In the past four years, ahead of the crucial parliamentary elections, the state of democracy in the country has deteriorated alarmingly. The process of state capture has continued and deepened; the impunity for high-level corruption has reached the level of kleptocracy; clan-based governance has further entrenched itself in the judiciary system; parliamentary oversight has remained a formality; a hostile environment has been created for critical media; and journalistic activity has become dangerous.

This report provides a four-year overview of the situation in several areas critical to democracy, which Transparency International Georgia has been working on: the anti-corruption environment, the judiciary system, the parliamentary oversight, and the media environment. 

Key Findings

Anti-corruption environment

• The process of state capture, which continued and deepened, has been conclusively proven;
• Over the past four years, the problem of high-level corruption has worsened significantly; clear signs of kleptocratic governance have emerged;
• Although the Anti-Corruption Bureau was created, which was initially seen as a positive development, it has not proved to be effective in fighting corruption, as it also joined the ranks of captured institutions;
• Except for establishing the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the government of Georgia has failed to fulfill the anti-corruption requirements of the European Commission and the recommendations of the Venice Commission.

Judiciary

• The Georgian authorities refused to fulfill the requirements of the European Union concerning the judiciary;
• Consolidation of the so-called “clan” governance within the judiciary has continued through further deterioration of the legislation and the selection and promotion of new personnel close to the clan; 
• The imposition of sanctions by the U.S. State Department on the judges at the helm of the “clan” made it clear how deeply a group of influential judges who control the entire judicial system is immersed in corruption;
• The captured judiciary obediently fulfilled the government’s orders in prosecuting participants in peaceful protests;
• The government-controlled judiciary was also actively involved in persecuting politicians and critical media.

Parliamentary oversight

• Parliamentary oversight often did not address issues of national importance, including corruption. The parliamentary majority used oversight mechanisms mainly for narrow party purposes;
• During the COVID-19 crisis, the parliament actually abandoned its oversight function over the executive branch;
• Parliamentary oversight of the security sector was of a formal nature. The parliament did not fulfill the European Commission’s requirement for a greater oversight of this sector;
• The role of the opposition in the oversight process was significantly weakened as the parliamentary majority created artificial barriers to prevent the opposition from exercising oversight over the government.

Media Environment

• Over the past four years, as the media environment deteriorated, disturbing incidents such as mass attacks and violence against journalists started to occur, which even led to the death of a cameraman from TV Pirveli. Legal cases were also brought against the owners and founders of broadcasters critical of the government, resulting in their detention;
• The use of the justice system, the Communications Commission, and other structures under government control against critical media is alarming;
• Particularly dangerous are the numerous laws and norms initiated by the ruling majority that have further restricted and complicated journalistic activities.

Anti-Corruption Environment in 2020-2024

Over the past four years, the country’s corruption environment has sharply deteriorated in almost every aspect. State capture continued and was proven beyond any doubt; high-level corruption reached a point of kleptocracy; anti-corruption reform was not implemented; international anti-corruption obligations and recommendations remained unfulfilled; and the country’s evaluations in international indices worsened.

State Capture

In December 2023, the comeback of Bidzina Ivanishvili [1] finally confirmed that for the past 12 years he has been the main decision-maker in the country, despite his formal status as a person outside of politics. Consequently, he has led the process of capturing [2] and politically subjugating various institutions over the years.

The process of state capture continued over the past four years, manifesting in the following ways:

• The dissolution [3] of the State Inspector’s Service after it issued a report unfavorable to the ruling party; 
• Damage [4] to the National Bank’s reputation as a result of an order issued by it to protect the former Chief Prosecutor Otar Partskhaladze, sanctioned [5] by the USA; 
• Attempt to impeach [6] the President using a politically subjugated Constitutional Court; 
• Appointment of a politically loyal person as head of the newly created Anti-Corruption Bureau; 
• Single-party composition [7] of the electoral administration.

In addition to political institutions, the process of state capture has expanded in recent years into public spheres, such as culture [8] and higher education.

Impunity for Elite Corruption and the Formation of a Kleptocratic System

One of the consequences of state capture is the complete disappearance of mechanisms to prevent corrupt practices, particularly high-level corruption. As a result, high-level corruption has been on the rise over the past four years and has acquired clear features of kleptocratic rule.

High-ranking officials are regularly involved in corruption. They appropriate public resources through various ways (e.g., public procurement, privatization of state property, subsidies, licenses, and permits). Monitoring by Transparency International Georgia has identified 206 such alleged cases [9] over recent years, involving more than 201 high-ranking officials.

These officials include current and former members of parliament, prime ministers and ministers, former chief prosecutors, judges, and senior officials from security agencies.

Cases of alleged corruption include serious violations such as undue influence on the judiciary, voter bribery, illegal enrichment, influence peddling, the adoption of tailor-made laws, nepotism/favoritism, political corruption, conflicts of interest, tailor-made tenders, the revolving door, and more.

