On October 16, 2025, the one-party parliament dominated by “Georgian Dream” adopted a legislative package that enables the prohibition of political parties and the indefinite deprivation of political rights for individuals associated with them.

We believe that these amendments are incompatible with the Constitution of Georgia and are aimed at excluding “Georgian Dream’s” political opponents from political participation. This decision once again demonstrates that the ruling party is instrumentalizing state institutions to secure its prolonged hold on power.

According to statements made by “Georgian Dream” leaders, the government intends to file a constitutional claim seeking to have up to ten political parties declared unconstitutional. They have also indicated that, alongside this claim, they are preparing a list of individuals to be labeled as “associated” with the banned parties, with the intention of removing these individuals from public and political life.

The legislative package was adopted under an expedited procedure—in three readings within only three days of its registration in the parliamentary bureau. The accelerated adoption of such a far-reaching, rights-restrictive law is inconsistent with international standards of the rule of law and due legislative process.

Under the new amendments, any individual declared “associated with a banned party” will be prohibited from: founding or leading a political party; joining a political party as a member; running as a candidate in parliamentary or local elections; holding public office; or making political donations.

In addition, the declaration of a political party as unconstitutional will automatically lead to the termination of the mandates of Members of Parliament or local councilors elected on that party’s ticket and the annulment of the party’s electoral list.

The legislative amendments adopted to ban political parties are extremely alarming for the following reasons:

1. Absence of Legal Criteria for Declaring “Associated Persons”
   The law provides no definition or objective criteria for determining who may be deemed “associated” with a banned party and consequently deprived of political rights. According to statements from “Georgian Dream,” an “associated person” could be any individual, regardless of whether any political or legal connection with the banned party ever existed. This lack of legal clarity creates fertile ground for arbitrary political persecution and enables the ruling party to ban political activity for any undesirable opponent at will.
    
2. Permanent and Indefinite Restrictions
   The amendments impose a lifetime ban on political activity for both the prohibited parties and persons “associated” with them.  The legislative package sets no time limit after which such restrictions might expire, nor does it specify any conditions under which individuals may regain their constitutional rights. As such, the changes violate international human rights principles and contradict standards of legal certainty and foreseeability.
    
3. Unconstitutional Expansion of the Constitutional Court’s Powers
   The proposed amendments are unconstitutional because they expand the mandate of the Constitutional Court without a constitutional amendment. Article 60 of the Constitution of Georgia exhaustively defines the Court’s jurisdiction, and depriving individuals of political rights or restricting political activity does not fall within that jurisdiction.
    
4. Unclear Criteria for Future Party Bans
   Former members of a dissolved party will be barred from any political participation, including forming new parties or joining existing ones. The law fails to specify how many former members of a banned party can join another party before that party itself risks prohibition—or whether the presence of even a single former member could be used as grounds for banning the new party.
    
5. Unrealistic Timeframe for Constitutional Review
   “Georgian Dream” has granted the Constitutional Court only 14 days to decide on the dissolution of any new party deemed “similar” to a previously banned one. No reasonable or impartial observer could expect a fair, well-reasoned judgment within such an extremely short period.

6. Voters of banned parties will be left without a choice

If the Constitutional Court satisfies the constitutional claim of “Georgian Dream” on the basis of unconstitutional amendments, hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of voters will be left without a real choice, which would render any future elections meaningless.

These amendments severely restrict constitutionally guaranteed political rights, endanger the democratic constitutional order, and contradict the principles enshrined in Article 3 of the Constitution of Georgia, which guarantees democratic governance, political pluralism, equality, and the prohibition of discrimination. The model established by these legislative changes effectively allows the ruling party, “Georgian Dream,” to dissolve any opposition party it deems undesirable and to neutralize any individual labeled as “associated” with such parties. In essence, the amendments aim to arbitrarily prohibit political activity for political parties and an indefinite circle of individuals, exclude them from political processes, criminalize dissenting political views, and thereby suppress political pluralism and freedom of expression in Georgia.

Accordingly, we consider that any constitutional lawsuit initiated by “Georgian Dream” under these laws would be unconstitutional, rights-restrictive, and incompatible with international democratic standards.

A comprehensive analysis of the constitutional and international inconsistencies of these legislative changes is presented below.

1.   Previous amendments to the legislation on political parties and their unconstitutionality

The October 16, 2025 amendments were preceded by two other amendments adopted a few months earlier to the Organic Law on the “Political Unions of Citizens” and the Organic Law on the “Constitutional Court of Georgia.”

