The monitoring conducted by "Transparency International - Georgia" has shown that the use of administrative resources for the parliamentary elections of October 26, when the line between the ruling party and the state has effectively been erased, is a serious problem for the fairness of the election environment.

The main challenges include: the worsened legislation, including the negative impact of the "Russian law" on the electoral environment; the use of the Anti-Corruption Bureau and Communications Commission to harass civil society and critical broadcasters; attacks on opposition representatives and their ineffective investigation; coercion of voters, including public servants, through threats, intimidation, illegal collection of personal data, and taking away of ID cards; large-scale mobilization of public sector employees for the purposes of the ruling party’s election campaign; misuse of budget programs for narrow partisan purposes, and other corrupt practices.

The monitoring from July 1 to October 15, 2024, revealed the following findings:

Misuse of Legal Administrative Resources for Electoral Purposes

• Adoption of the “Russian Law”: In April 2024, the government re-initiated the previously failed legislative initiative - the so-called law “On Transparency of Foreign Influence” (“Russian Law”). Despite mass protests within the country and extremely harsh reactions from Georgia’s Western partners, the government still passed the law. According to the Venice Commission, the restrictions set by the Law to the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association and privacy are incompatible with the strict test set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The events surrounding the adoption of the law have negatively impacted the electoral processes.
• Changes to the CEC Composition Rules: In spring 2024, Parliament adopted amendments to the election legislation, changing the rules for composing the Central Election Commission (CEC). The amendments allowed the ruling party, in case of failure to achieve a formal ⅗ majority, to elect, at their own discretion, without considering the opposition views, the CEC chairperson and other “non-partisan” members with 76 votes. The Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR expressed sharp criticisms and numerous recommendations regarding amendments, none of which were ultimately considered by the Georgian government.
• Abolition of Gender Quotas: Another legislative change in April 2024 abolished the mandatory gender quotas in Parliament and local self-government bodies. The President’s veto was used in this case as well which Parliament overrode once again. The legislative package, which drew criticism from the Venice Commission, was discussed and adopted through expedited procedures.
• Expansion of the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s Powers: In summer 2024, the government made several amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law “On Political Associations of Citizens”, granting additional powers to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB). Specifically, if a party fails to meet certain financial requirements, the ACB can request the registering body to cancel that party’s registration, which contradicts Georgia’s Constitution. Additionally, the ACB was granted the authority to request any information from any person, including the information containing special categories of personal data and banking secrets, which comes into conflict with the existing personal data and banking laws..
• Introduction of the institute of “Delegates”: In May 2024, Parliament passed another amendment to the Election Code, according to which parties were given a right to designate persons included in their parliamentary list as “delegates” of voters registered in electoral districts. The purpose of this change was to replace the former majoritarian deputy concept with these so-called delegates.
• Drawing Lots for the Division of Precinct Commission Members’ Functions: On August 16, 2024, the CEC adopted a decree stating that the drawing of the lots to divide functions among commission members at polling stations would be held 7 days before election day instead of on election day. This change undermines the transparency of the electoral process and contradicts the Election Code. Under the previous rule, this procedure was held between 7:00 and 8:00 AM on election day.
• Assigning Zviad Kharebashvili, a US Sanctioned Police Official, Known for Violent Crackdown on Peaceful Protesters, to Creating “Territorial Groups” Supposedly Responsible for Ensuring Election Day Security: On September 30, 2024, the Minister of Internal Affairs issued an order to create “groups responsible for the prevention of violations of law and response to these violations” - the so-called “territorial groups” in Georgia's regions and Tbilisi. Zviad Kharazishvili, the head of the Special Assignment Department of the Ministry of Interior, who has been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for serious human rights abuses, and namely because of the violent treatment of anti-government demonstrators during Spring 2024 protests, will be put in charge of forming these groups. These groups can come into play even when there is a “flow of crowd” near the polling station. Putting Kharasishvili, a symbol of police brutality, in charge of this endeavor could be aimed at seeding fear among the opposition supporters on the election day.
• Problem of Stability of Election Legislation: Overall, the government's aggressive legislative policy during the election year aimed at deteriorating previously existing legislative standards is incompatible with the established international standard, according to which election legislation should be stable and should not be open to amendment less than one year before an election.