In many cases, the benefits gained through kleptocratic methods are later used to fund the ruling party, which becomes particularly visible and problematic during elections. For example, in just August-September of this year, companies that donated GEL 2 million to the Georgian Dream have received [10] over GEL 1.2 billion in public procurement contracts and from various state programs over the past decade.

Transparency International Georgia, through a study of municipal procurements alone, identified approximately GEL 3.28 billion in budgetary funds that were allegedly expended [11] through corruption deals in the past decade.

Despite numerous alleged cases of elite corruption, the Prosecutor’s Office and the State Security Service, the bodies in charge of investigating such cases, ignore them, and as a result, high-ranking officials enjoy full impunity and immunity. In fact, over the years, no high-ranking official of the central government has been held accountable for corruption.

This contrast is evident in the official data of the Prosecutor’s Office [12] and the State Security Service [13]. They primarily focus on the municipal level. Their annual reports from 2021 to 2023 confirm that the detection and prevention of corruption by high-ranking officials is mainly limited to the level of municipal officials.

Failed Anti-Corruption Reform

It can be confidently stated that, over the past four years, anti-corruption reform has completely failed. This failure is reflected in the following processes:

Nonexistent strategy and institutional uncertainty

For four years now, the country has lacked a national anti-corruption strategy, which should serve as the main policy document guiding reform in this area. One of the main reasons for the failure to develop this strategy was that the institution responsible for developing it changed several times, which, in the absence of political will, completely halted the process of drafting this strategic document. For the past four years, the development, monitoring, and coordination of national anti-corruption policy have actually been stopped [14]. The new Anti-Corruption Bureau, which has been in operation for over a year, has also not renewed this process. 

Unfulfilled international commitments

Since 2020, almost all processes related to the development and implementation of anti-corruption policy have stopped:

• European Integration (European Commission’s 12 priorities and nine steps) – Even though anti-corruption reform is a crucial precondition for European integration, the legislative changes made to meet the European Commission’s anti-corruption requirements, aside from the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, do not accommodate [15] essential recommendations from the European Commission and the Venice Commission and, in some cases, even worsen [16] existing regulations.
• Anti-Corruption Network of the OECD (OECD/ACN) – In 2023, for the first time in 20 years, the Georgian government refused [17] to participate in the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network monitoring. The purpose of this monitoring is to promote anti-corruption reforms through analysis of the corruption situation, prepare recommendations, and monitor their implementation. Georgia is the only country that refused [18] this monitoring.
• Open Government Partnership (OGP) – Once a leading country in the Open Government Partnership, Georgia’s membership in this organization is currently suspended [19] due to serious violations [20] of the OGP’s core values and principles by the government of the country.
• Association Agreement and Association Agenda with the European Union – Although the Georgian government approved a 2023 action plan for EU integration within the Association Agenda framework, it does not meet [21] the priorities and objectives outlined in the Association Agenda and ignores [22] all major challenges in the fight against corruption.

Neglect of existing anti-corruption regulations

In the past four years, effective enforcement [23] of existing anti-corruption laws and mechanisms has remained a challenge. Violations, such as conflicts of interest, incompatibility of positions, acceptance of illegal gifts, whistleblower protection, and restrictions on the “revolving door,” at least at the ministerial level, have not been detected. In most cases, mechanisms necessary for the enforcement of the law’s requirements have not been implemented at all.

Establishment of a politically subordinated Anti-Corruption Bureau

The Anti-Corruption Bureau, whose establishment was one of the conditions set by the European Commission for Georgia’s European integration, was initially positively evaluated [15]. However, as expected, in the absence of guarantees of independence, this institution quickly fell under political influence, which was evidenced by its illegal decision [24] against NGOs during the pre-election period and the reversal [25] of this decision later on the Prime Minister’s order.

As a result, the politically obedient Anti-Corruption Bureau has worsened anti-corruption legislation as well as its enforcement practices:

• The Bureau did not publish [26] a separate report on the results of the monitoring of asset declarations and thus violated legal requirements; 
• The Bureau has closed [26] information on detailed results of the monitoring of asset declarations, so the identities of audited officials, fined officials, and the reasons for their fines are no longer public; 
• Legislative amendments [16] initiated by the Bureau restricted the publicity of declarations. According to these amendments, new declarations will not be publicly accessible for up to two months after they are filed.

Through these changes, the Anti-Corruption Bureau closed the declaration system to external observers, creating a comfortable environment for dishonest officials.

Corruption Perceptions Index

According to Transparency International’s 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index [27] (CPI), which measures the perceived level of corruption in the public sector, Georgia scored 53 points, three points lower than in the previous year. Although Georgia still holds a leading position in the region, it has not had such a low score since 2015. Moreover, the results of the index over the past 12 years indicate that the country has experienced stagnation in its fight against corruption in the public sector.

