Executive

Summary

The executive is the strongest branch of authority in Georgia both in law and in practice and its capacity has improved considerably as a result of reforms and a general increase in government revenues since 2004. However, the executive’s accountability is not ensured adequately in practice due to the weakness of other bodies such as Parliament and the judiciary. Georgia has extensive integrity rules for executive officials but lacks established and functioning mechanisms for their implementation. The executive branch has had some significant achievements in improving the public sector and reducing corruption though important challenges remain in both areas.

The table below presents the indicator scores summarising the Executive’s capacity, internal governance and role within the Georgian integrity system. The remainder of this chapter presents a qualitative assessment for each indicator.

Structure and Organisation

The executive branch of authority in Georgia consists of the president and the cabinet.[1] The cabinet is made up of the prime minister and 16 ministers who are in charge of respective ministries,[2] as well as three ministers of state who are not in charge of a ministry but are responsible for coordination of government policies in specific areas.[3]

Prior to 2004, the president was both the head of state and the head of executive branch under the Constitution. Following the February 2004 constitutional amendments, the position of prime minister was created and the president only retained the title of the head of state.[4] However, as the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission noted, while the 2004 amendments aimed at replacing Georgia’s presidential system of government with a semi-presidential one, the intention was not fully realised and the president retained strong powers.[5] The prime minister is selected by the president and appointed with parliamentary approval. The president also submits a list of cabinet members (selected by the prime minister) for parliamentary vote.[6] The president essentially remains the head of the executive branch: he/she can dismiss the prime minister or the entire cabinet, while also being able to dismiss some of the ministers (the ministers of defence, internal affairs and justice) directly. The prime minister requires presidential approval to appoint cabinet members,[7] while the president can call and lead cabinet meetings[8] and also has the power of suspending or cancelling the cabinet’s decisions.[9]

Assessment

Resources (Practice)

Score: 75

To what extent does the executive have adequate resources to effectively carry out its duties?

The funding allocated to the agencies of Georgia’s executive branch has increased dramatically over the last few years, enabling these agencies to perform their most important functions adequately. However, frequent changes in ministry staff make service in executive bodies less attractive to qualified professionals.

Major improvements in tax collection that occurred after the current leadership’s accession to power in 2004 resulted in a rapid increase in state revenues, which grew from GEL 2.5 billion (USD 1.5 billion)[10] in 2004 to GEL 7.6 billion (USD 4.5 billion) in 2008. The recent economic slowdown caused by the global financial crisis and the 2008 Georgian-Russian war led to a decline in state revenues, although they are still amounted to GEL 6.9 billion (USD 4.1 billion) in 2010.[11] The resources allocated to various state agencies, including most of the bodies that make up the executive branch, have thus increased significantly in recent years. For example:[12]

According to an advisor to the prime minister, along with the general increase in the budget allocations, an overall staff reduction and optimization has made it possible for the ministries to offer higher salaries to their employees and to attract qualified professionals.[13] Another government advisor told TI Georgia that the current level of funding makes it possible for the executive branch to compete with the private sector on the labour market.[14] Both interviewees noted that the executive branch presently has sufficient resources to perform its functions effectively.

Ghia Nodia, head of a leading Georgian think tank – the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, told TI Georgia that, while ministries still face some problems in terms of resources, the improvements in funding have enabled them to perform their primary functions adequately. However, according to Nodia, since changes in a ministry’s political leadership often result in the dismissal of civil servants employed there, the public generally views ministry jobs as an unstable type of employment, which could discourage some highly-qualified potential candidates from applying.[15]

Independence (law)

Score: 100

To what extent is the executive independent by law?

Georgia’slegal framework does not contain any provisions that would unduly restrict the executive’s activities and allow for excessive intervention by other branches of government in its operation. On the contrary, as noted in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index report on Georgia, the executive enjoys “almost unrivalled power” under the country’s current constitutional system.[16]

Independence (practice)

Score: 100

To what extent is the executive independent in practice?

In practice, as well as in the law, the Executive is the strongest branch of authority in Georgia. There have been no cases of undue interference by other actors (such as the Legislature or the military) in its activities.[17]

Transparency (law)

Score: 50

To what extent are there regulations in place to ensure transparency in relevant activities of the executive?