Misuse of Executive Administrative Resources for Electoral Purposes

• Unlawful Decisions of the So-called Independent Institutions: During the pre-election period, so-called “independent institutions” - the ACB and the Communications Commission (the ComCom) - demonstrated, with their decisions taken presumably on government orders, loyalty to the government, aiming to harass civil society and media critical of the government.
• Illegal Decisions of the ACB: On September 24, 2024, the ACB head issued a decision against “Transparency International - Georgia” and its Executive Director Eka Gigauri, designating both as persons with “declared electoral goals”. In his decision, the ACB head substantially misinterpreted the provisions of the organic law, as the factual circumstances did not allow for such a decision. Later, at a public “request” of the Prime Minister, the ACB head revoked the decision. Despite this, the revoked decision still left its mark on Transparency International - Georgia’s activities during the pre-election period, as instead of focusing on its monitoring mission, the organization spent a week in planning and implementing a legal strategy against this decision, which, inter-alia disrupted the recruitment effort of election day monitoring.
• Harassment of Critical Media by the ComCom: Starting from August, throughout September and October, the ComCom repeatedly declared government-critical broadcasters - “Mtavari”, “Formula”, and “TV Pirveli” - as offenders for various reasons, resulting in heavy fines imposed by courts. The ComCom’s repressive decisions were triggered by a number of lawful and legitimate decisions by the broadcasters: 
  • to air advertising videos aimed to promote the country’s Euro-Integration and to cover anti-“Russian Law” protests; 
  • refusal to air “Georgian Dream’s” pre-election advertisement which portrayed NGO representatives, including election monitoring organizations, in an unethical, unfair, and misleading context; 
  • refusal to air a “Georgian Dream” campaign advertisement that exploited the tragedy of Ukrainian people and used Russia’s destruction of Ukrainian cities for their electoral purposes; 
  • granting qualified subject status to the party “Gakharia for Georgia”, etc.
• Violence Against Opposition Parties by Groups Affiliated with the Ruling Party: During the pre-election period, groups presumably organized by the ruling party remained aggressive, attacking opposition party representatives and hindering their normal election campaign activities. Specifically, representatives of the “National Movement”, “Coalition for Change”, and “Gakharia for Georgia” became victims of such attacks. On two occasions, the representatives of the “National Movement” also fell victim to police violence and illegal arrests.
• Criminal Influence on Voter Will: Various forms of voter manipulation continued to emerge - including threats, intimidation, illegal obtaining of personal data, confiscation of ID cards, vote-buying, making and fulfilling illegal promises - as described in the 2022 study published by “Transparency International - Georgia” and “International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy”, which was based on whistle-blowing revelations by the former Deputy Head of State Security Service, Ioseb Gogashvili.
• Illegal Scheme for Collecting Personal Data from Public Servants: On October 12, 2024, the TV “Pirveli” investigative journalism program “Nodar Meladze Saturday” aired a story about secret lists of employees and their family members from ministries, municipalities, other public institutions, state and government-affiliated private companies, evidencing the ill-practice of public officials being instructed and forced to collect and forward their personal and family members’ personal data to the ruling party to ensure their votes to be given to “Georgian Dream” in elections. Such actions contain the elements of several criminal offenses under the Criminal Code of Georgia.
• Illegal Scheme for Collecting Personal Data of Tens of Thousands of Residents of Adjara: On October 15, online publication “Batumelebi” published an article revealing multiple facts confirming once again the criminal schemes described in 2022 study published by Transparency International - Georgia and International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy. According to the article, “Georgian Dream” is processing sensitive personal data of tens of thousands of people in their party offices before elections. This is confirmed by documents provided to “Batumelebi” by an informed person.
• Smear Campaign Against Civil Society Activists: During the pre-election period, an aggressive smear and hate campaign was continued against local observer organizations and their leaders. Personified attacks and defamation went beyond the social and traditional media and appeared on a massive scale through photos and posters on the streets across the country. “Georgian Dream’s” campaign advertisement that portrayed several civil society leaders in an unethical and misleading context is notable in this regard. Additionally, in October, an anonymous author presumably connected to “Georgian Dream" launched a new website called “USAმშობლო”, which badly vilifies civil society activists. The ComCom and the CEC failed to react to these palpable breaches of the broadcasting and election law.