The Corruption Perceptions Index traditionally assesses 180 countries. A country is evaluated with a scoring system from 0 to 100, where 100 represents a positive outcome and 0 represents a negative outcome.

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI – Georgia’s results in 2012-2023)

Among challenges identified in the 2023 regional report [28] on the Corruption Perceptions Index for Georgia is the following: “For several years, Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding, where deepening state capture [29] and high-level corruption are turning the government into a kleptocracy [30].” Issues of state capture, high-level corruption, unhealthy concentration of power, and, specifically, Bidzina Ivanishvili’s undue influence over key institutions were highlighted in the reports for previous years as well (2022 [31], 2021 [32]).

The State of the Judicial System in 2020-2024

Summary

Between 2020 and 2024, the justice system continued to deteriorate. Unlike the previous eight years of the Georgian Dream’s rule, where the implementation of certain reforms to a varying scale, degree, and pace was at least on the government’s agenda, discussions on judicial reform ceased entirely after 2020. The reform was actually considered completed.

The Georgian government has not only failed to fulfil the requirements set by the European Union when granting candidate to Georgia status but, by adopting laws such as the “Russian law” and other anti-democratic legislation, has openly opposed all the fundamental principles and values on which the EU is based.

The only thing remarkable during the reporting period was that the so-called “Murusidze-Chinchaladze” clan, which controls the judiciary, consolidated power around itself. This was reflected in the worsening of legislation, the selection and promotion of new personnel close to the clan, and the resistance to the requirements from the international democratic community, particularly from the European Union.

The sanctioning by the USA of four influential leaders of this clan clearly demonstrates how deeply entrenched corruption is in the system. However, in exchange for fulfilling political orders, clan leaders have been enjoying full impunity. They are even no longer subject to the mechanism for review of their asset declarations. The government’s policy in the field of justice, which contradicts EU requirements, including on the issue of integrity checking, is being shaped by the dictates of this clan.

The interconnection between the country’s political leadership and the judicial clan is most evident in politically motivated cases, where courts take decisions favorable to the government.

The only way to revitalize the justice system is the introduction of an integrity check mechanism and thorough fulfillment of other requirements of the EU.

The common court system is not the only one that acts on the political leadership’s will. In recent years, the Constitutional Court has also shown its readiness to fulfill any orders from the Georgian Dream government.

U.S. Sanctions on Clan Leaders

One of the main highlights of the reporting period was the U.S. imposing sanctions on the leaders of the dominant judicial clan. 

On April 5, 2023, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken officially announced that the U.S. Department of State had imposed [33] sanctions on three active Georgian judges and one former judge - Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Irakli Shengelia, and Valerian Tsertsvadze - due to their involvement in significant corruption. The statement noted that these individuals abused their positions as court chairpersons and members of the High Council of Justice, undermining the rule of law and the public’s faith in Georgia’s judicial system.

EU Requirements in the Field of Justice

On December 15, 2023, Georgia received EU candidate status on the condition that it would implement the recommendations issued by the European Commission on November 8, 2023. The European Commission’s requirements outlined the steps to be taken in nine different areas. Among the essential conditions for EU membership was a fundamental reformation of the justice system. The reform was to ensure the complete independence of the judiciary and the prosecutor’s office. It was to be fully in line with EU standards and the recommendations of the Venice Commission. Specifically, one of the required measures was the creation of an integrity-check mechanism, which would apply an exceptional evaluation for members of the High Council of Justice, judges of the Supreme Court, court chairpersons, and candidates for these positions. International experts were to play [34] a decisive role in this process.

The Georgian Government’s response to EU requirements

The Georgian government has not taken any action to fulfill these requirements. On the contrary, since December 15, 2023, all measures taken by the government have been contrary to the above-mentioned and other EU requirements. In April 2024, by passing the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (the “Russian law”), the Georgian government openly opposed the fundamental principles and values on which the EU is based. This move by the government resulted in the EU announcing [35] that the process of Georgia’s integration into the EU had been suspended.

Moreover, the introduction of the “Russian law,” alongside other factors, was, to some extent, a response by the government to the demands for a comprehensive judicial reform, including the establishment of an integrity-check mechanism (vetting). This was affirmed by the words of Georgia’s shadow ruler, oligarch Ivanishvili, in a speech [36] delivered at a rally in front of the parliament on April 29, 2024.

The judicial clan's response to the integrity-check mechanism

The clan-dominated judiciary naturally joined the government in its campaign against the introduction of a mechanism to check the integrity of judges. Also naturally, those judges whose integrity has been most questioned [37] by the public were the ones that most aggressively opposed this mechanism.

