Criminal proceedings are currently underway before the Criminal Cases Panel of the Tbilisi City Court against eight political leaders. The case is being heard by Judge Tamar Makharoblidze, while the prosecutors are Ani Khubejashvili and Lasha Kotrikadze.

This case stands out even among the recent high-profile proceedings bearing the hallmarks of political justice, as never since the restoration of Georgia’s independence have so many political leaders simultaneously stood trial on such serious charges. The gravest of these charges carries a possible sentence of up to 15 years’ imprisonment.

Among the defendants are:

• Mikheil Saakashvili, the third President of Georgia and leader of the “United National Movement.” He has been charged under Article 317 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (CCG), which establishes criminal liability for publicly calling for the violent overthrow of the constitutional order of Georgia or the overthrow of state authority, punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment.
• Elene Khoshtaria, leader of the political associations “Droa” and “Coalition for Change.” She is charged under Article 318(1), Article 319, and Article 321¹(1) of the CCG, concerning sabotage; assistance to a foreign state, foreign organization, or organization under foreign control in activities aimed at undermining the state interests of Georgia; and the collection or provision of financial resources or other property with prior knowledge that they will be used, wholly or partially, for the commission of the aforementioned offenses. If convicted, she faces a sentence of up to 15 years’ imprisonment.
• Giorgi Vashadze, leader of “Unity – National Movement” and “Strategy Aghmashenebeli.” He has been charged under Article 318(1) and Article 319 of the CCG.
• Zurab Japaridze, leader of “Girchi – More Freedom” and “Coalition for Change.” He has likewise been charged under Article 318(1) and Article 319 of the CCG.
• Nika Gvaramia and Nika Melia, leaders of the “Coalition for Change.” They have been charged under Article 318(1) of the CCG.
• Mamuka Khazaradze and Badri Japaridze, leaders of the political associations “Lelo” and “Strong Georgia.” They have also been charged under Article 318(1) of the CCG.

Accordingly, the targets of criminal prosecution are the leaders of all major opposition parties possessing meaningful public influence. This naturally gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the government of Bidzina Ivanishvili and his “Georgian Dream” party is using criminal proceedings as a means of restricting, or even eliminating, political competition. This becomes particularly apparent against the backdrop of a constitutional complaint currently pending before the Constitutional Court of Georgia, filed by the parliamentary faction of “Georgian Dream,” seeking the prohibition of the four most influential political parties in the country.

It should also be noted that several defendants — Giorgi Vashadze, Zurab (“Girchi”) Japaridze, Nika Gvaramia, and Mamuka Khazaradze — were imprisoned last year as well for failing to appear before the temporary parliamentary investigative commission established by the “Dream” parliament. Three others — Mikheil Saakashvili, Elene Khoshtaria, and Nika Melia — are currently detained in penitentiary institutions for various alleged “offenses.”

If the above-mentioned so-called “crimes” are proven, all of them will now face lengthy imprisonment.

Finally, in the same context, it should also be recalled that several other political figures, including former chairman of United National Movement Levan Khabeishvili, Paata Burchuladze, Murtaz Zodelava, Irakli Nadiradze, Paata Manjgaladze, and others, are already serving sentences in connection with other political cases.

Part One

The Political Nature of the Case

(a) The Soviet Character of the Charges

This case is unique in that the basis of the prosecution is not any single concrete episode or act allegedly committed by the defendants, but rather the general critical attitudes and positions of opposition political leaders toward ongoing developments in Georgia. In other words, the politicians are being punished for being opposition politicians.

In the propaganda media affiliated with “Georgian Dream,” this case is frequently referred to as the “sabotage case,” although this does not correspond to reality. In fact, the defendants are charged not only with sabotage itself, but also with other even more serious offenses directed against the state. However, labeling this complex prosecution simply as a “sabotage case” is a propaganda tactic serving a dual purpose.

First, concise labels are more effective for the intended audience of propaganda — the remaining supporters of “Georgian Dream” and politically uninformed individuals — than lengthy legal formulations. Instead of explaining in detail what the politicians are accused of, propagandists merely state that they are all engaged in “sabotage.”