There are robust legal mechanisms in place for ensuring the transparency of the government budget and the assets of executive officials. However, the transparency provisions concerning some aspects of the executive’s operation, such as cabinet meetings, are inadequate.

While the law allows the cabinet to invite the media to a session meeting or hold an «open meeting» which members of the general public may attend,[18] there are no specific mechanisms in place to ensure that the content of cabinet sessions and discussions is accessible to the public.

The law does not require the cabinet to produce minutes of its meetings. Instead, according to the Government Regulations, the prime minister can choose to order the government to produce the minutes or an audio recording of a meeting.[19] There is no provision in the law requiring the government to publicize the minutes when they are produced. There is no legal provision requiring that the executive’s activities be recorded in a single information system, although all of the government’s and the president’s decisions that qualify as normative acts must be entered into the official registry of normative acts.[20]

On the positive side, under the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service, executive branch officials are required to submit asset declarations to the Civil Service Bureau within two months from accession to office. Officials must submit such declarations annually and also within a month from leaving the office. Any interested person/organisation can request and obtain a copy of an official’s asset declaration from the Civil Service Bureau. Officials who fail to submit asset declarations will face fines and even criminal charges.[21] One significant shortcoming of the legal provisions governing asset declarations is that they do not establish a verification mechanism.

The Budget Code highlights transparency as one of the core principles of Georgia’s budget system, stating that all budgets and the reports on their implementation must be made public.[22] The Code requires that the draft State Budget and the attached materials be made available to the public immediately after their submission to parliament.[23] The annual State Budget is a law and must therefore be published in the same manner as any other piece of legislation passed by parliament. In addition, the Parliamentary Rules of Procedure specifically require that the State Budget, once approved by the legislature, be made available to the public.[24]

Transparency (practice)

Score: 50

To what extent is there transparency in relevant activities of the executive in practice?

The executive branch proactively provides some types of information for public scrutiny. For example, cabinet decrees and decisions, the government budget and the asset declarations of executive officials can be accessed online. However, both the president’s website and the websites of government ministries are inadequate in terms of the information provided. During the NIS field tests, the selected ministries only fully answered half of the submitted requests for public information, and four of the total 12 requests received no response or a refusal to answer.

Some important types of information about the executive are available for public scrutiny online. The cabinet website[25] contains a database of government decisions and decrees adopted over the last five years.[26] Agendas and summaries of cabinet meetings are also available.[27] Detailed information about the cabinet’s budget can be obtained from the Ministry of Finance website.[28] Executive branch officials submit their asset declarations to the Civil Service Bureau and they are accessible via a special website.[29] However, it has been suggested that the declarations often contain inaccurate information and misleading information about the origin and actual amounts of the assets.[30] There is no mechanism to verify the asset declarations and no routine checks are carried out by a designated agency.

The president’s website[31] only provides general information about the presidential administration along with press releases regarding the president’s activities. Most importantly, presidential decrees and other decisions are not posted to the website.

In 2009, the Tbilisi-based NGO Institute for Development of Freedom of Information conducted an audit of all government ministry websites. The website of the Ministry of Finance was awarded the highest score of all ministry websites in the survey, but was only assessed as 41 percent transparent. All other ministries scored below 25 percent. The analysis concluded that Georgian ministries presently do not view their websites as an important tool for disseminating information and communicating with the public. The assessment (which was based on extensive criteria, including comprehensiveness, topicality and accessibility) found that the websites carried insufficient information about the general structure of the ministries and the roles of their units, the databases kept by the ministries, the activities of the ministries, the laws and other legal acts governing the operation of the ministries, the procedures for individuals and organisations to submit requests or appeals to the ministries, the activities of the ministries in the field of public procurement, and the staffing and financial policies.[32]

During NIS field tests conducted by TI Georgia, requests for public information were sent to three government ministries: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defence. Four requests (two standard and two difficult ones) were sent to each of these ministries. Overall, out of the 12 requests sent to the executive branch, full information was only provided in six cases. An incomplete answer was given in one case and another request was incorrectly transferred. The ministries refused to provide information in two cases (one justified, one unjustified), while mute refusal occurred in another two cases. Thus, while the executive branch agencies do not proactively release information through their websites, they are not particularly responsive to citizen queries either.