Opposition of Clan Leaders to the Review System of Asset Declarations of Judges

The government-encouraged resistance of the clan was not limited to the campaign against vetting. Their arbitrariness and cynicism reached new levels. In April 2024, it became known that judges at the head of the clan, including Mikheil Chinchaladze and Levan Murusidze, petitioned the court to halt the review process of their asset declarations. The court satisfied [38] their requests.

According [39] to the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, on January 12, 2024, an independent commission formed by the Anti-Corruption Bureau selected [40] 300 public officials, including 27 judges, whose asset declarations were to be reviewed in 2024. The commission made this decision based on high public interest and high-risk corruption criteria. Judges Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, Sergo Metopishvili, and Vasil Mshvenieradze were among those selected. These judges applied to the Tbilisi City Court and requested that the commission’s decision be annulled. Judges Liela Poladishvili, Valeriane Pilishvili, Nino Buachidze, and Lela Mildenberger suspended the review of declarations of Chinchaladze, Murusidze, Metopishvili, and Mshvenieradze. It is worth noting that of the 300 selected officials holding political and professional positions, only the judges requested the suspension of their asset review process.

This incident sets a disturbing precedent [41] as it allows members of the clan, using the judiciary loyal to them, to evade scrutiny of their financial integrity even within a limited inquiry conducted by the Anti-Corruption Bureau.

It is worth noting that the review of asset declarations was challenged in court by the judges whose integrity, especially their financial position, raises serious questions in society. This fact perfectly explains the resistance of the judicial clan to the mechanism of integrity checks. A judge who fears even a limited anti-corruption mechanism such as a declaration review will naturally resist a comprehensive assessment of his integrity.

The High Council of Justice as an Instrument of Clan Influence on Ordinary Judges

For years, the main support of the influential group of judges within the judicial system has been Georgia’s High Council of Justice with its constitutionally established powers. The Council makes decisions on all key issues important to the judiciary. Therefore, the civil sector has been long speaking about the need for a radical change in the judicial reform strategy and a deep reform of the High Council of Justice, aiming [42] to establish consensus-based governance in the judicial system and create firm barriers to the concentration of power.

As previously mentioned, the recommendation for a deep reform of the Council is included in the European Union’s decision of December 15, 2023, and related documents prepared by the European Commission as a precondition for candidate status. 

The resistance from the country’s political leadership and the judicial clan is evident in this matter as well.

It is vital to the clan that the High Council of Justice be manned by people under its control. This was also the case in the recent renewal of the Council’s composition. In addition to the campaign against the institution of vetting, which was mentioned above, another key issue on the agenda of the Conference of Judges held on March 24, 2024, was the election of members and the secretary of the High Council of Justice.

As in previous years, the election of Council members was held [42] in a non-competitive environment. The candidates did not present their views on the situation in the judiciary or the challenges it faces. Clan members continued to be appointed to managerial positions. Of the 292 judges participating in the vote, 279 voted for Levan Tevzadze, 281 voted for Vasil Mshvenieradze, and 284 for Nikoloz Marsagishvili. Marsagishvili was re-elected as secretary of the Council, despite a marked deterioration in transparency under his previous tenure. It is worth noting that all three of them have been Council members at various times and, simultaneously, have held [43] significant managerial positions in the judicial system for years.

As for Levan Tevzadze, in addition to being one of the most aggressive clan members, he is the brother-in-law [44] of the US-sanctioned judge Irakli Shengelia. He deems any reference to his conflict of interest as “persecution.” Similar family ties are seen within the political team of the Georgian Dream. Aluda Gudushauri, a member of parliament, is the husband of Irakli Shengelia’s niece.

It is not enough for the clan to control only judge members of the High Council of Justice. It is equally necessary for it to control non-judge members of the Council. This is ensured by the political leadership and parliament of the country. On May 17, 2023, the Parliament elected [45] three non-judge members to the High Council of Justice: Tristan Benashvili, Giorgi Gzobava, and Zurab Guraspashvili. From June 2021, the Council had been operating without five non-judge members.

The interviews with Tristan Benashvili, Giorgi Gzobava, and Zurab Guraspashvili showed that they do not see key challenges within the system. Moreover, an examination of their biographies revealed their connections to US-sanctioned judges Mikheil Chinchaladze, Levan Murusidze, and Irakli Shengelia. Consequently, their election to the Council further strengthens the clan’s positions.

It is noteworthy that unlike in previous years, when the government and the clan would agree to have one or two members of the Council independent from their influence for the sake of formality, such as, for example, Ana Dolidze and Nazi Janezashvili, this time the clan did not even allow a single member who would be beyond its influence. When the President of Georgia, who has the authority to appoint one Council member unilaterally, appointed Kakhaber Tsikarishvili, a well-known legal expert and a harsh critic of the clan, the clan-controlled court suspended [46] the President’s decree regarding Tsikarishvili’s appointment, in gross violation of the Constitution, the Organic Law on General Courts, and administrative procedural legislation.