The essence of the first amendment is that from now on, the Constitutional Court will be able to ban a party whose “declared goal and/or the essence of its activities (including its personal composition and/or the composition of the party list submitted to the relevant election commission) substantially repeats the declared goal and/or essence of the activities (including personal composition) of a party that has already been banned by the Constitutional Court of Georgia on the grounds provided in Paragraph 1 of this Article” (see Paragraph 2 of Article 35 of the Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens).

With this amendment, the standard of proof has been lowered to such an extent that it will be sufficient merely to demonstrate that a certain number of individuals within a party were members of another, already banned party for a decision to be made to ban this second party on that basis alone.

According to the second amendment, the time limit for the Constitutional Court to issue a decision on a constitutional complaint regarding the constitutionality of a political party’s activities shall not exceed nine months from the date the complaint is submitted to the Constitutional Court, and in the case provided for by Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Organic Law of Georgia on Political Unions of Citizens—no more than 14 days (see Paragraph 42 of Article 22 of the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court of Georgia).

Everyone in Georgia knows that the Constitutional Court typically takes years to consider a constitutional complaint and issue a ruling. Yet, for a complaint seeking the banning of a political party, “Georgian Dream” has imposed a strict 9-month deadline on the Constitutional Court. Moreover, in the case of a party that has “essentially the same” goals, activities, personnel, or party list, only 14 days were deemed sufficient for its banning.

The unconstitutionality of the first amendment is primarily due to its vagueness. It is unclear what is meant by “declared goal” or “essence of activities.” Even more obscure is the question of a party’s “personal composition” and the “composition of the party list submitted to the election commission.” How many former members of a banned party must be present in another party or its list for that party to also be banned? Would even a single such individual in a party or its list be sufficient for prohibition? These are questions for which the “law” provides no answers.

According to the Constitutional Court of Georgia’s own interpretation, “when imposing liability, the legislator is constrained by the principle of legal certainty.” “The principle of legal certainty derives from the principle of the rule of law enshrined in the Constitution of Georgia. It is connected to Article 42, Paragraph 5 [Paragraph 9 of Article 31 in the current version of the Constitution] and forms part of the sphere protected by this right. Accordingly, the contested norm will comply with Article 42, Paragraph 5 of the Constitution only if it meets the requirements of the constitutional principle of legal certainty.” “Predictable and unambiguous legislation, on the one hand, ensures a person’s protection from the arbitrariness of the law enforcer, and on the other hand, guarantees that the individual receives a clear signal from the state to enable a correct understanding of the norm—to determine which actions are prohibited by law and which may lead to legal liability. A person must have the ability to foresee the characteristics of a prohibited act within their behavior and to conduct themselves in accordance with the rules established by law.”[1]

The second amendment’s inconsistency with the Constitution of Georgia, in particular with Article 31, Paragraph 1—which guarantees the right to a “fair trial”—relates to the extremely short deadline that the so-called “legislator” imposed on the Constitutional Court to ban a political party. No reasonable, impartial, and objective observer could expect any fair and well-reasoned decision to be made within such a short period.

2.  Inconsistency of the new amendments with the Constitution

The amendments of October 16, 2025, are unconstitutional because they lack an adequate procedural and substantive legal basis in the Constitution of Georgia.

(a) Lack of procedural basis

The Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) pointed out the lack of procedural basis in a recent publication. Specifically, GYLA correctly noted that the amendments expand the mandate of the Constitutional Court contrary to the Constitution, because Article 60 of the Constitution exhaustively defines the competence of the Constitutional Court and does not allow for banning the activities of individuals as envisaged by the amendments. Accordingly, if the Constitutional Court accepts for consideration a complaint submitted in the near future by deputies of “Georgian Dream” regarding the prohibition of political activities for individuals “associated with” opposition parties, it will exceed the mandate assigned to it by the Constitution and violate the very Constitution it was ostensibly created to uphold.

(b) Lack of substantive legal basis

Furthermore, the above-mentioned amendments have no constitutional foundation from a substantive legal perspective either. Even if the Constitutional Court were authorized to accept and consider a complaint regarding the prohibition of political activity for individuals “associated with” parties subject to banning—which, as noted, it is not—the Court would not be able to invoke any article of the Constitution that would legally justify restricting such activity for these individuals.

Article 23 of the Constitution of Georgia guarantees the freedom of political parties. Paragraph 3 of this Article prohibits the creation and activities of a political party whose aim is “the overthrow or violent change of the constitutional order of Georgia, the violation of the country’s independence, the breach of territorial integrity, or which engages in war or violence propaganda, or incites national, ethnic, regional, religious, or social hatred.”