Second, the term “sabotage” evokes reminiscences of the Bolshevik-Soviet past. Victims of Leninist-Stalinist repression were frequently accused of “sabotage” or “subversive activity” against the Soviet state.

However, this seemingly effective propaganda maneuver also has a boomerang effect, which the political technologists of “Georgian Dream” appear to have overlooked. Precisely because opposition political leaders are being accused of sabotage in the style of Soviet purges of the 1920s and 1930s, the accusations themselves inevitably appear as artificial, fabricated, and unconvincing as the cases once fabricated against victims of Soviet repression.

Thus, this case may be regarded as one of the most symbolic and serious episodes in Georgia’s ongoing political developments. The problem is not merely that so many political leaders are simultaneously accused of criminal offenses — the case concerns the model of relations between the state and the political opposition, the authorities’ attitude toward protest, and the use of criminal law instruments for political purposes.

The principal feature of this process is that crimes directed against the state — sabotage, undermining state interests, activities linked to foreign powers — have been associated not with armed groups, secret networks, or organizers of violent conspiracies, but with openly operating opposition political leaders and the political positions they publicly expressed. This is precisely what gives the case its political and legal gravity.

In effect, the case constructs a narrative according to which sharp political opposition to the government, support for street protests, and critical political rhetoric are treated as activities directed against national security. In such circumstances, the boundary between political responsibility and criminal liability becomes particularly significant. In a democratic system, even aggressive, radical, and emotional political rhetoric directed against the authorities is generally protected under freedom of expression, provided it does not directly and specifically incite violent acts.

(b) The Case Concerns Not Only Politicians, but Also Civil Society and Dissenting Citizens

The initiation of criminal prosecution against opposition political leaders did not constitute an isolated legal reaction by “Georgian Dream” to specific events. Rather, it may be assessed as the culmination of a gradually developing and consistently expanding state campaign that, over nearly a year, affected various social and political groups.

Analysis of this process demonstrates that state actions progressively expanded over time, both in terms of the range of targeted subjects and the repressive instruments employed.

• The process began in December 2024, directly alongside protest demonstrations, with the detention of civic activists. At that stage, the state’s repressive machinery focused on criminalizing direct participants in the protests. Activists were first charged, and later convicted, for participation in both individual and group acts of violence. At that point, the ruling power’s target remained public protest itself as a form of political expression.

The aim of criminal prosecution against civic activists was to portray the exercise of freedom of expression and assembly as conduct directed against public security. Their convictions were intended to send a message to society that participation in protests could lead to severe legal consequences for any individual.

• From April 2025 onward, the process took a new direction, shifting from direct participants to those individuals and organizations providing support to the protest movement or expressing solidarity with activists. Attention first focused on the solidarity funds established during the November–December 2024 protests. The state portrayed these support mechanisms as potential forms of unlawful financial activity or encouragement of criminal conduct.

In this context, various investigative measures were carried out — searches of the homes and personal belongings of fund managers, summonses before magistrate judges, examination of financial operations, and seizure of bank accounts. These actions had not only legal consequences but also a clear deterrent effect: they signaled that not only direct protest, but also financial, organizational, or humanitarian support for protests could be perceived by the state as suspicious or criminal activity.

• In August–September 2025, this approach expanded even further and came to encompass the non-governmental sector more generally. At this stage, repressive practices were no longer linked solely to particular protests or solidarity funds, but affected broad segments of civil society. Georgian NGOs engaged in critical activity toward the government became objects of investigative and administrative pressure.

Among the organizations targeted by the Prosecutor’s Office was our own organization — Transparency International Georgia — as well as its Executive Director, Eka Gigauri, who, at the Prosecutor’s Office request, was twice summoned and questioned before a magistrate judge in September and December 2025. The records of her questioning, together with the financial documentation of Transparency International Georgia, are included in the case materials.

This created the impression that the state was gradually moving beyond the investigation of specific criminal acts toward the systematic restriction of critical civic and political space. Particularly significant at this stage was the emergence of a logic of “expanding responsibility”: initially the prosecution targeted direct activists, then support networks, and ultimately the entire civic sector naturally expressing critical opinions regarding the unlawful actions of the authorities.