Obvious Examples of Politically Motivated Criminal Cases

The primary purpose of the corrupt connection between any authoritarian political power and a clan-based judiciary is to ensure the desired outcome in politically motivated cases. It is always vital for such a government to take revenge on political opponents and competitors, with the compliant judicial system facilitating this.

During the reporting period, Georgian courts heard and issued convictions in numerous politically motivated cases [47], making the connection between the country’s political leadership and the clan leaders at the helm of the justice system even more evident.

The Clan-Based Judiciary as a Punitive Tool in the Government’s Hands Against Peaceful Protesters Opposing the “Russian Law”

The nature of the Murusidze-Chinchaladze clan judicial system was also clearly demonstrated in the judgments handed down against participants in peaceful protests opposing the “Russian law” in April and May 2024.

Between April 15 and May 15, a unified hotline of non-governmental organizations received notifications about the detention of 189 people on the basis of Articles 166 (petty hooliganism) and 173 (disobedience to a lawful order of a law-enforcement officer) of the Administrative Offences Code. Additionally, around 30 peaceful demonstrators reported [48] fines issued under Article 125 of the Code (organized blocking of a road or participation in group movements with vehicles in a city or other settlement).

Most detainees reported physical and verbal abuse by law enforcement officers at the time of detention. It is noteworthy that, in most cases, the use of force by the police was retaliatory and not related to the prevention of unlawful resistance or other offenses. In several instances, the representatives of law enforcement used such excessive methods of force that several detainees required medical treatment and emergency surgeries due to the severity of their injuries.

Although an investigation into these crimes committed by law enforcement officers was initiated by the Special Investigation Service, no one has been held accountable by the agency or the prosecutor’s office even 5-6 months after these events. The investigation remains merely formal.

As for the courts, they also played the role of obedient enforcer for the authorities and imposed substantial fines on unlawfully detained and brutally beaten protesters, with few exceptions, which was followed by the freezing [49] of accounts to enforce the collection of these fines.

Harassment of Critical Media by the Communications Commission and the Role of the Judiciary in This Issue

During the 2024 pre-election period, the Communications Commission, on various grounds, repeatedly declared broadcasters critical of the government - Mtavari Arkhi, Formula, and Pirveli - to be in violation of regulations. Reasons for the repressive decisions by the Commission were: promotion of the country’s European integration through advertising videos; coverage of protests against the “Russian law;” refusal to broadcast pre-election advertisements of the Georgian Dream, which presented NGOs, including representatives of observer organizations, in an unethical, dishonest, and misleading context; and refusal to air another Georgian Dream advertisement that speculated on the tragedy of the Ukrainian people and used Russia’s destruction of Ukrainian cities for electoral purposes.

In this matter, the judiciary not only failed to exercise effective judicial control over the repressive policy of the administrative body toward free media but even encouraged [50] this policy through its decisions by imposing heavy fines on these broadcasters.

The Constitutional Court of Georgia in Service of the Georgian Dream Government

The political leadership’s influence is not limited to the common courts. In recent years, the readiness of the Constitutional Court’s majority to fulfill any government request has become apparent. This trend was set [51] in previous reporting periods when judges loyal to the government were appointed to the Constitutional Court.

Although there are three judges in the Constitutional Court who typically have dissenting opinions on important cases, unfortunately, they cannot influence decisions of the Constitutional Court due to their small number.

Two decisions serve as clear examples of the Constitutional Court’s favorable rulings for the government during the reporting period. The first was made in September 2023, when the Court supported [52] Georgian Dream’s demand by allowing the impeachment process against the President of Georgia to proceed. The second is a recent decision in which the Court refused [53] to suspend the “Russian law.” Civil society has sharply criticized [54] this decision.

Conclusion

Georgia’s justice system is in dire straits. It has been captured by a deeply corrupt clan that fulfils any desire of the political leadership. The only way to improve the system is to introduce an integrity checking mechanism and fully implement the European Union’s other requirements.

Parliamentary Oversight in 2020-2024

Over the past four years, the Parliament of Georgia has worsened openness, accountability, and parliamentary oversight not only in practice but also through legislative changes. Although the new parliament started its work under an improved legislative framework, the 2019 Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, the weakness of its oversight function remains one of its main challenges.

Strengthening parliamentary oversight is one of the nine conditions set [55] by the European Commission for granting Georgia candidate status.

The main cause of the weakness in parliamentary oversight should be sought in the undemocratic processes that have taken place in the legislature over the past four years. The parliament of the tenth convocation turned into a closed institution, characterized by the disregard for the role of opposition and society in the process of parliamentary activity; physical and verbal confrontations; performing the essential functions of parliament, including parliamentary oversight, only formally, serving narrow partisan interests; and a fight against civil society, which ultimately culminated in the adoption of a so-called “Russian law.”

