detail in subsequent sections. Here, it is noted only that the complaint makes no attempt to separately explain the alleged responsibility of each party for the acts attributed to the government of 2004–2012.
97. Even assuming that one party—the “United National Movement”—might, for acts committed by its representatives in the distant past, bear responsibility to the extent of an extreme measure such as party banning (which, as we will see below, the Georgian Dream deputies cannot prove), it is unclear why the same harsh responsibility should be applied to other parties if their only connection to the targeted party is a similar view or position on certain general or specific political issues.
98. Moreover, the plaintiffs threaten to demand the banning of other parties if they acquire “substantial” influence on political processes, which is linked to overcoming the electoral threshold:

“It should also be noted that the aforementioned political parties are closely linked with other parties such as Elene Khoshtaria – Droua and Girchi – More Freedom, which are in fact part of the Coalition for Change – Gvaramia, Melia, Girchi – Droua, though formally registered as independent parties, as well as Yes, Europe – Strategy Aghmashenebeli, European Georgia – Movement for Freedom, Federalist Party, Republican Party of Georgia, and other fictitious, one-man, and small parties. However, since they currently do not have substantial influence in politics or a realistic prospect of passing the electoral threshold, their banning is not necessary at this stage. The issue of their unconstitutionality may arise later if they acquire substantial influence on the political process.”^[92]

99. Accordingly, it is evident that the plaintiffs are not motivated by a “desire to protect the constitutional order,” but rather by an irrational aim to destroy the pro-European, liberal-oriented political opposition, thereby artificially removing their main opponents from the political scene. Banning opposition parties would mean the destruction of representative democracy in the country, as it would deprive nearly half of the active electorate (if we rely on the 2024 exit poll results rather than the figures from the election administration responsible for falsifying the elections) of the ability to choose.

2. Lack of Evidentiary Basis for the Complaint: Unconstitutionality of the So-Called Temporary Parliamentary Investigation Commission and Illegality of Its Conclusion

100. The only evidence underpinning the constitutional complaint by representatives of Georgian Dream is the so-called conclusion of the Temporary Parliamentary Investigation Commission.^[93]
101. Our organization published a detailed study on the incompatibility of the establishment and mandate of this so-called temporary parliamentary investigation commission with the Constitution of Georgia and the rules of procedure of the Parliament.^[94]
102. Specifically, the study highlighted that, under the current legislation, opposition representation in a temporary parliamentary investigation commission should not have been less than half of the total number of commission members.^[95]
103. As is known, as a result of the falsified elections on October 26, 2024, four opposition parties obtained mandates in Parliament, three of which refused the mandates and left Parliament, while one—the “For Georgia” party—formally retained parliamentary mandates at the time of the so-called commission’s creation, but refused to participate in parliamentary work.
104. To supposedly resolve this issue, Georgian Dream artificially created a so-called “opposition” by splitting off several deputies elected via its own list from the majority, forming a pseudo-opposition faction called “People’s Power” and another pseudo-opposition group called “European Socialists.”
105. As a result of these events, when the creation of the Investigation Commission arose, the Parliament decided to form a 10-member Commission, with 5 seats allocated to the Georgian Dream majority and 5 seats, as claimed, to the opposition, of which 2 were assigned to People’s Power, 1 to European Socialists, and 2 to representatives of the “For Georgia” party. However, according to Georgian Dream, since the elected deputies of this party had refused to participate in Parliament until recently, their allocated seats remained “vacant.”
106. Such actions directly violated the Constitution of Georgia^[96] and the imperative rule of the Parliament’s then-effective Rules of Procedure,^[97] which stipulated that members of Parliament elected via one political party are not allowed to form more than one faction.
107. In any case, the so-called Temporary Parliamentary Investigation Commission, constituted in violation of this rule, should not have had any lawful basis to operate or issue conclusions simply because the “opposition” seats in the commission were artificially filled in a manner circumventing the Constitution and parliamentary rules.
108. Furthermore, as noted in our study, the Parliament granted the so-called Temporary Investigation Commission a far broader mandate than provided for by its own rules of procedure.^[98]
109. Specifically, according to the parliamentary rules, the purpose of a temporary investigation commission could only be to examine violations of Georgian law by state authorities and officials. Therefore, granting the Commission authority to investigate the activities of persons who were never “state officials,” but only active or former officeholders in political parties or even private or civil sector employees, went far beyond the limits established by the rules of procedure.