Out of five separate Freedom of Information (FOI) requests sent as part of the NIS field tests requesting the size of bonuses given to the minister and deputy minister of five different ministries, not a single request was adequately answered. The Ministry of Finance cited the right to privacy as justification for not providing the information, the Ministry of Justice responded with a citation of the law defining public servant salaries but did not provide information on bonuses, and the Ministry of Defence did not respond at all.

Accountability (law)

Score: 75

To what extent are there provisions in place to ensure that members of the executive have to report and be answerable for their actions?

The Constitution and a number of other laws contain adequate provisions concerning the accountability of the executive. However parliament’s ability to hold the executive branch accountable is undermined by the president’s power to dissolve the legislature. There is also no legal requirement for the executive to consult with the public in its activities.

The Constitution requires cabinet members to respond to questions submitted by MPs and to appear before parliament if summoned.[33] The Parliamentary Rules of Procedure provide MPs and different parliamentary bodies with considerable powers in terms of executive oversight. A more detailed discussion of parliament’s oversight powers vis-a-vis the executive is provided in the relevant chapter of this report.

Parliament has the constitutional power to oversee the cabinet’s budget spending and to recommend that the president suspend cabinet spending if irregularities occur.[34] The cabinet is required to report to parliament on a quarterly basis about the implementation of the State Budget and to submit the final report within three months from the end of a budget year. If parliament votes against approving the budget implementation report, the president will have to consider the possibility of dismissing the cabinet but is not required to do so.[35] The prime minister is also required to report to parliament annually on the implementation of the government programme and to present an ad-hoc report within 15 days from receiving such request from the legislature.[36] The president is also required, under the Constitution, to present annual reports about the state of affairs in the country to parliament.[37] At the same time, parliament’s legal power to hold the executive accountable is undermined, to some extent, by the fact that a conflict between the two branches over the approval of the state budget or cabinet appointments can lead to the dissolution of the legislature. The decision, in this case, is to be made by the president who, as noted before, essentially remains the head of the executive.

The president, the prime minister and other members of the government can be impeached by parliament if found guilty by the Supreme Court of violating the Constitution or committing a crime.[38]

The Chamber of Control (Georgia’s supreme audit institution) has a constitutional duty to monitor the financial activities of the executive and to report to parliament on the implementation of the State Budget by the executive twice a year.[39] The Chamber audits executive branch agencies and can send the audit results to law enforcement bodies whenever suspicions of a crime arise.[40]

Ministries are required to set up internal audit units responsible for examining the effectiveness of financial management in these institutions.[41] However, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are not required to establish these units until 2013.[42]

The Constitutional Court has the power to review compliance of the laws and by-laws issued by the executive with the Constitution.[43]

The executive is required to give reasons for its decisions. For example, the drafts of decisions that qualify as normative acts (such as presidential decrees and the by-laws adopted by the president and the cabinet) must contain explanation as to why they are being adopted. [44] The Government Regulations further require that the drafts of by-laws and other legal acts presented for adoption at cabinet sessions contain an explanation.[45] Administrative bodies of the executive are also required to provide an explanatory note in the administrative-legal acts they adopt.[46]

However, there are no legal provisions expressly requiring the executive to consult with the public during the decision-making process.

Accountability (practice)

Score: 25

To what extent is there effective oversight of executive activities in practice?

The accountability provisions included in the law (some of which are robust) are not effective in practice, primarily due to the current political situation (where the legislature is dominated entirely by the president’s party which is not sufficiently independent from the president).

The executive submits annual and quarterly reports to parliament as required by the law. However, since a large majority of seats in parliament (some 80 percent) are controlled by the president’s party (which, as the political parties chapter shows, is a highly centralized organisation acting mostly according to its leader’s will), the legislature has little incentive to hold the executive accountable.