The following major challenges have emerged in the area of parliamentary oversight:

Significant Area Left Outside Parliamentary Control – Security

Although new Rules of Procedure came into effect in 2019, which significantly improved the legislation, the changes had the least impact on parliamentary control over the security sector. This area has actually remained outside of oversight. Strengthening parliamentary oversight, especially over security services, is one of the nine conditions set by the European Commission for granting Georgia candidate status. In its plan to strengthen parliamentary control over the security sector, the Georgian government merely included the appointment of members to the parliamentary trust group, which was insufficient [56] to meet the European Commission’s requirements. However, parliament completed its term without even managing to form this trust group.

Ignoring the Role of the Opposition in the Parliamentary Oversight Process

A strong parliamentary opposition is a significant component of a functioning democracy and is essential for the full exercise of parliamentary control.

In the parliament of tenth convocation, the role of the opposition in the oversight process was not only not strengthened but significantly weakened - the legislation does not provide additional guarantees for the participation of the opposition, and the executive branch ignores parliamentary control if it is initiated by the opposition.

The following issues are notable in this regard:

• All parliamentary committee chairs are members of the majority. This issue received special attention in the April 19 agreement document [57] between political parties (the so-called Charles Michel Agreement), which included five key areas, one of which addressed power-sharing within parliament. However, as with many EU recommendations, this was also left unfulfilled;
• The parliament restricted the role of the opposition through its Rules of Procedure too. In 2023, the majority voted in favor of legislative amendments [58] allowing committee chairs to set speaking times for participants in committee sessions. This change poses a risk for the opposition, as its selective application may severely restrict [59] the expression of critical opinions;
• Members of the executive branch do not respond to questions from opposition MPs, thereby preventing them from using the constitutional mechanism of parliamentary oversight. For example, according to the data for 2023, 791 of the unanswered questions were from the opposition, while only five were from the majority. The same trend was observed in 2022, with 939 unanswered questions from the opposition and 58 from the majority;
• According to the Rules of Procedure of the Parliament, opposition factions have the right to summon accountable individuals to committee sessions. However, this parliamentary control mechanism does not function effectively, as government members do not attend committee sessions if summoned by the opposition. For instance, in 2021, opposition factions summoned accountable individuals to committee sessions twelve times, but not a single hearing took place. Due to the ineffectiveness of this oversight mechanism, neither the opposition nor the majority used the right to summon in 2022. In 2023, opposition factions summoned ministers five times, but in one case, the Minister of Internal Affairs did not turn up for the session.

Deterioration of Transparency in Parliamentary Oversight

• The tenth convocation of parliament became a closed institution [60] for the public and media representatives. Media and civil society representatives were unjustifiably restricted from entering the parliament building; during discussions on critically important issues, a security regime was declared, barring entry into the parliament building; the accreditation rules for the media were tightened; and parliament no longer provided timely and complete public information. All of this had a negative impact on the transparency of the parliamentary oversight process and public engagement.
• In 2023, parliament voted in favor of changes [58] to the Rules of Procedure, removing the requirement to discuss important reports in plenary sessions (e.g., reports from the Anti-Corruption Bureau, the Special Investigation Service, on personal data protection, and on public information). Reports are now only discussed in plenary sessions if requested by a relevant committee, bureau, or faction. These changes have significantly worsen [59]ed parliamentary control and transparency. The purpose of discussing reports in plenary sessions was not only to satisfy MPs’ interests but to inform the public about the activities of important state services and parliamentary oversight over them.

Obstruction of the Parliamentary Oversight Process by the Majority

Parliamentary control frequently did not address important issues for the country, including corruption. The majority used parliamentary control mechanisms mainly for narrow partisan purposes. A clear example is the opposition’s attempt to establish a temporary investigative commission on corruption schemes within the judiciary. In 2023, a draft resolution on the establishment of a temporary investigative commission to investigate corruption and other illegal activities in the judiciary was not put to a vote because the majority MPs did not get registered before the session. As stated [61] by members of the majority, this was an “act of solidarity” with sanctioned judges. Through this action, members of the majority prevented opposition MPs from using the constitutional mechanism of parliamentary control.

The Formal Nature of Parliamentary Oversight in Times of Crisis for the Country

During the pandemic and the ensuing crisis, parliament actually refused to perform its function and left the power to restrict fundamental human rights entirely to the government. Parliament did not conduct effective monitoring of the activities of the executive branch.

During the state of emergency, parliamentary committees did not hold any sessions related to overseeing the government’s activities during this period; the committees did not exercise their authority to review, based on their areas of responsibility, the compliance of normative acts issued during the state of emergency with Georgian legislation and to monitor their implementation.