The culmination of this process came in October 2025 with the filing of charges against eight opposition political leaders. It was at this stage that the process initiated by “Georgian Dream” in December 2024 fully acquired a clear political character.

Whereas in the initial stages the authorities justified their actions as necessary to preserve public order and prevent violence, the subsequent criminal prosecution of opposition leaders created a well-founded assumption that the entire preceding process constituted a consistent strategy aimed at discrediting and weakening the political opposition.

More generally, criminal prosecution connected to protest against the ruling power — particularly when it concerns political party leaders and publicly significant figures — inevitably raises questions regarding the neutrality, proportionality, and possible political motivation of the legal process.

Thus, the chronological development of events creates a picture in which the investigative and procedural measures carried out at different stages may be perceived not as separate cases, but as a coherent and progressive process: initially, the criminalization of protest participants; then the targeting of their financial and solidarity networks; next, pressure against a broad segment of civil society; and finally, the imposition of criminal liability upon political opposition leaders.

It is precisely this continuity and gradual expansion that strengthens the argument that the matter concerns not isolated criminal proceedings, but rather a broader policy directed toward state control over political and civic space.

Of these four major groups, judgments have already been delivered against the first group — participants in civic protests — and they are currently serving prison sentences. The fourth group — political leaders — is already before the courts, and convictions may be delivered at any time. The remaining two groups — solidarity funds and civil society organizations — have not yet been formally charged.

However, the fact that representatives of civil society, including our organization’s director Eka Gigauri, have not yet been indicted does not mean that they are not under threat. On the contrary, the threat remains present and hangs over civil society like the sword of Damocles, capable of falling at any moment whenever the leadership of “Georgian Dream,” or more precisely Bidzina Ivanishvili, so desires.

Part Two

Legal Analysis of the Case: Lack of Substantiation of the Charges

(a) Absence of a Connection between the Different Stages of the Investigation

Crimes directed against state security require an exceptionally high evidentiary standard. It is necessary not only to describe an aggressive political background or protest-related tensions, but also to establish a direct connection between a specific individual and a specific criminal plan. The mere fact that a politician attended a protest, criticized the government, or made emotional statements cannot automatically constitute sabotage or anti-state activity.

However, at no stage of the investigation has any evidence emerged linking the protest participants, leaders of solidarity funds and civil society organizations, and/or the subsequently charged political leaders to one another. This is particularly notable given that at least half of the 45 volumes of case materials concern the protest participants detained in December 2024, the leaders of solidarity funds and civil society organizations, and investigative actions conducted in relation to them.

A natural question therefore arises: if a substantial portion of the case file is devoted specifically to civil protests, solidarity funds, and civil society, then criminal-law logic would require the establishment of a direct link between each of these actors and the political leaders, so that it would be clear to an objective observer that this was a unified plan, reflecting a single intent, in which each participant had a defined role, objectives, and tasks.

Yet the problem is precisely that within this enormous body of materials there is not a single piece of evidence confirming such a connection. The impression is created that the investigation is merely attempting to construct the image of a broad political network and threat, despite the fact that individual criminal liability must rest on concrete evidence. Criminal law does not operate on the basis of associations — it requires a clear connection between specific alleged accomplices, each individual’s intent, and the alleged criminal conduct.

The temporal factor is also particularly sensitive politically. If the State genuinely believed that the case concerned organized activities directed against the constitutional order or threats connected to foreign interests, a rapid and immediate response would have been expected. Instead, the large-scale prosecution of opposition leaders began several months later. This circumstance raises doubts that the case is less about an immediate security threat and more about the management of political processes.

(b) The Ideological Alignment of the Charges with the Political Narratives of “Georgian Dream”

The criminal prosecution of political leaders acquires particular significance in light of the political statements made by representatives of the ruling power. Reference is made, inter alia, to discussions of “five revolutions” or similar scenarios, which are frequently invoked in public speeches by Irakli Kobakhidze and other leaders of Georgian Dream as a kind of mythological narrative concerning possible threats directed against the State.