The Chamber of Control conducts audits in the executive bodies as required by the law.[47] However, the thoroughness and the ultimate impact of these audits could be limited because of the Chamber’s lack of qualified personnel and political independence (see the chapter on the supreme audit institution for further information). A 2007 inquiry into the Ministry of Education’s activities, which resulted in the dismissal of a large number of auditors from the Chamber, is one indication that the Chamber is unlikely to gain the upper hand in any potential conflict with influential members of the executive.[48]

A uniform system of internal auditing was only introduced through the legal amendments adopted in March 2010 and these provisions are yet to be fully implemented in practice. Internal oversight and control has so far been exercised by the General Inspectorates within government ministries. , In the absence of a unified legal framework, each ministry has been free to determine the rules governing the operation of its General Inspectorate. Also, being subordinated to the relevant ministers, the Inspectorates lack the functional independence to conduct proper inspections.[49] Thus, their effectiveness is “seriously undermined” by a lack of independence, resources and harmonised procedures.[50]

Prosecution of high-level executive officials is very rare in practice. The only exception to this trend in recent years was the 2007 arrest of former Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili on corruption charges. However, given that the arrest only took place after Okruashvili’s decision to join the opposition, it is not clear whether the case qualifies as a proof that high-ranking officials are held accountable for corruption-related offences in Georgia. According to an expert interviewee, high-level executive officials who become implicated in corruption are likely to be quietly removed from their positions, although the president and the ruling party leadership may refrain from publicizing such cases or bringing formal charges against such officials.[51]

According to OECD ACN, Georgia has established a “sound system” of budget preparation, discussion, approval, implementation and reporting as all financial transactions are consolidated under a single treasury account and the Treasury is believed to exercise effective control.[52]At the same time, the Open Budget Index 2010 report identified a number of gaps in this area. Specifically, audits of the budget reports are not comprehensive and they are not scrutinized properly by the legislature either.[53]

The lack of a legal requirement for public consultation in the executive’s activities has resulted in a corresponding gap in the practice. At the same time, there have been some positive exceptions: according to an advisor to the prime minister, the recent draft amendments to the tax legislation were discussed extensively with the business community.[54]

Integrity (law)

Score: 75

To what extent are there mechanisms in place to ensure the integrity of members of the executive?

Georgia’s legal framework contains adequate rules for ensuring integrity of executive officials and a mechanism for the implementation of these rules was also established through recent legislative changes. However, restrictions on the activities of members of the executive branch after they leave public office are weak.

Integrityrules for public officials, including the members of the executive, are laid down in the Law on Public Service[55] and the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service.[56] The former establishes general rules of conduct, while the latter’s provisions are more detailed.

Public officials (including those from the executive branch) are prohibited from offering or receiving any benefits that are linked to their position. They are required to prevent and/or declare any instances of conflict of interest and to notify their respective agencies annually about any of their family members or close relatives employed in the same agencies.[57] Public officials are prohibited from accepting any gifts or services that can prevent them from exercising their official duties and must notify their immediate superiors about any such offers. Whenever a public official obtains evidence and has suspicion of a colleague’s illegal activity, he/she is required to notify a superior or the law enforcement agencies.[58]

The Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Services establishes the maximum annual value of gifts that public officials can receive at 15 percent of their annual salary. A similar restriction is in place for their family members. Officials involved in decision-making in a government body have to notify their immediate superiors or other members of the same body about any cases where a decision to be made by them concerns their personal interests. Officials cannot demand payment or gifts for the services that they are required to provide for free under the law, nor are they allowed to make commercial deals with the public agencies where they hold the office. Officials are prohibited from performing any other paid work, except for academic or creative activities. Officials and their family members cannot hold positions, work or own shares in the commercial enterprises whose activities they oversee as part of their official duties. Officials who violate the provisions listed in this paragraph face disciplinary sanctions or dismissal.[59]

The Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service contains extensive provisions to protect whistleblowers. The law expressly prohibits intimidation, pressure and discrimination against a whistleblower. A whistleblower cannot be subjected to administrative or criminal punishment or investigation over the case in question until the inquiry is completed.[60] Whistleblowers have a right to address the judiciary and request state protection if they or their families are threatened.[61] The Law on Public Service requires public officials to refrain from disclosing the identity of whistleblowers, to prevent any damage to their reputation and to protect them from problems at work.[62]

The Law on Public Service imposes certain post-employment restrictions on public officials. Specifically, for a period of three years after leaving office, they are prohibited from joining or receiving a salary from the commercial entities that they supervised as part of their official duties.[63] However, this provision is unlikely to be particularly effective in the case of high-level executive branch officials since they do not exercise direct supervision of any commercial entities. Also, there are no specific restrictions on post-ministerial employment or revolving door appointments.