Georgia’s Media Environment In 2020-2024

Year by year, Georgia's media environment has been systematically deteriorating. While it remains pluralistic, sharp polarization continues to be a significant challenge, especially within the context of broadcast media, as, for years now, television has been perceived by political actors as a primary tool for political struggle and narrow partisan interests. Thus, the intense confrontation among the political class directly affects the media environment [62]. The deterioration of Georgia’s media environment has also been noted in international reports. For example, according to the latest 2024 study of the international media rights organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Georgia’s media freedom index declined by 26 places, placing it 103^th among 180 countries.

Over the past four years, key challenges have included:

• Incidents of both verbal and physical attacks, threats against journalists, and interference with their professional activities, including from members of the ruling majority and law enforcement representatives.
• The use of the judiciary, law enforcement, and other structures under the influence of the ruling party, including the Communications Commission, as tools for suppressing and pressuring critical media has remained an alarming trend.
• Some laws and regulations initiated by the ruling majority that have further restricted and complicated journalistic activities are a matter of serious concern. The clear objective of these initiatives is to weaken, limit, and ultimately eliminate channels critical of the government.
• The spread of disinformation and Russian propaganda remains a challenge, with the government lacking a cohesive, effective plan to combat it. Even more, in many cases, the government appears to be a primary source of disinformation itself, using it actively to discredit its opponents and critics. This is evidenced by the removal of dozens of pages and users connected to Georgian Dream by Facebook [63] in recent years. Opposition representatives have also engaged in similar activities.
• The lack of substantive and thematic political debate on television remains a formidable obstacle. Representatives of the ruling party continue to boycott critical broadcasters and refuse to appear on their programs. On the other hand, opposition voices can hardly be heard in pro-government talk shows, thereby depriving viewers of the opportunity to hear diverse, reasoned discussions on issues that matter to them. Unfortunately, the Public Broadcaster also fails to organize proper political debates, which is its direct obligation. This is especially problematic during election periods, as this flawed practice leaves voters without the chance to make informed choices.

Attacks on Journalists and Interference with Professional Activities

In Georgia, journalistic activity becomes increasingly dangerous and life-threatening, as evidenced by the rising statistics of crimes committed against journalists year by year. As in previous years, 2020-2024 saw frequent cases of verbal and physical attacks, threats, intimidation, harassment, violence against journalists, and interference with journalistic work, as well as their arrests [64]. In 2023 alone, Transparency International Georgia recorded [65] approximately 45 such publicly known incidents.

The situation is further exacerbated by inadequate response to such crimes, protraction of investigations into violence against journalists, and lenient punishment of offenders, which only encourages such crimes and creates a hostile environment for journalistic activity. Particularly dramatic in this regard was July 2021, when during homophobic attacks by violent groups encouraged by the authorities [66] more than 50 media representatives were injured [67], and Lexo Lashkarava, an operator from TV Pirveli, died [68] a week after he was attacked. It is worth noting that the organizers of these mass attacks on journalists remain unpunished. 

Georgia is not safe for foreign journalists fleeing persecution from their own governments either. In recent years, a number of Russian, Belarusian, and Azerbaijani journalists who are critical of their countries’ ruling elites and are persecuted by them were denied entry to Georgia. Following the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, several Ukrainian journalists critical of the Kremlin were also denied entry to Georgia. One case of particular concern is that of Azerbaijani investigative journalist Afgan Sadigov [69], who was arrested in Georgia in August this year and remains in extradition detention. According to his wife, Sevinch Sadigova, the Baku government has been persecuting Afgan Sadigov for his critical stance toward the government, and in case of his extradition to Azerbaijan, he will face a death sentence. Imprisoned Sadigov has been on a hunger strike since September 21, and his health condition is very poor, according to human rights advocates. 

Legal Disputes Against Owners and Journalists of Critical Broadcasters

The past four years have been marked by legal disputes against the owners and founders of TV companies critical of the government, specifically, Mtavari Arkhi [70], Formula [71], and TV Pirveli [72]. In May 2022, the former general director of Mtavari Arkhi, Nika Gvaramia, was found guilty of abuse of power and sentenced [73] to 3.5 years in prison. He was pardoned by the President of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, in June of the same year. In January 2022, Avtandil Tsereteli, the father of TV Pirveli founder Vato Tsereteli, was also convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison [72]. However, he was not jailed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Moreover, just before the 2021 local elections, the Supreme Court sentenced former defense minister and co-owner of Formula Davit Kezerashvili to five years in prison in absentia, despite two previous acquittals in the same case. Another lawsuit against Kezerashvili was filed in the same month.

There has also been an alarming increase in defamation [74] lawsuits, so-called SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) against critical television stations and journalists, often used as an additional lever by the government to suppress critical media. Such lawsuits began in Georgia in 2021, and over the past three years, nearly 40 [75] such cases have been registered. The plaintiffs are mostly representatives of the ruling party or individuals associated with them, who demand substantial “compensation for damages,” which puts additional financial pressure on broadcasters already in financial crises [76].