110. The same applies to the excessively broad subject matter assigned to the Commission. Specifically, according to the rules of procedure, the investigation of a temporary parliamentary commission could only cover illegal actions or corrupt violations that posed a threat to Georgia’s national security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, political, economic, or other interests, or were related to the improper use of the state or municipal budget. Any other offenses, even if serious or particularly grave, that do not fall within the above definition, should not have been the subject of the commission’s study. However, both the complaint and the commission’s conclusion devote significant attention to crimes committed within the law enforcement system between 2003–2012, which cannot be interpreted as illegal acts or corrupt violations posing a threat to Georgia’s state security, sovereignty, territorial integrity, political, economic, or other interests, or related to the improper use of state or municipal budgets.
111. Finally, as also noted in our study, according to the Parliament’s rules of procedure, a temporary investigation commission is established only to examine a specific issue. The mandate assigned to this commission covered a period of more than 20 years, during which the former “regime” officials allegedly committed hundreds of crimes. Clearly, such a broad scope for investigation could not satisfy the requirement of “specificity.”
112. According to Article 31(10) of the Constitution of Georgia, evidence obtained in violation of the law has no legal force.^[99]
113. The Constitutional Court has explained:

“This constitutional provision expresses the principle of a legal state, according to which it is impermissible to prosecute or convict a person based on evidence obtained in violation of the law and human rights. The principle of a legal state imposes an obligation on the state to establish rules of proof that ensure the accurate determination of material facts significant for the case and the fair adjudication of specific individuals based on evidence obtained in accordance with Georgian law and international human rights standards.” (Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia, 31 July 2015, №2/2/579, Maya Robakidze v. Parliament of Georgia, II-1,2)

“This constitutional provision primarily requires that evidence be obtained in accordance with procedures established by law. By prohibiting evidence obtained in violation of the law, the Constitution of Georgia aims to ensure the objective establishment of truth in a particular criminal case, the protection of participants’ constitutional rights and freedoms, public confidence in justice and the accountability of law enforcement authorities, ultimately ensuring the overall fairness of the proceedings and the accused’s right to a fair trial.” (Decision №2/2/579, II-4)

“Moreover, the right protected under Article 31(10) of the Constitution is not limited to the lawful procedure for obtaining evidence. It also requires that evidence be obtained both formally and materially in accordance with constitutional rights. Otherwise, there is a risk that a person will be held responsible through unconstitutional, human rights-violating methods, which is incompatible with the principle of a legal state.”^[100]

114. According to the Constitutional Court’s practice, “constitutional terms have autonomous meaning, and their content is not determined by definitions used in lower normative acts.”^[101]
115. Accordingly, the provision of Article 31(10) of the Constitution, as well as the Constitutional Court’s above-cited interpretation, must be applied not only by ordinary courts and not only in criminal proceedings, but also by the Constitutional Court when exercising constitutional justice. As the Court itself states, this constitutional provision “expresses the principle of a legal state,” and evidence must be obtained “formally and materially in accordance with constitutional rights.” Naturally, the Constitutional Court must apply this approach in reviewing the constitutional complaint filed by representatives of Georgian Dream.
116. Therefore, the conclusion of the commission, established in gross violation of constitutional and legal rules—and to which Parliament had also unlawfully granted an excessively broad mandate—must be regarded by the Constitutional Court as “evidence obtained in violation of the law,” which has no legal force.
117. According to Article 31¹(3)(e) of the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court of Georgia, when a constitutional complaint concerns the constitutionality of the creation and activities of a political party,^[102] the complainant is required, among other things, to attach evidence supporting the legitimacy of the constitutional complaint.^[103] The same Organic Law establishes that if the constitutional complaint does not comply, in form or substance, with the requirements of Article 31¹, it will not be accepted for consideration.^[104] As noted above, the only evidence attached to the complaint—the conclusion of the so-called temporary parliamentary investigation commission—was obtained in violation of the Constitution and law. Therefore, the constitutional complaint was filed without legally obtained evidence and does not meet the requirements of Article 31¹, which means the Constitutional Court should not accept it for consideration.^[105]