Regardless of whether such statements have any real factual basis (in Georgia they clearly do not, at least insofar as no supporting evidence has been presented to the public), they cannot automatically be accorded evidentiary value in legal analysis for the purpose of establishing the criminal liability of specific individuals. As a rule, they describe general political perceptions or security assessments, but they cannot replace the requirement that criminal accusations be based on individualized logic grounded in concrete facts and proven conduct.

In a democratic state governed by the rule of law, it is particularly important that instruments designed to protect national security not be transformed into tools for criminalizing political opposition, critical opinion, or protest activity. However, the present criminal case against political leaders points in precisely the opposite direction.

Below is a description of the constituent elements of the crimes imputed to the political leaders, in order to clarify what the prosecution controlled by “Georgian Dream” would have been required to prove for these charges to acquire even a minimal degree of substantiation.

(c) Constituent Elements of the Imputed Offences

The offences provided for under Articles 317, 318, 319, and 321¹ of the Criminal Code of Georgia, which have been charged against the political leaders in various combinations, belong to the category of crimes against state security. Criminal liability in such cases depends not only on the objective manifestation of conduct, but also on strictly defined subjective purposes and intent on the part of the accused. In each case, the prosecution bears the burden of proving both the factual commission of the act and its purposive and mental elements.

Article 317 – Public Calls for the Violent Change of the Constitutional Order of Georgia or the Overthrow of State Authority

The objective elements of this offence include:

• a public call for the violent alteration of the constitutional order or overthrow of the government;
• dissemination of materials containing such calls; or
• incitement to armament.

The subjective element requires direct intent — the person must be aware that their conduct is directed toward the violent alteration of the state order and must intentionally engage in such advocacy.

The prosecution must prove that:

• a public call was made (or materials of such content were disseminated);
• the content of the call objectively constituted advocacy of violent change or overthrow;
• the conduct was public and accessible to third parties;
• the accused possessed direct intent to facilitate the violent alteration of the constitutional order.

Article 318 – Sabotage

Sabotage encompasses conduct that is directed toward weakening the State; and manifests itself through the intentional obstruction of the normal functioning of a state or other enterprise, institution, or organization. Sabotage is a material or result offence. Its existence requires the occurrence of a harmful result and the presence of a causal link between the act committed and the resulting consequence.

This offence places particular emphasis on purpose — namely, the weakening of the State — which constitutes the central element of the subjective component.

The prosecution must prove that:

• a specific act obstructed normal functioning;
• the act was unlawful and intentional;
• the purpose of the act was to weaken the State (rather than merely to pursue a private or administrative dispute);
• a causal link existed between the act and the disruption of functioning.

Article 319 – Assisting a Foreign State, Foreign Organization, or an Organization under Foreign Control in Hostile Activities

The objective element of this offence consists of assisting a foreign state or organization in activities aimed at infringing the interests of Georgia.

The prosecution must prove that:

• an act of assistance took place (financial, organizational, informational, or otherwise);
• assistance was rendered to a foreign entity;
• the entity was engaged in activities contrary to the interests of Georgia;
• the accused was aware of the hostile nature of such activities;
• the conduct does not fall under another, more specific criminal provision.

Article 321¹ – Financing or Other Material Support of Activities Directed Against the Constitutional Order and the Foundations of National Security of Georgia

This provision covers:

• the collection or provision of financial resources, property, or other resources;
• with the knowledge that they would or could be used in crimes directed against state security.

The subjective element is especially strict — prior awareness is required.

The prosecution must prove that:

• the accused provided financial or material support;
• such support was directly or indirectly directed toward specific criminal activity;
• the accused knew or should have known in advance the intended use of the resources;
• a connection existed between the financing and activities directed against the constitutional order;
• the conduct is not covered by another, less severe, or more specific legal provision.

(d) Lack of Substantiation of the Charges and Their Incompatibility with the Imputed Offences

Accordingly, with respect to each of the above-mentioned offences, the prosecution was required not only to establish facts proving the objective elements of the offences, but also clearly defined subjective elements — namely purpose, intent, and awareness. The prosecution failed to discharge these obligations. For example:

• With regard to sabotage, the prosecution was required to present evidence showing that the conduct of each political leader charged with sabotage genuinely and substantially disrupted the normal functioning of a state institution — in this case, Parliament — and that such conduct was undertaken with the aim of weakening Georgia. Mere political criticism, participation in protests, calls for boycott, or harsh statements directed against the system cannot constitute sabotage. The prosecution was required to present clear evidence establishing both a causal link between specific conduct and the alleged consequence, and direct intent — namely, that the person was consciously pursuing an anti-state objective and intended to damage the interests of the State.