Deteriorating Legislation

Over the past four years, the legal framework has also deteriorated, further restricting and hampering the activities of media. Especially alarming in this regard is the reintroduction of the so-called Russian Law by the Georgian Dream in the spring of this year, forcing independent media outlets and NGOs receiving Western funding to register as “agents of foreign influence.”

In October of last year, Parliament, bypassing public debate, adopted, in an accelerated manner, controversial amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, proposed by majority MPs, transferring [77] oversight of hate speech and obscenity from the realm of self-regulation to that of regulation. The power to review these two issues and apply corresponding sanctions was granted to the Communications Commission, which, for its part, was exposed for political bias.

Early last year, the Georgian Parliament introduced a new accreditation rule that made the legislative body even more difficult to access and more non-transparent for critical media. In addition, the accreditation rule has become a kind of punitive mechanism based on which access to parliament was suspended [78] for several representatives of critical media. The new rule has further worsened the already deteriorated practice [79] of access to information and, accordingly, the quality of public awareness.

Amendments [62] to the Law on Broadcasting enacted in March 2022, banning advertising for gambling, also had a detrimental impact on the already difficult financial situation of critical broadcasters. These amendments caught broadcasters unprepared and resulted in a 7.6% drop in total commercial advertising revenue for television and radio broadcasters in 2022.

The Role of the Communications Commission

The Communications Commission played a particularly negative role over the past four years in its treatment of critical media. Although being legally independent of all branches of government, the activity of the Commission has been repeatedly questioned for its decisions that favor the government and a number of controversial initiatives aimed at limiting critical opinions in the country. During this period, the Commission issued several controversial decisions and repeatedly imposed significant fines on critical broadcasters based on complaints from the ruling party.

The Commission became particularly active during the current pre-election period and, based on complaints from the ruling Georgian Dream party, drew up a number of controversial offense reports against critical television stations for their refusal to air unethical election advertising, on the basis of which the court imposed fines [80] on the TV channels. The “Mediaombudsman” also negatively assessed the activities of the Communications Commission in its interim report [81] published on October 5, emphasizing that the commission, along with the courts, became “complicit in punishing critical media outlets once again during the election period.” While the Commission has also issued several offense reports against pro-government broadcasters, this does not offset the irreparable harm that the Commission’s decisions already caused to critical television stations and the pre-election environment in general. 

Pro-Government Media

In the context of polarization, the role of pro-government media, whose editorial policy is fully oriented towards open and unconditional support [82] of the government and dissemination of propaganda aimed at discrediting critics of the authorities, is worth mentioning separately. Among these, Imedi Holding, which comprises Imedi TV, Maestro, and GDS, and has the most significant financial resources, stands out. Imedi TV currently leads television ratings. One of its owners, Irakli Rukhadze, a businessman with close ties to the Georgian Dream, even stated [83] during the pre-election campaign that his mission, and that of his television station, is to ensure that the United National Movement and “its affiliates never return to power in the country.”

Another pro-government station, POSTV, also plays an active role in disseminating government propaganda and discrediting government critics. Fifty-two percent of the company is owned by Victor Japaridze, a parliament member from the ruling party. Alongside Imedi and POSTV, Rustavi 2 also toes the government line; its owner, Kibar Khalvashi, is another businessman closely linked with Georgian Dream.

Public Broadcaster

In the context of political and media polarization, the role and importance of the public broadcaster become even more significant in providing balanced and impartial coverage. Unfortunately, the Georgian Public Broadcaster has so far failed to establish itself as a media outlet with the public’s trust. For years, questions have been raised about its pro-government bias. The skepticism is compounded by the fact that its management is composed of individuals affiliated with the government. The current chairperson of the Public Broadcaster’s Board of Trustees is Vasil Maghlaperidze, who is closely linked to Bidzina Ivanishvili, the honorary chairman of Georgian Dream. Maghlaperidze previously served as the director of the broadcaster from 2017 to 2020, and after resigning from this post, he served [84] as the deputy chairperson of Georgian Dream in 2021. At the opening of the new building of the Public Broadcaster on October 16, Maghlaperidze thanked [85] Ivanishvili personally.

After Maghlaperidze’s resignation, Tinatin Berdzenishvili, a long-time top manager and a prominent figure on Maghlaperidze’s team, was appointed as the new director. Upon her appointment, she promised to continue Maghlaperidze’s policies at the broadcaster. It is noteworthy that in 2022, former employees accused [86] the broadcaster’s management of attempted censorship. Transparency International Georgia is representing them in court. Last year, the Public Broadcaster canceled several programs hosted by figures who were harshly critical of the so-called “Russian Law,” including the programs “Gorgiladze’s Unbearable Lightness [87]” and “Men [88].” The hosts of the program, “Acoustic,” also protested against the reintroduction of the law and were subsequently fired [89] in July of this year.