F. Lack of Evidence for Unconstitutional Aims

118. As noted above, the complainants request the prohibition of the respondent parties under Article 23(3) of the Constitution. According to this provision, a party may be banned if it is proven that it aims to overthrow or violently change Georgia’s constitutional order, undermine the country’s independence, or violate its territorial integrity. Below, it is explained in detail that the complainants failed to prove these circumstances.

1. Overthrow or Violent Change of Georgia’s Constitutional Order

119. The complainants assert that the aim of “overthrowing or violently changing Georgia’s constitutional order” was manifested in the following actions:

• Systematic and repeated violations of human rights;^[106]
• Refusal to recognize the legitimacy of authorities and officials elected through universal suffrage;^[107]
• Attempts to overthrow or violently change Georgia’s constitutional order.^[108]

(a) Systematic and Repeated Violations of Human Rights

120. The complaint states that:

“During its period in power (2004–2012), the United National Movement (‘UNM’) created and developed a system of torture and inhumane and degrading treatment of persons placed in penitentiary institutions. During the same period, many acts of violence, torture, or other violations of human rights occurred in penitentiary institutions, representing clear unconstitutional activity that went beyond isolated incidents and took on a systematic and repeated character.”^[109]

“During its period in power (2004–2012), the UNM implemented and developed a widespread practice of illegal surveillance, wiretapping, and illegal collection, storage, and use of video, audio, and photographic materials depicting individuals’ private lives. This practice went beyond isolated incidents and became systematic and repeated. It affected nearly all segments of society, including many persons in penitentiary institutions, where acts of violence, rape, and degrading treatment were recorded on video, often for blackmail or other illegal purposes.”^[110]

“During its period in power (2004–2012), the UNM created and developed a system of extortion and violation of property rights. During the same period, numerous acts of illegal attacks on businesses, unlawful coercion to forfeit property, and violations of property rights were committed, representing clear unconstitutional activity beyond isolated incidents and taking on a systematic and repeated character.”^[111]

“During its period in power (2004–2012), the UNM committed numerous acts of violence or violations of property and other rights against mass media outlets, unjustifiably restricted freedom of the media in various ways, and engaged in clear unconstitutional activity that went beyond isolated incidents and took on a systematic and repeated character.”^[112]

i. Complainants Fail to Prove that “Systematic and Repeated Violations of Human Rights” Served an Unconstitutional Aim of Overthrowing or Violently Changing the Constitutional Order

121. First of all, it is completely unsubstantiated and unexplained what connection exists between “systematic and repeated violations of human rights” and the aim of “overthrowing or violently changing Georgia’s constitutional order.”
122. Overthrowing or violently changing the constitutional order occurs when an individual or a group of individuals, for example, using the armed forces or other official or unofficial, informal, or ad hoc armed groups, seizes power through armed rebellion or coup, suspends the activities of constitutional and other state bodies, declares the constitution and other legislative acts suspended or void, and declares itself the authority of the country.
123. Clearly, no such events occurred in 2004–2012. The complainants themselves understand this, which is why they do not claim that the United National Movement (UNM), let alone the other two parties, engaged in such actions. Therefore, they attempt (unsuccessfully and unconvincingly to any reasonable, neutral observer) to argue that “systematic and repeated violations of human rights” could be interpreted as an attempt to overthrow or violently change the constitutional order. In this regard, the complainants argue:

“An integral element of Georgia’s constitutional order is the principle of the rule of law and fundamental human rights, the systematic violation of which should be considered as undermining Georgia’s constitutional order. Accordingly, under the Constitution of Georgia, political activity that violates the rights of others is impermissible, as reflected both in Article 2 of the Constitution and the principle of the rule of law: the state recognizes and protects universally recognized human rights and freedoms as inalienable and supreme human values.”^[113]

124. The principle of the rule of law and fundamental human rights are indeed an integral part of Georgia’s constitutional order, but this does not mean that “systematic violations” by authorities or any party served an unconstitutional aim of “overthrowing” or “violently changing” the constitutional order. To infer such an unconstitutional aim from alleged crimes committed by state authorities—even serious ones—requires irrefutable evidence and highly convincing arguments, which the complainants have neither provided nor attempted to provide.

ii. Past “Systematic and Repeated Violations of Human Rights” Cannot Pose an Immediate and Real Threat to the Constitutional Order

125. As noted above, Article 23(3) of the Constitution requires that, for a party ban to be justified, it must be proven that the party’s activity poses an immediate and real threat to democracy and the constitutional order by seeking to overthrow it or change it by force. Past, non-immediate violations—even if they occurred in the distant past (which itself would require proof, and has not been proven)—cannot justify the extreme measure of banning a party. Although the Constitutional Court of Georgia has not yet had relevant practice in this regard, this principle is consistent with established European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.

iii. Systematic and Repeated Violations of Human Rights Cannot Be Attributed to the Respondent Parties

126. As noted above, the fact of “systematic and repeated violations of human rights” alone does not mean that the then-government pursued an unconstitutional aim of overthrowing or violently changing the constitutional order. Even if it did, the complainants cannot prove why alleged violations by state representatives in 2004–2012 (even if systematic and repeated) can be entirely attributed to the UNM. The complaint does not cite excerpts from the UNM’s statutes, program documents, or any other legally obtained evidence showing that the UNM: (a) incited or organized “systematic and repeated violations of human rights”; or (b) sought to achieve an unconstitutional aim of overthrowing or violently changing the constitutional order.
127. It is even more unclear how such actions and alleged unconstitutional aims could be attributed to the other two parties. While some leaders of one party—“Coalition for Change”—may have had past connections with the UNM, they no longer have any link to that party simply because they belong to another party, which includes many members who never had any connection to the UNM or state authorities. As for the second party, “Lelo – Strong Georgia,” any connection with the UNM is entirely paradoxical, since it largely consists of individuals who never had any connection with the UNM, including its leadership.

(b) Refusal to Recognize the Legitimacy of Authorities and Officeholders Elected through Universal Elections

128. According to the complainants, the second circumstance that allegedly demonstrates an unconstitutional aim of the respondent parties to “overthrow or violently change Georgia’s constitutional order” is that over the past ten years, the respondent parties allegedly refused to recognize the results of elections for central and local government bodies, refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of officeholders elected through elections, or boycotted elections.^[114]
129. Detailed discussion on this point is unnecessary. Refusing to recognize election results, declaring elected authorities or officeholders illegitimate, or boycotting elections are normal methods of political struggle in a democratic society. Associating these actions with an aim of overthrowing or violently changing the constitutional order is completely baseless to any reasonable, neutral observer. Forcing an individual or group to recognize certain election outcomes, and equating non-recognition with unconstitutional aims, is nothing more than banning them from holding and expressing their own opinion—an activity currently fully protected in this country.^[115]

(c) Lack of Evidence for Alleged Attempts to Overthrow or Violently Change Georgia’s Constitutional Order

130. The complainants claim that the respondent parties made “five attempts to overthrow or violently change Georgia’s constitutional order in 2022–2026.”^[116] Elsewhere, they mention six attempts but do not specify what the “sixth” attempt was.^[117] According to the complainants, these attempts occurred as follows:

• “In June 2022, unconstitutional political parties openly joined an attempt to overthrow Georgia’s constitutional order when non-partisan political activists, using the artificial pretext of denying Georgia EU candidate status, demanded the resignation of the Georgian government and the formation of a so-called technical government.”
• “In the spring of 2023, the spring of 2024, and the fall of 2024, unconstitutional political parties were directly involved in activities that allegedly encouraged violence and other destructive acts, during which three attempts to enter the Parliament and thus overthrow or violently change the constitutional order occurred.”
• “In the months leading up to the October 4, 2025, local elections, various political actors allegedly carried out an active public campaign and made statements advocating for the overthrow and violent replacement of Georgia’s government on October 4, 2025. All three allegedly unconstitutional political parties openly supported these calls. Although the authors of these statements often used the word ‘peaceful’ alongside the term ‘overthrow,’ this does not change the violent and unlawful nature of these statements, as ‘peaceful overthrow’ is an oxymoron that clearly indicates an unlawful attempt to change the constitutional order by force. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights has held that even statements containing terms like ‘jihad,’ when used in context suggesting force, can be considered as incitement to violence, regardless of qualifying words such as ‘legitimate.’ The violent and unlawful nature of the calls to overthrow the Georgian government was allegedly confirmed by events in Tbilisi on October 4, 2025.”^[118]

131. First and foremost, the above-described “facts” require proof, which is impossible since the sole evidence cited is the so-called parliamentary temporary investigative commission report, which, as already noted, was obtained in violation of the Constitution and the law and has no legal force.^[119]
132. Furthermore, even if any of the above circumstances were proven, they cannot be legally classified as “overthrowing” or “violent changing” of the constitutional order.

i. Events of June 2022

133. The demand in June 2022 for the resignation of the Georgian government and the creation of a technical government is a normal component of the political process. Declaring it an attempt to “overthrow or violently change” the constitutional order constitutes an unjustified restriction of the freedoms of assembly and association and is a weak and unsustainable argument.

ii. Events of Spring 2023, Spring 2024, and Fall 2024

134. The protests that occurred in Spring 2023, Spring 2024, and Fall 2024 were provoked by the ruling party, “Georgian Dream,” and were a consequence of:

• The adoption of anti-democratic laws, including the so-called “Foreign Influence Transparency” law (commonly, and quite justifiably, referred to as the “Russian law”) and the “Foreign Agents Registration Act” (so-called “FARA”), as well as amendments to the “Grants Law,” all aimed at obstructing the operation and even existence of civil society organizations.^[120] These laws were strongly criticized by the Venice Commission^[121] and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)^[122].
• Adoption of restrictive norms in legislation affecting the media.^[123]
• Amendments to the “Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations” and five packages of changes to the Code of Administrative Offenses, effectively undermining freedom of assembly.^[124] These laws were also heavily criticized by the Venice Commission^[125] and OSCE/ODIHR.^[126]
• Unlawful, criminal, and unprecedentedly harsh measures by law enforcement during protests, including mass beatings of peaceful demonstrators, often amounting to torture or other forms of ill-treatment, unlawful detentions, arrests, and imposition of heavy financial penalties.^[127]
• Illegal interference with journalists’ work, violence against media representatives by police and so-called “titushki,” and failure to investigate these crimes.^[128]
• Unlawful criminal prosecution of dozens of protest participants and the issuance of unjust verdicts based on illegally obtained evidence by courts.^[129]
• Widespread election fraud and,^[130] for example, the November 28, 2024 statement by so-called Prime Minister Kobakhidze suspending Georgia’s EU accession process, among other actions.