In the present case, the testimonies of certain police officers (though not all of them), which themselves lack credibility, merely establish that some of the accused political leaders, for example Elene Khoshtaria, were present on Chichinadze Street at the time when certain confrontations occurred between police officers and demonstrators. However, the nature of this confrontation, or who inspired or provoked it, has not been established at all. Furthermore, there is no evidence indicating that Elene Khoshtaria directed any alleged operation of “pushing against” police officers. Most importantly, even if it had been proven that Elene Khoshtaria had called on others to “push against” police officers, it has not been demonstrated whatsoever that this in any way obstructed the “normal functioning” of Parliament. On the contrary, throughout 2024, including during the protests of November–December 2024, there was not even a brief period during which Parliament ceased functioning or its ordinary activities were materially disrupted. To the contrary, it continued operating and adopted numerous anti-democratic laws during that period.

However, the absence of these most essential elements of the offence of sabotage — namely, a harmful result and a causal link between the act committed and the resulting consequence — does not prevent Georgia’s present-day law enforcement and justice systems from charging and even convicting individuals of sabotage as a completed offence. Quite recently, Levan Khabeishvili was convicted, along with another offence, of committing sabotage on the grounds that he had called on police officers not to comply with unlawful orders issued by their superiors, promising that, should he come to power, he would reward those officers for doing so. Apparently, it was precisely such conduct that the court regarded as constituting completed sabotage (when delivering the judgment, the court made no reference to Article 19 of the Criminal Code, which is ordinarily invoked where there is an attempted offence rather than a completed one), despite the absence of any evidence whatsoever that Levan Khabeishvili’s promise caused even the slightest disruption to the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs — there was not a single instance of a police officer refusing to comply with an order.

• Likewise, regarding the allegation of calls for the violent alteration of the constitutional order or overthrow of the government, it is irrelevant what type of critical statements an accused person may have made about the constitutional order or, especially, about the government, since such political statements enjoy a high level of protection under freedom of expression standards. Moreover, even calls to “push against” police officers — assuming such calls had actually been proven — could not suffice to support this type of charge, because such statements do not necessarily imply an intention to violently alter the constitutional order or overthrow the government. The prosecution was required to present evidence that any of the accused had in fact made statements advocating violent alteration of the constitutional order or overthrow of the government, and that such statements reflected the speaker’s corresponding intent. In addition, it is of critical importance whether there existed any real danger that such calls could produce practical consequences. No evidence supporting any of the foregoing exists in the case file.
• Similarly, there is no evidence in the case file demonstrating assistance to a foreign state or organization in “hostile activities” directed against the interests of Georgia. No foreign subject — state or organization — allegedly engaged in “hostile activities” against Georgia has been identified, let alone has the nature of such “hostile activities” been specified. There were suggestions that the accused were allegedly working toward the imposition of sanctions by democratic states against political representatives of “Georgian Dream” and public officials. However, even if this were true, the imposition of sanctions against specific individuals — regardless of their official position — cannot be regarded as hostile activity against Georgia as a State.

As for the alleged “hostile subjects,” if one follows the political rhetoric of representatives of the ruling party, it would appear that the prosecution regards the European Union and its institutions, the state bodies and diplomatic representations of individual EU member states (for example Sweden, Denmark, Germany, and the Baltic states), as well as the United Kingdom and the United States to be “hostile subjects.”

• Finally, where a person is charged with financing or otherwise materially supporting activities directed against the constitutional order and the foundations of national security of Georgia, the prosecution was required not only to prove that specific financial assistance, grants, or donations had been provided, but also to demonstrate that the resources in question were specifically used, or could have been used, for the commission of crimes against state security and, most importantly, that the accused acted with prior awareness of this. Criminal-law logic requires a concrete connection between the financial resources, the alleged criminal plan, and the individual’s knowledge. No evidence proving such a connection has been presented in the case file.