Until recently, Georgia had no dedicated legal mechanism for the implementation of the integrity rules described above. However, under the Law on Internal State Audit and Inspection adopted in March 2010, government agencies are required to set up internal audit units whose responsibilities include, among other things, to detect any violations of conflict of interest rules by the members of the relevant agencies.[64]

Integrity (practice)

Score: 50

To what extent is the integrity of members of the executive ensured in practice?

While there is little information available about the implementation of the existing integrity rules in practice, there are valid reasons to believe that they are not being applied comprehensively at present.

As Global Integrity’s 2009 report rightly notes, there is no established mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the existing post-employment restrictions.[65] The same is true for most of the other integrity rules. As noted before, the law that provides for the establishment of internal audit units responsible for investigating conflict of interest cases was only adopted in March 2010 and the process of establishment of these units in the executive branch agencies is still far from complete: some key executive bodies (the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice) are not require to establish them until 2013. In the meantime, there is an effective lack of oversight since, according to an expert interviewee, neither the Chamber of Control nor the General Inspectorates focus on conflict of interest provisions when they examine the activities of government ministries.[66]

There have been no publicized cases of conflict of interest implicating high-ranking members of the executive recently, although it is difficult to say whether this is the result of a lack of infringements or a lack of monitoring. It is also difficult to assess the effectiveness of the existing whistleblower protection rules in practice since there have been no publicised whistle-blowing cases to date.

Revolving-door appointments are a matter of concern insofar as the law does not expressly prohibit them. Several high-ranking officials (including two former prime ministers) joined commercial entities shortly after leaving the executive branch.

Role: Public Sector Management (Law and Practice)

Score: 50

To what extent is the executive committed to and engaged in developing a well-governed public sector?

The executive branch has achieved some significant improvements in the public sector by increasing its overall funding and reducing low-level corruption. However, the development of an independent and effective public sector has been obstructed by excessive executive interference and the lack of comprehensive reform.

Georgia has a number of legal provisions regarding the executive’s management of the public sector. While it is primarily parliament’s responsibility to determine state policy in the public service field, the law provides for the executive’s participation both in the formulation of the policy and its implementation via the Civil Service Bureau, a body that reports to the president and is responsible for analyzing the state of affairs in the public sector and coordinating the management of human resources in public agencies.[67]

In practice, there have been some important positive changes in the public sector under the current government. Namely, the overall funding of the sector has increased and administrative corruption has been reduced.[68] However, no comprehensive reform of the sector has been implemented. As OECD ACN has noted, “while some elements of the civil service are transformed continuously, the civil service reform still lacks a clear overall approach and a coherent strategy.”[69]According to an expert interviewee with considerable experience of working with Georgia’s public sector, there is presently no political will to implement such a reform or to establish a professional public service, as the executive’s leadership believes that it requires great flexibility in managing different public agencies during this transitional period and fears the prospect of being bound by rigid rules.[70] According to another expert, another factor behind the government’s attitude is a widespread belief inside the executive leadership is that public service should generally aim to emulate the private sector and it should not be overly difficult for managers in the public service to dismiss underperforming employees.[71]

According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index report on Georgia, the government’s excessive reliance on the punitive component of the anti-corruption policy has often resulted in “somewhat arbitrary executive interference” in the day-to-day operation of the public service, preventing the emergence of institutional routine.[72] This observation was reiterated by an expert interviewee, who told TI Georgia that the executive is sometimes overly active in dealing with the civil service and ministers frequently engage in micromanagement.[73]

Also, considering persistent transparency-related problems in parts of the public sector (discussed in greater detail in the relevant chapter of this report), it appears that the executive branch does not provide the public sector with proper incentives to ensure its transparent operation.

Role: Legal System (Law and Practice)

Score: 75

To what extent does the executive prioritize public accountability and the fight against corruption as a concern in the country?