Misuse of Institutional Administrative Resources for Electoral Purposes

• Participation of Ruling Party Candidates in Budgetary Events: During the reporting period, several trends of institutional administrative resource misuse were observed. Like in previous elections, the most notable was the ruling party’s electoral candidates’ participation in various state or locally funded events, which took the form of campaigning for them as ruling party candidates. Such cases were recorded nationwide and once again revealed the lack of a clear boundary between the state and the ruling party before elections. Typically, municipalities organizing various events (launching infrastructure projects, local celebrations, various award ceremonies) would give floor to “Georgian Dream’s” publicly announced parliamentary candidates who simultaneously held some national political positions. The participation of “Georgian Dream” candidates in such events usually made them the main actors of these events: they would address the public, cut ribbons at infrastructure facilities, pass awards, etc. As a result, budget-funded events were used for campaigning purposes for the ruling party’s parliamentary candidates. To this date, we have identified up to ten such cases; however, it is not ruled out that similar facts may have occurred many more times.
• Mobilization of Public Servants in Ruling Party Pre-Election Gatherings: The mobilization of civil servants and other budget-funded organization employees at “Georgian Dream’s” pre-election meetings was a widespread practice. Since they are, in various forms, professionally subordinate to political officials, there is a high risk that they have participated in the election campaigns against their will.

Misuse of Financial Administrative Resources for Electoral Purposes

• Spending of Budgetary Funds for Ruling Party Electoral Purposes: Since July, Transparency International - Georgia has identified twelve different types of large-scale socio-economic initiatives by the Georgian government and other public institutions, which can be considered as electorally motivated spending of state and municipal budgetary funds. In a context where the line between the ruling party and the state has effectively been erased, such initiatives provide benefits at taxpayers’ expense and put the “Georgian Dream” in an advantageous position compared to their rivals. Examples of such spending include a Georgian government decree allocating GEL 250,000 from the government’s reserves fund to the government administration “to support the events to be held for the appreciation of successful Georgians and promotion of their professions”; another government decree allocating GEL 20 million to municipalities for financing local projects; decisions by the Adjara government to support socially vulnerable families, beekeepers, families with twins, and others.

Recommendations

• The government should ensure the stability of election law and refrain from frequently amending it, especially in less than one year before an election.
• At the same time, it is necessary that all outstanding recommendations that the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission have reiterated from year to year in their opinions be incorporated in election law.
• Any amendment that may be made to election law should be preceded by broad consultations among the parties, civil society organizations and expert groups, and should be based on a broad consensus.
• During a pre-election period, the law enforcement agencies should quickly and impartially investigate any acts of violence or pressure or other behaviors containing elements of crime against the persons involved in the electoral process.
• The government should revoke the recently granted unconstitutional power to the ACB to indicate to the registering agency to repeal for whatever reason the registration of a political party. 
• The CEC should not pass or revoke the already passed acts which may be in conflict with the superior legal acts of Georgia. 
• The Ministry of the Interior and other government institutions should not allow the engagement in the election process of any persons sanctioned by Georgia’s western partners, including the US-sanctioned Zviad Kharazishvili.
• The courts should exercise a genuine judicial review of the decisions and acts of administrative agencies.
• The ACB should refrain from designating, without any lawful grounds and based on arbitrary interpretations of legal provisions, the civil society organizations and activists as persons having “declared electoral goals”.
• The ComCom should refrain from harassing the critical media by their groundless and arbitrary decisions and exercise a genuine control over the political parties’, specially the ruling party’s productions of political ads containing hate speech and unethical and misleading messages.
• The relevant law enforcement agencies should conduct timely investigation of the allegations of vote-buying, deprivation of ID cards, unlawful collection of voters’ personal data, otherwise influencing the voters’ will, interferences with parties’ normal electoral campaigns, especially physical assaults on, showdowns with, or other violent acts against the representatives of opposition parties, and any breaches of law which may have impact on the election process and on the election outcomes.
• The government agencies should refrain from mobilizing the public servants and employees of other budget-funded organizations to attend against their will and under duress the ruling party’s campaign events.
• The government should refrain from launching large-scale social programs in a short-time period before elections which may affect the healthy competition between the electoral subjects.