In relation to all four offences, the principle of individual criminal responsibility is decisive. Criminal law does not operate on the basis of collective suspicion, ideological affinity, or associative connections. Even if it had been proven that some foreign entity had engaged in hostile activities against Georgia — which clearly has never been proven and cannot be proven because no such activities existed — the mere fact that the accused participated in the same protest movement, shared common political positions regarding the protests, or even communicated with Western partners in one form or another cannot in itself establish the existence of a common criminal plan among them. The role, intent, knowledge, and specific conduct of each individual must be established independently and on the basis of clear evidence.

It is also particularly important to take into account temporal and contextual factors. When the State claims that a case concerns an organized threat directed against the constitutional order and national security, one would naturally expect a swift, consistent, and immediate response. In circumstances where large-scale criminal prosecution begins only after a prolonged period, and where the main body of the accusations is built upon political rhetoric, broad narratives, and indirect associations, it naturally raises suspicion that criminal-law instruments are being used to manage political processes. This is precisely why such cases require exceptional judicial caution and strict scrutiny of the evidence. However, no such expectation can reasonably exist in a captured state operating under conditions of clan-based justice.

(e) Overall Assessment of the Prosecution’s So-Called Evidence: Insufficiency and Irrelevance

The case file consists of 45 volumes. These materials comprise a mechanical compilation of various investigative and judicial documents, banking and financial records, searches, audits, and witness statements collected between January and October 2025.

A substantial portion of the case materials — at least half — primarily concerns the activities of participants in the civil protests of November–December 2024, solidarity funds, and non-governmental organizations, as well as investigative measures conducted against them, their financial information, bank statements, and related materials. However, no direct or even indirect connection to the politicians charged in this case is apparent. There is no indication of organizational or financial control, nor any evidence of orders, coordination, or instructions allegedly issued by the accused politicians to these civil society organizations. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of the evidence bears no relevance to the charges brought against the political leaders and is therefore irrelevant.

First, one portion of the documents reflects standard procedural actions: separation of criminal proceedings, decisions recognizing individuals as accused persons or victims, appointment of audits, and various motions. This indicates that the case was gradually expanded, with additional persons and episodes incorporated over time.

The second major block concerns financial and banking information. The documents include records requested from several banks (Basisbank, Bank of Georgia, TBC Bank, and Pasha Bank), as well as correspondence with the Financial Monitoring Service. This creates the impression that the investigation was actively examining financial flows and the operations of various funds (for example, the “Nanuka Fund”). However, the materials fail to demonstrate how these third parties’ financial operations relate to the alleged crimes attributed to the defendants. Consequently, this extensive portion of the case materials also constitutes irrelevant evidence.

Another significant area concerns investigative measures directed against non-governmental organizations and foundations, including the seizure of documentation and requests for information within the framework of legal assistance related to USAID. On the one hand, this highlights unsuccessful attempts to obtain data at both the international and domestic levels. On the other hand, it remains unclear why any investigative measures or expenditure of state resources were necessary for this purpose, given that information concerning support received by these organizations from USAID and other international donors was already publicly available on each organization’s website.

One of the largest sections of the case materials consists of a mass series of searches. Personal and residential searches were conducted simultaneously against numerous individuals, accompanied by corresponding judicial orders and records. This points to a coordinated and large-scale investigative operation encompassing several directions at once. It is evident that enormous administrative resources were expended, yet with virtually no effectiveness, since the information obtained through these investigative actions failed to assist the prosecution in substantiating the charges.

Another large block concerns informational and digital evidence: reviews of open internet sources, television reports, social media posts, and video recordings. This demonstrates that the investigation relies significantly on publicly available media materials. Each piece of evidence obtained in this manner merely confirms that the accused — professional politicians — exercised their freedom of political expression, which in this country, at least on paper, is not a crime but rather a constitutionally protected right.

The section containing witness statements is particularly extensive, yet these statements likewise fail to constitute incriminating evidence. Various law enforcement officers describe the protests of autumn–winter 2024 and identify political figures as “active participants or organizers” of the demonstrations. According to certain police witnesses, they allegedly heard the accused politicians calling on people to engage in “disobedience.” In some cases, witnesses also claim that certain politicians directed operations involving physical pressure against police officers.