This article does not contain any provision establishing that, along with the banning of a party, political activity is prohibited for its leaders and members. Accordingly, the extent to which deputies of “Georgian Dream” will be able to justify their complaint regarding party bans in relation to Article 23, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution—and, most importantly, how well-founded the Constitutional Court’s decision would be if it were to satisfy such a complaint—is a separate matter for discussion. However, when it comes to prohibiting future political activity for members of a “banned” party, the Constitutional Court cannot invoke Article 23, because this Article says nothing about such restrictions.

Similarly, no other relevant provision of the Constitution provides for the possibility of prohibiting political activity for individuals.

Article 24 of the Constitution concerns electoral rights. According to its first paragraph, every citizen of Georgia aged 18 and over has the right to participate in referenda and elections of the state, autonomous republics, and local self-government bodies. Paragraph 2 of the same Article states that a citizen may not participate in elections or referenda if they are serving a sentence for a particularly serious crime, as determined by a court, or if they have been declared legally incompetent by a court and placed in an appropriate inpatient medical institution. In other words, Paragraph 2 of Article 24 provides an exhaustive list of conditions under which a citizen of Georgia does not have the right to participate in elections. Membership in a party banned by the Constitutional Court is not listed as a basis for such a restriction.

Similarly, according to Article 37, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution of Georgia, a citizen with the right to vote, aged 25 or older and who has lived in Georgia for at least 10 years, may be elected as a member of Parliament. A person cannot be elected to Parliament if they are subject to a court-imposed deprivation of liberty. No other constitutional provision—including Article 37 or any other article—imposes restrictions on the exercise of passive electoral rights in parliamentary elections based on party membership.

Based on all of the above, it is clear that the Constitutional Court cannot properly accept the complaint filed by the deputies of “Georgian Dream” insofar as it concerns the “consequences” of banning a political party for individuals “associated with” the party. And even if the Court does accept it, it cannot grant the complaint with respect to such “consequential” measures. Otherwise, the Constitutional Court of Georgia would violate the Constitution and completely undermine its already fragile reputation.

3. The banning of political parties and prohibiting political activity for their members under international human rights standards

(a) Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court regarding the banning of political parties

The amendments adopted by “Georgian Dream” and its plans to ban opposition parties and prohibit political activity for opposition politicians—particularly depriving them of passive voting rights—are in conflict with the standards of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

Under Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”), everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of their interests. According to Paragraph 2 of the same Article, restrictions on this right are not permitted, except when all three of the following conditions for restriction exist cumulatively:

(a)   restrictions are “prescribed by law”;

(b)  they pursue legitimate aims, such as protecting national security or public safety, preventing disorder or crime, safeguarding health or morals, or protecting the rights and freedoms of others; and

(c)   they are “necessary in a democratic society,” which requires that there be: a “pressing social need” for the restriction, that the restrictive measures are “proportionate to the legitimate aim,” and that the arguments in favor of the restriction are “relevant and sufficient.”

According to the Court’s interpretation, democracy is a fundamental feature of the European public order. From the preamble of the Convention, there is a clear connection between the Convention and democracy.[2] The proper functioning of democracy requires the existence of political parties.[3] Therefore, when it comes to banning parties, such measures affect not only the freedom of association but democracy itself.[4]

Based on the above, the European Court holds that, regarding political parties, the exceptions set out in Article 11 of the Convention must be construed strictly, and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on parties. States parties therefore have only limited margin of appreciation in this matter.[5] Consequently, drastic measures, such as the dissolution of an entire political party and a disability barring its leaders from carrying on any similar activity for a specified period, may be taken only in the most serious cases.[6]

The European Court has established certain criteria that must be taken into account when determining whether there was a “pressing social need” for banning a political party:

(i) whether there was plausible evidence that the risk to democracy, supposing it had been proved to exist, was sufficiently imminent;

(ii) whether the acts and speeches of the leaders and members of the political party concerned were imputable to the party as a whole; and

(iii) whether the acts and speeches imputable to the political party formed a whole which gave a clear picture of a model of society conceived and advocated by the party which was incompatible with the concept of a “democratic society”.[7]

Taking the above principles into account, the European Court considered justified, under Article 11 of the Convention, the banning of a party whose activities threatened the constitutional principles of Turkey as a secular state, because it promoted the idea of a state based on Sharia law.[8] In another case, the Court did not consider the banning of parties that served as “instruments” of the terrorist strategy of the Basque terrorist organization ETA to constitute a violation of Article 11 of the Convention.[9]

At the same time, the European Court found the banning of parties such as the United Communist Party of Turkey,[10] the People’s Labour Party of Turkey,[11] and the Republican Party of Russia[12] to be a violation of Article 11 of the Convention, as these parties’ activities were deemed not to pose a threat to democracy.

