On October 12, 2024, TV “Pirveli” investigative journalism program “Nodar Meladzis Shabati” aired a story about the secret lists of employees of ministries, municipalities, other public institutions, state and private companies close to the government and their family members, which proves how public servants are instructed and forced to collect and send their and their family members’ personal data to the ruling party in order to ensure that these people vote in favor of “Georgian Dream”. The material depicted in the story is yet another piece of evidence that the large-scale scheme of voter bribery and illegal mobilization described in the 2022 study published by “Transparency International - Georgia” and “International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy” is still actively operating.

In one such list, which ended up in the hands of a journalist of “Nodar Meladzis Shabati”, the employees of the Central Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Criminal and Border Police Departments of the Ministry, the Ministry of Defence, the Gardabani Municipality City Hall, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation, “Air Navigation” and “United Airports” and their family members are listed, indicating their names, surnames, personal numbers, addresses and telephone numbers.

The first number on the list belongs to G.O., an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who also listed his family members: Kh. (wife), I.A. (mother), D.O. (brother), M.B. (daughter-in-law), O.O., and T.O. (sisters). The authenticity of these individuals was confirmed by G.O.’s mother, while G.O. himself avoided contact with the journalist.

The list includes the data of E.A., the deputy head of the Chokhatauri police division, who then included the data of his 18-year-old daughter S. This is S.'s first election, and his policeman father’s influence on her is obvious. 

The list includes the Deputy Head of the Administrative Division of the Military Police Department of the Ministry of Defence, I.N., and his wife, M.G., who is also a Ministry of Defence employee. She is the Chief Manager of the Ministry's Cyber Security Bureau.

T.Z., a Gardabani Municipality City Hall employee who listed his wife V. on the list, promised on behalf of himself and his wife to vote for the ruling party in a conversation with the journalist, who introduced herself as a representative of “Georgian Dream”. “She is at my disposal”, stated T.Z. about his wife.

In addition to himself, K.O., the representative of Gardabani Municipality, submitted the information for his wife, N.M., and his 19-year-old child, M.O.  It is noteworthy that K.O.'s wife is also a public servant; she works at a preschool education institution.

The list also includes M.G., an employee at Gardabani Municipality City Hall, and their children's personal information. It is noteworthy that when a journalist visited M.G. at her work place during working hours, she was told that M.G. had gone to the “Georgian Dream” headquarters. The journalist, who could not hide her surprise at a public servant’s visiting the ruling party’s headquarters during working hours, was explained by the staff present at the municipality that such activities were also related to “working hours”.

D.O., the head of the N(N)LE “Gardabani Service”, established by Gardabani Municipality City Hall, has promised 4 votes from his family to the ruling party. His wife, E.Kh., is a school principal. 

Employees of “Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation”, “Sakaeronavigatsia”, “United Airports of Georgia”, airlines “Geo Sky” and “Airzena”, as well as their family members, were placed on the list.

“TV Pirveli” program also covered the email sent on October 4th by L.Sh., an employee of the “Georgian Dream” Chiatura headquarters, to 40 different institutions’ recipients in Chiatura. The recipients were asked to fill out the attached form with their personal data by October 5th, a document that was informally referred to as the “thematic” form.

The message sent by mobile phone to the parents of the 2nd “D” class of the 3rd public school in Kutaisi is shocking, informing them that, according to “Tamuna Mast” (“Mast” is short for teacher), the day before, a meeting of the teachers with the directorate regarding the elections took place, during which it was decided to collect from the parents information on who they were going to vote for: “the ruling party, or another party or if they abstain”. “Please comment” is what this message says.

The reports and evidence described above strongly suggest that public servants are likely committing crimes on a large scale in order to mobilize votes for the ruling party. These crimes can be categorized into three groups of criminal offenses: 

• Crimes Related to Personal Data: According to the Article 157 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, “Unlawful obtaining, storage, or use of information on private life or personal data, which has resulted in considerable damage”, is an offense. Among the various documented instances of violations, one such example involves public servants being instructed to collect personal data from themselves and their family members.  Such data, including names, addresses, and personal numbers, was submitted to the ruling party for electoral purposes. The lists collected from various ministries and public institutions, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, clearly demonstrate the extent of this unlawful activity, resulting in significant harm to individuals’ privacy rights. 
• Crimes Related to Election Coercion and Voter Influence: The facts described above substantially reach the threshold to constitute an offense outlined in Article 164⁴ of the Criminal Code. According to this article, "influencing the will of voters and/or violation of the secrecy of the vote, committed using coercion or threat", is a criminal offense.  Among the documented instances, one notable example comes from Gardabani Municipality, where public servants were pressured to secure votes for the ruling party on behalf of their family members, highlighting the systemic nature of this voter manipulation.
• Abuse of Official Powers: Articles 332 and 333 of the Criminal Code criminalize abuse or exceeding of official powers. Among the documented violations, one recurring pattern involves the misuse of work hours and public resources, including visits to the ruling party's headquarters during official working hours. This, along with other similar incidents, clearly falls within the scope of abuse of official powers as defined by the law. 

We urge law enforcement agencies to investigate these crimes, with patterns of systemic crime.