Some statements also reveal an alternative narrative, whereby witnesses either fail to identify the accused politicians or describe events not from their own recollection but solely on the basis of video footage.

Police witnesses frequently describe events using similar, and at times entirely identical, phraseology, raising suspicions that these testimonies were coordinated in advance. Particularly problematic is the fact that the witnesses cannot recall specific calls to action, cannot identify precise wording, and describe only a generalized “aggressive atmosphere.”

Ultimately, despite the enormous volume of the case materials, the disconnected nature of the evidence, and its typological diversity, there is no discernible direct causal chain capable of transforming this ocean of information into a coherent and logically structured criminal accusation. On the basis of such disconnected and largely irrelevant material, it remains incomprehensible to an objective observer how the prosecution arrived at the incrimination of specific criminal acts against specific defendants — especially considering that part of the evidence is indirect (media sources and social networks), part is administrative or procedural in nature, and witness testimonies often differ substantially from one another in interpretation and factual precision.

Part Three

Procedural Violations

(a) Procedural Issue: The Judge Failed to Recuse Herself despite Bias

The case is being heard by Judge Tamar Makharoblidze, whose recusal was requested by attorney Omar Purtseladze during the hearing of 23 February 2026. The motion was based on Makharoblidze’s prior public statements, which were politically motivated and discrediting toward the defendants.

Who is Tamar Makharoblidze?

Tamar Makharoblidze was appointed as a judge in 2024. Before that, from 2015 to 2022, she served as a specialist in the Legislative Drafting Department of the Ministry of Justice while simultaneously appearing in the public sphere as an “expert.” It was during this period that she made the statements which now cast doubt on her impartiality in the present criminal case.

What statements did Makharoblidze make in the past?

Materials submitted by the defense, together with public monitoring of Tamar Makharoblidze’s statements, demonstrate that her remarks displayed a continuous, repetitive, and strongly politically biased character — on the one hand in support of “Georgian Dream,” and on the other against the current defendants and the broader opposition spectrum:

• Regarding Nika Gvaramia (2019, NSP.GE): Makharoblidze effectively accused Gvaramia of “money laundering” and referred to the corresponding punishment of 9 to 12 years’ imprisonment.
• Regarding the case of Giorgi Rurua (2020, for.ge): She characterized the defense strategy as a “political show” and endorsed the prosecution’s version, stating that “Rurua committed this crime as well.”
• Regarding judicial independence (2019, 1tv.ge): She stated that during the rule of “Georgian Dream,” the number of acquittals had increased by 721.4%, describing this as a “major achievement of international significance” for the government.
• In the electoral and political context (2019, kvira.ge): She accused the opposition of “false accusations, lies, destabilization, and attempts at a coup d’état” — using precisely the same narrative that today forms the basis of the “sabotage” charges.

The Judge Rejected the Motion for Recusal

Judge Tamar Makharoblidze denied the recusal motion. She acknowledged that the quoted statements were indeed hers, but argued that she had not been a judge at the time and therefore “had not been restricted from expressing opinions.” According to her, statements made prior to obtaining judicial status could not cast doubt on her objectivity or impartiality.

This argument is unsubstantiated and cannot withstand scrutiny: the standard of impartiality is not assessed solely in relation to the period during which a person formally serves as a judge; it encompasses the individual’s overall public profile, which either creates or undermines public confidence in the impartiality of justice among trial participants and society at large.

Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees everyone the right to have their case heard fairly by “an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” According to the settled case-law of the Strasbourg Court (Piersack v. Belgium, Micallef v. Malta, Kyprianou v. Cyprus, and others), impartiality is assessed through two tests: (1) the subjective test (the personal attitude of the judge) and (2) the objective test (whether a reasonable observer would harbor doubts regarding the judge’s impartiality).

Where the judge hearing the case has publicly and repeatedly expressed strongly negative views about the defendants, including through terminology directly echoing the government’s official messaging, the requirement of objective impartiality cannot be regarded as satisfied. Accordingly, the rejection of the recusal motion under such circumstances is likely to lead to a finding by the Strasbourg Court of a violation of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention.