135. In any case, except for isolated incidents, these protests were peaceful in nature, and there is no basis to classify them as attempts to “overthrow” or “violently change” the constitutional order. Even isolated incidents of “violence,” even if established in a fair judicial process—which did not occur—would not pose a threat to the constitutional order sufficient to justify such a classification.
136. Moreover, these protests were spontaneous in nature, and no party, including the respondent parties, was considered their organizer. Therefore, even if an individual participant had the alleged goal of “overthrowing” or “violently changing” the constitutional order—which even the regime-controlled courts did not establish—this goal cannot be attributed to the respondent parties.

iii. Events of October 4, 2025

137. Regarding the events of October 4, 2025, the claim that these constituted an attempt to “overthrow” or “violently change” the constitutional order is entirely unfounded and unsubstantiated.
138. It is undisputed that the protests on Rustaveli Avenue and Freedom Square were peaceful, and no incidents occurred between the participants and the police.
139. The announcement of the National Assembly decision by Paata Burchuladze at Freedom Square was symbolic and cannot be considered an attempt to “overthrow” or “violently change” the constitutional order.
140. Concerning the incident near the Presidential Palace, where a small number of participants damaged the palace fence and entered the courtyard, the precise circumstances remain unclear. However, investigative journalists have documented certain facts that give rise to a well-founded suspicion that representatives of the authorities may have deliberately compromised the fence beforehand, so that minimal pressure would cause it to fall, simulating a violent takeover of the palace.^[131]
141. In any case, even if the events near the Presidential Palace could be classified as an “attempt to seize a strategic or high-importance facility,” they cannot be considered an attempt to “overthrow” or “violently change” the constitutional order. Under the current Georgian constitutional framework, the presidency and the Presidential Palace do not constitute centers of power whose capture could threaten the constitutional order.
142. Finally, regardless of how the events of October 4, 2025, are assessed, they cannot be attributed to the respondent parties, as none of them, as parties, through their leadership bodies, or through party officials, participated in organizing or directing these events. No evidence has been presented to substantiate such a claim, aside from vague political statements contained in the complaint.

2. Alleged Undermining of National Independence and Territorial Integrity

143. The claimants assert that the respondent parties also acted with the intent to undermine Georgia’s independence and violate its territorial integrity.^[132] According to the claimants, such unconstitutional objectives were evident in the August 2008 events^[133] and in the post-2012 period.^[134]

(a) Regarding the August 2008 War

144. The claimants allege:

“During its time in power (2004–2012), the United National Movement committed multiple acts against Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity, engaging in clearly unconstitutional activities that damaged prospects for the peaceful restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity and facilitated occupation and the consolidation of political positions by the occupying force. This is evidenced by the findings and evidence in the temporary investigative commission’s report, as well as other appropriate sources.”^[135]

145. More specifically, the claimants cite the following actions by the government between 2004 and 2012, allegedly aimed at undermining national independence and territorial integrity:

• Armed clashes in the direction of Tskhinvali in 2004;^[136]
• The abolition of the Ergneti bazaar in 2004;^[137]
• Statements by the then Minister of Defense in 2006 indicating that he would no longer hold office if he did not attend meetings in Tskhinvali during the New Year;^[138]
• Stopping a diplomatic vehicle carrying the Russian Ground Forces deputy commander and an ITAR-TASS correspondent in 2006, allegedly causing verbal and physical affronts;^[139]
• Conducting “alternative unconstitutional elections” in the Tskhinvali region in November 2006;^[140]
• Creating a temporary administrative-territorial unit in former South Ossetian territory in 2007;^[141]
• Assigning the name “Upper Abkhazia” to the Kodori Gorge on September 28, 2006;^[142]
• Actions in August 2008 to “prepare the ground” for occupation forces in the Tskhinvali region and support for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Resolution of October 2, 2008.^[143]

146. In a democratic society, political decisions can be subject to multiple, sometimes conflicting assessments. For example, many would view all the actions listed above as attempts by the government to restore the control of Georgia’s central authorities over its indigenous territories—namely, the Tskhinvali region and Abkhazia—which, under international law, are recognized as Georgian territory by all of Georgia’s friendly countries and partners (with the exception of the occupying power and its allies). Such lawful attempts, and their eventual outcomes, may be debated from a perspective of political expediency. However, qualifying these actions as serving the purpose of “undermining national independence” or “violating territorial integrity” is, first, an unqualified legal assessment and, second, at minimum, a gesture favoring the occupying state and an attempt to convince it that any action aimed at restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity is punishable under current law. At its most extreme, this could even be described as a betrayal of national interests.