(b) Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court on depriving individuals of passive voting rights

The European Court has also well-established practice regarding the deprivation of passive voting rights of individuals in relation to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention—the “Right to free elections.”

According to the ECtHR’s interpretation, when considering a potential violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the Court has to satisfy itself that the conditions imposed on the rights to vote or to stand for election do not curtail the exercise of those rights to such an extent as to impair their very essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means employed are not disproportionate. In particular, any such conditions must not thwart the free expression of the people in the choice of the legislature – in other words, they must reflect, or not run counter to, the concern to maintain the integrity and effectiveness of an electoral procedure aimed at identifying the will of the people through universal suffrage.[13]

It should be noted that the European Court has distinguished between active and passive voting rights in that restrictions on passive voting rights imposed by national law are examined with less strictness than restrictions on active voting rights.[14] Accordingly, in considering the deprivation of passive voting rights for a member of the Communist Party of Latvia, the Court took into account the historical context—the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the occupation of the Baltic states by Soviet forces, and the extremely negative role of the Communist Party not only in relation to the above events but also after Latvia’s independence, when the party actively participated in the attempted state coups of January and August 1991—and concluded that such a measure was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.[15]

At the same time, the Court strictly emphasized the obligation of the Latvian state to periodically review the decision depriving the complainant of passive voting rights. The Court warned Latvia that, in the absence of such review, it would take a different decision.[16]

Permanent disqualification from running for elected office was considered by the Court to be a disproportionate measure in the case of the former Lithuanian president, Paksas, who was removed from office through impeachment. The Court noted that the Lithuanian state’s statements regarding violations committed by Paksas while in office were insufficient to justify the applicant’s “permanent and irreversible disqualification” as a proportionate measure for protecting democratic order. The Court emphasized that “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” must be ensured in all cases.[17]

The Court drew a sharp distinction between the Ždanoka and Paksas cases. First, the Court noted that the difference between the two cases concerned the historical context. In the Ždanoka case, participation in elections was denied to a person who was a member of the Communist Party, which had acted against Latvia’s independence and actively participated in the attempted coups of January and August 1991. In contrast, in the Paksas case, no such dramatic events had occurred. Furthermore, in the early 1990s, Latvia’s democracy was still fragile, so measures taken against the Communist Party and its members were considered justified; such circumstances did not exist in Lithuania in the 2000s, when the country’s democratic system was already established and strong, and no comparable threats existed.[18]

Another key factor explaining the European Court’s different rulings was that, in the Ždanoka case, the obligation established by the Court—that the Latvian state periodically review the deprivation of the complainant’s passive voting rights—was regularly fulfilled by the Latvian Parliament. Moreover, the Latvian Constitutional Court adopted a decision prescribing a specific legislative timeframe for such a restriction.[19] In Lithuania, no such measures were in place. According to the European Court, the decision regarding the complainant’s disqualification in Lithuania was of an “unchanging” nature, which was deemed incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention.[20]

Conclusion

The adopted amendments are clearly unconstitutional, create a tool for the destruction of political pluralism, and limit citizens’ ability to participate in the political process. These changes will sharply reduce democratic space, undermine the principles of the rule of law, and restrict human rights, in direct conflict with Georgia’s international obligations, including those assumed upon accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and other international treaties and agreements in the field of human rights.

[1] Decision of the Constitutional Court of Georgia in the case 'Citizens of Georgia Aleksandre Baramidze, Lasha Tugushi, Vakhtang Khmaladze, and Vakhtang Maisaia versus the Parliament of Georgia,' 2/2/516,542, 14/05/2013, pp. II-29-30.

[2] United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 133/1996/752/951, 30 January 1998, § 45;  Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey,

Applications nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 13

February 2003, § 86.

[3] United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, § 25; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, § 87.

[4] United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, § 31; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, § 87.

[5] United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, § 46; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, § 100.

[6] Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, § 100.

[7] Id., § 104.

[8] Id., §§ 132-236.

[9] Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain, Applications nos. 25803/04 and 25817/04, 30 June 2009, §§ 85, 94-95.

[10] United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 133/1996/752/951, 30 January 1998.

[11] Yazar and Others v. Turkey, Applications nos. 22723/93, 22724/93 and 22725/93, 9 April 2002.

[12] Republican Party of Russia v. Russia, Application no. 12976/07, 12 April 2011.

[13] Ždanoka v. Latvia, Application no. 58278/00, [GC] 16 March 2006, § 104.

[14] Id., § 115(e).

[15] Id., §§ 132-136.

[16] Id., § 135.

[17] Paksas v. Lithuania, Application no. 34932/04, [GC], 6 January 2011, § 105.

[18] Id., § 107.

[19] Id., § 108.

[20] Id., § 110.