(b) Closure of the Proceedings and Its Purpose — Preventing the Public from Learning about the Weakness of the Prosecution

The clan-based judiciary associated with “Georgian Dream” has already established a practice of closing hearings in cases where the ruling power has political, financial, or other significant interests.

In the present case as well, the court hearing the matter has decided to close the proceedings.

Under Article 6 §1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to a fair trial includes the right to a “public hearing,” subject to the condition that “the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”

According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, public hearings constitute a fundamental principle protecting litigants against secret justice operating without public scrutiny. Moreover, publicity is one of the means by which confidence in the courts may be maintained. By rendering the administration of justice transparent, public hearings contribute to the achievement of the purpose of Article 6 §1 of the Convention, namely securing a fair trial, which is a fundamental principle of any democratic society (Belashev v. Russia, Application no. 28617/03, 4 December 2008, §79).

It follows that hearings may be closed, either partially or entirely, only where the circumstances of the case “strictly require” such a measure (Welke and Białek v. Poland, Application no. 15924/05, 1 March 2011, §74). The task of the European Court is to determine whether the closure of the hearing was “justified” (ibid., §75). Furthermore, the Court must establish whether the closure was “strictly necessary” (ibid., §76).

The European Court adheres to these principles even in cases involving state secrets. The mere fact that case materials may contain confidential information is insufficient to justify closed hearings without balancing the principle of publicity against the interests of national security (Belashev v. Russia, §83).

In the present case, the judge decided to close the hearings following a dispute with defense counsel, which naturally cannot constitute a legitimate basis for excluding the public. Accordingly, one plausible explanation for this arbitrary decision is that the current authorities do not wish the public to observe the evident weaknesses of what appears to be an artificially constructed prosecution case.

Conclusion

• The trial of the eight political leaders exceeds the scope of an ordinary criminal proceeding both in scale and substance and represents one of the gravest and most symbolic processes in Georgia’s contemporary political system. The case concerns not only the criminal liability of specific individuals, but also the state’s attitude toward political opposition, protest, and critical opinion.
• The accusations presented in the case fail to satisfy the high evidentiary standard required for crimes directed against state security. The prosecution has failed to present evidence demonstrating a concrete criminal plan, organized conspiracy, violent intent, or cooperation with hostile foreign forces.
• Analysis of the case materials demonstrates that the 45-volume evidentiary basis largely consists of disconnected, frequently indirect, and legally weak materials — media sources, social media content, financial documentation, and inconsistent witness statements. Despite this massive quantity of information, no logical or direct causal chain emerges that would provide a sound legal basis for the charges.
• It is particularly noteworthy that the criminal prosecution gradually expanded: initially targeting civil activists, then solidarity funds, subsequently the non-governmental sector, and finally leaders of opposition political parties. This sequence of events creates the impression that the matter concerns not isolated legal responses, but rather a systematic policy aimed at controlling the political and civic sphere.
• Another major problem in the case is the conflation of criminal law with political rhetoric. Public statements by government representatives concerning “revolutionary scenarios,” “foreign influence,” and “hostile forces” have effectively been mirrored in the substance of the charges, whereas in a democratic state political narratives cannot substitute for individualized and concrete evidence.
• Moreover, the closure of the proceedings further strengthens suspicions regarding the political nature of the process. Restricting the principle of publicity in a case of high public interest, without proper justification, contradicts both the principles of a fair trial and the established jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
• The materials presented in the case in no way substantiate the alleged crimes. Rather, they merely demonstrate how political activity, criticism of the authorities, support for protest movements, and engagement with international partners have been transformed — in the hands of the law enforcement and judicial systems controlled by “Georgian Dream” — into “criminal activity” allegedly directed against state security.
• Ultimately, the present case poses a serious threat to the democratic system, as it creates a precedent whereby political opposition, civil protest, and critical civic activism may be portrayed as threats to national security. For this reason, assessment of the case transcends the purely legal dimension and directly concerns the future of democracy, political pluralism, and the rule of law in Georgia.