(b) Events following 2012

147. The claimants allege that the respondent parties continued after 2012 to engage in activities aimed at undermining Georgia’s independence and violating its territorial integrity. They further assert:

“The United National Movement continued to commit acts against Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity after 2012, together with other closely aligned unconstitutional political parties. This is evidenced by the findings and evidence of the temporary investigative commission, as well as other appropriate sources. The claimants categorize these actions into two types:

• Damaging the prospects for the peaceful restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity and promoting or attempting to provoke active hostilities between Georgia and Russia;
• Assisting foreign powers in undermining Georgia’s independence.”^[144]

148. The claimants argue that against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war, the respondent parties are attempting to escalate tensions between Georgia and Russia in the same form and manner as the United National Movement allegedly did prior to the 2008 war.^[145] According to them, such escalation carries the immediate threat of active hostilities, which would have catastrophic consequences for Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity, comparable to the outcomes of the 2008 escalation.^[146]
149. The claimants list specific steps that, in their view, demonstrate the respondent parties’ intent:

• Publicly demanding that the government authorize international flights transporting Georgian volunteers to fight in Ukraine;^[147]
• Publicly calling for sanctions against Russia;^[148]
• Labeling the Georgian government as “pro-Russian” without basis;^[149]
• Avoiding clear and immediate disassociation from European Parliament resolutions imposing sanctions on Russia, which were adopted “through the initiative or support of these unconstitutional political parties”;^[150]
• Failing to distance themselves from repeated appeals by Ukrainian authorities for Georgia to participate in hostilities against Russia, including expressions of dissatisfaction and “attacks” on the Georgian government, such as the July 2023 demand that Georgia’s ambassador leave Ukraine.^[151]

150. According to the claimants, these actions supposedly reveal the respondent parties’ intent to provoke Russian aggression similar to that of August 2008 and thereby contribute to “undermining national independence” and “violating territorial integrity.” Under the logic presented by the claimants, any political statement condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, supporting the Ukrainian people, or favoring international sanctions on Russia would allegedly constitute an act aimed at undermining Georgia’s independence and violating its territorial integrity. Clearly, this reasoning is devoid of legal logic and common sense.
151. The claimants also contend that attempts to undermine Georgia’s independence occur in other ways, alleging that the respondent parties seek to “penalize” Georgia and its authorities internationally.^[152] Examples cited include:

• Actions harmful to visa-free travel arrangements for Georgian citizens in EU member states;^[153]
• Efforts obstructing Georgia’s EU accession, including misusing the EU’s denial of candidate status for Georgia in June 2022 as a mechanism of sabotage;^[154]
• Obstructing implementation of obligations under EU-determined processes by the Georgian parliament in 2022–2023, thereby delaying Georgia’s accession to EU candidate status;^[155]
• Supporting or facilitating international informational attacks on the Georgian state and government, including attempts to impose foreign sanctions or other punitive measures, as reflected in EU parliamentary documents and U.S. domestic legislative initiatives (e.g., the “Friends of Georgia Act” proposed by Congressman Joe Wilson).^[156]

152. It is a widely known fact, also documented in the very sources cited by the claimants (Council of Europe and European Parliament resolutions, the “Friends of Georgia Act,” etc.), that any threats to Georgia’s EU candidate status, its maintenance, or the visa-free regime with the EU are a direct result of the anti-democratic, anti-national, and anti-European efforts of the Georgian Dream regime and, among others, the members of the so-called parliament, who carried out these actions in recent years, especially over the last eighteen months.^[157] Therefore, the claimants themselves bear responsibility for the sabotage of Georgia’s European future.

Conclusion

153. In conclusion, as noted at the outset of these considerations, it is our view that the Constitutional Court should refuse to accept this constitutional complaint for review. Alternatively, if the Court has accepted it, it should reject the claims. This is the Constitutional Court’s obligation to posterity and to history.