Georgia’s current executive leadership made the fight against corruption a top priority after 2004. Lower-level corruption was curbed dramatically and a number of legal reforms were implemented. At the same time, the potential for high-level abuse of power and the government’s lack of success in extending anti-corruption policies beyond the law enforcement efforts could undermine further progress in this area.

The Georgian government devoted considerable attention to the fight against corruption after the current president’s and ruling party’s accession to power in 2004. It initially showed a very “strong will” to fight corruption and officials frequently included the subject in their public speeches.[74] As a result, Georgia has seen a major decline in lower-level corruption: according to the 2009 edition of the Global Corruption Barometer, only two percent of the people interviewed in Georgia had paid a bribe in the preceding 12 months.[75] The government’s current programme highlights the need for consolidating the progress achieved in this field.[76]

The executive branch, together with the legislature, has implemented a number of important legal changes aimed at reducing corruption risks and reinforcing public accountability. The legal reforms include the introduction of integrity rules for public servants and officials, provisions on whistleblower protection, a reform of the public procurement system and the supreme audit institution, as well as establishment of internal auditing in public agencies. The details of these reforms and the extent of their impact in practice are discussed in the relevant sections of this report.

Along with important achievements, there are some significant gaps in the government’s anti-corruption policies. Many of the important legal provisions described above have not yet been fully applied in practice due to the lack of proper implementation mechanisms. While corruption has been reduced or even eradicated at the lower levels of public administration, it has been suggested that high-level corruption could still be a problem.[77] It is difficult to verify or substantiate these claims but, as the Bertelsmann Transformation Index report rightly emphasises, “at least the opportunities for cronyism and insider deals have grown considerably in recent time due to the concentration of power among a small and interwoven circle of individuals”.[78] The executive branch’s excessive influence over the legislature and the judiciary (discussed in the relevant chapters of this report) has undermined accountability by weakening the system of checks and balances.

The government has also mostly failed to involve the larger public in its anti-corruption efforts. As OECD ACN notes, the government’s communication with the public on anti-corruption issues has mostly been limited to news conferences held by prosecutors, while other officials working in this field (such as the members of the Anti-Corruption Coordination Council) hardly make any public appearances to inform citizens about their activities.[79]

Footnotes

[1] The official term used in the Georgian Constitution is “government”. However, in order to make a distinction between the government in general and the executive branch, it will be referred to as “cabinet” throughout this chapter.

[2] The Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Economy and Sustained Development, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Culture and Protection of Historic Monuments, the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Protection, the Ministry of Prisons, Probation and Legal Assistance.

[3] The Minister of State for Integration with European and Euro-Atlantic Structures, the Minister of State for Reintegration and the Minister of State for Diaspora Affairs.

[4] The Constitution of Georgia, adopted on 24 August 1995, Article 69.

[5] European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution of Georgia, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 58^th Plenary Session, Venice, 12-13 March, 2.

[6] The Constitution of Georgia, Article 80.

[7] Id., Article 73.

[8] Id., Article 78.

[9] Id., Article 73.

[10] Conversion rate as of 26 July 2011 throughout the report. Source: www.oanda.com

[11] The website of the Georgian Ministry of Finance, Budget Revenues in 2005-2010, http://www.mof.ge/budget (accessed on 9 August 2010).

[12] The budget figures for 2004 are taken from the Ministry of Finance website: http://www.mof.ge/budget/by_year/2004/ (accessed on 9 August 2010); The budget data for 2010 is taken from: The Law on Georgian State Budget for 2010 (Shortened Version), http://www.mof.ge/4069 (accessed on 9 August 2010).

[13] Interview of Tamar Kovziridze, advisor to the prime minister of Georgia, with the author, Tbilisi, 29 June 2010.

[14] Interview of Vakhtang Lezhava, advisor to the prime minister of Georgia, with the author, Tbilisi, 12 July 2010.

[15] Interview of Ghia Nodia, head of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, with the author, Tbilisi, 18 August 2010.

[16] Berteslmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Georgia Country Report (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 8.

[17] Interview of Gia Nodia with the author.

[18] The Government Regulations, Articles 20, 23.

[19] Id., Article 23.

[20] The Law on Normative Acts, Article 29.

[21] The Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service, adopted on 17 October 1997, Articles 14-20.

[22] The Budget Code of Georgia, adopted on 18 December 2009, Article 4.

[23] Id., Article 38.

[24] The Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, adopted on 17 February 2004, Article 182.

[25] http://www.government.gov.ge

[26] http://www.government.gov.ge/old/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=49 (accessed on 5 August 2010).

[27] http://www.government.gov.ge/old/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=44 (accessed on 5 August 2010).

[28] http://www.mof.ge/budget (accessed on 5 August 2010).

[29] http://www.declaration.ge/csb/main.seam. (accessed on 5 August 2010).

[30] Global Integrity, Global Integrity Scorecard: Georgia 2009 (Global Integrity, 2010), 72, 76.

[31] http://www.president.gov.ge

[32] Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, Monthly Bulletin No 1, July-September 2009, 23-37.

[33] The Constitution of Georgia, Article 59.

[34] Id., Article 93.

[35] The Parliamentary Rules of Procedure, Articles 233-234.

[36] Id., Article 196.

[37] The Constitution of Georgia, Article 73.

[38] Id., Articles 63-64.

[39] Id., Article 97.

[40] The Law on Chamber of Control of Georgia, 26 December 2008, Article 24.

[41] The Law on Internal State Audit and Inspection (adopted on 26 March 2010), Articles 6-8.

[42] Id., Article 32.

[43] The Constitution of Georgia, Article 89.

[44] The Law on Normative Acts, adopted on 22 October 2009, Article 17.

[45] The Government Regulations, Article 37.

[46] The General Administrative Code of Georgia, adopted on 25 June 1999, Article 53.

[47] The list of the audits conducted by the Chamber in 2009 is available on the Chamber’s website: http://www.control.ge/files/upload-file/pdf/auditis-chamonatvali.pdf (accessed on 6 August 2010).

[48] See the Supreme Audit Institution chapter of this report for a more detailed discussion of the Chamber of Control’s capacity-related problems.

[49] OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Second Round of Monitoring, Georgia Monitoring Report, (Paris: OECD ACN, 2010), 35.

[50] Id.

[51] Interview of Ghia Nodia with the author.

[52] OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Second Round of Monitoring, Georgia Monitoring Report, 34.

[53] International Budget Partnership, Open Budget Index 2010 Georgia, http://internationalbudget.org/files/OBI2010-Georgia.pdf (accessed on 22 March 2010).

[54] Interview of Tamar Kovziridze with the author.

[55] Adopted on 31 October 1997.

[56] Adopted on 17 October 1997.

[57] The Georgian Law on Public Service, adopted on 31 October 1997, Article 73 (4).

[58] Id., Article 73 (5).

[59] The Georgian Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service, adopted on 17 October 1997, Articles 5, 9-11, 13, 20.

[60] The Georgian Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption in Public Service, Article 20 (4).

[61] Id., Article 20 (6).

[62] The Georgian Law on Public Service, Article 73(5).

[63] Id., Article 65.

[64] The Law on Internal State Audit and Inspection, Article 6.

[65] Global Integrity, Global Integrity Scorecard: Georgia 2009, 74.

[66] Interview of Ghia Nodia with the author.

[67] The Law on Public Service, Article 130.

[68] Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2009, (Transparency International, 2009), 29, 32.

[69] OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Second Round of Monitoring, Georgia Monitoring Report, 4.

[70] Interview of Larry Held, former Chief of Party at AED for the USAID-funded project, Public Administration Reform, with the author, Tbilisi, 30 June 2010.

[71] Interview of Ghia Nodia with the author.

[72] Berteslmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Georgia Country Report (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009), 26.

[73] Interview of Larry Held with the author.

[74] OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Second Round of Monitoring, 10.

[75] Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2009, 29, 32.

[76] Georgian Parliament’s Resolution on Declaring Confidence in Government Members and Government Programme, 2 July 2010, http://www.government.gov.ge/old/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=68 (accessed on 4 August 2010).

[77] OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Second Round of Monitoring, Georgia Monitoring Report,10; Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2010, Georgia, (Freedom House, 2010), 228-229.

[78] Berteslmann Stiftung, BTI 2010 – Georgia Country Report, 26.

[79] OECD Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Second Round of Monitoring, Georgia Monitoring Report, 11.